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ABSTRACT 
Why do some individuals show more support for international aid than others? And are people 
in donor countries less supportive of the idea of aid than those in recipient countries? These are 
the primary questions motivating this thesis, and the results can be summarized by four main 
findings. One is that the level of economic development, which determines a country’s status 
as a potential aid donor, has a strong influence on support for aid, as citizens of more 
developed countries are considerably less in favor of increasing aid than others are. The second 
finding is that, among donor countries, the level of development is positively related to several 
forms of opposition to the donation of aid. This appears partly due to the fact that more 
developed countries have donated more aid, for a longer period. Respondents in countries that 
donate more are more likely to find current levels of international aid sufficient, and this may 
explain part of the between-country differences. In other words, people in donor countries may 
find the extent of international aid satisfactory at lower levels than those in other countries. 
Most notably, however, people in more developed countries are more likely to state disinterest 
as a reason for not supporting aid, and this reason is the only one that has a clear impact on 
aggregate levels of support. There is also some evidence that greater donations increase 
skepticism regarding the impact of aid, but it is not clear that this affects aggregate support. 
Furthermore, the third finding is that individual beliefs regarding the impact of aid are 
endogenous to support for aid. While such beliefs appear to influence the support for aid at the 
individual level, there is also a significant effect of support on the beliefs themselves. The 
fourth finding is that the negative relationship between economic development and support 
holds for all but the very least developed countries of the world. It appears that respondents in 
the latter countries are living under such conditions they lack the critical opinions typically 
found in more developed countries, making it hard to compare them to those from more 
developed countries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world of considerable economic inequality, and while inequalities within nations 
are notable, international inequalities are even more pronounced. Differences between 
countries’ mean incomes explain between 75 and 88 percent of the world’s overall income 
inequality, and “[a]n American having the average income of the bottom US decile is better-
off than 2/3 of the world population” (Milanovic 2002: 89). Such international inequality is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, having been negligible compared to intra-national economic 
inequality up until the last few centuries. The rapid development of global communications 
has also increased the interactions between people living under different conditions, making 
them more aware of these inequalities and confronting them with related ethical dilemmas. 
Just as the presence of inequality and poverty within a country generates calls for 
redistributive measures, international inequalities tend to create calls for international 
redistributive measures. Jan Tinbergen, for example, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, 
takes the following position:  
[T]here should … be redistribution at the international level through development cooperation. 
… As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, so the redistribution of world 
income should become similar to that within well-governed nations. (Tinbergen 1994: 88; 
cited by UNDP 1999) 
Along the same lines, Pogge (2008: 107) finds international inequality particularly grave 
compared to national inequality, due to the lack of democratic international institutions: “even 
a large majority of those on whom [the existing global economic order] is imposed – the 
poorest four-fifths of humankind, for instance – cannot reform it by peaceful means”.1 
Whether or not we find this perspective appropriate, it is clear that international inequalities 
generate a number of dilemmas, and that the citizens of developed countries may have an 
important influence on how they are handled. Thus, we are led to the question of how the 
public – not least in developed, democratic countries – form its opinions on international 
issues and foreign policy.  
                                                
1 Against this background, it has even been claimed that “the contours of the world today bear an eerie 
resemblance to the political dilemmas that [were] found in the years leading up to the revolutions in 
England, America, France, and Russia” (Webb 2006: 84), but this is not the issue here.  
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While some features of domestic politics are paralleled internationally, others are undeniably 
different, and the comparison of the two spheres has proven fruitful to both empirical research 
and political theory. In domestic politics, it is frequently taken for granted that economic self-
interests influence the distributive principles people endorse and the preferences they express. 
The expected pattern is typified by traditional class conflicts, in which “individuals who 
objectively benefit from the stratification system in comparison with others are more likely to 
judge its inequalities to be just” (Robinson and Bell 1978: 128). Yet, with regard to 
development aid for example, people of donor countries appear highly supportive and 
altruistic (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003). This paradox has received limited 
attention, and we know little about aggregate patterns of support for international aid and 
what explains them. Given theories holding states to be fundamentally self-interested (e.g. 
Gilpin 1987; Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979), and others holding foreign policy to be shaped by 
public opinion (e.g. Aldrich et al. 2006; Hartley and Russett 1992; Jacobs and Page 2005; 
Shapiro and Jacobs 2000), we might expect public opinion to reflect national interests, but we 
do not know whether this is the case. The best way to address this matter may be to focus on 
issues where individual self-interests generally overlap within countries, and it is argued 
below that international aid is such an issue, at least to a greater extent than most other foreign 
policy issues.  
MAIN QUESTION 
Thus, this study is centered on the following question: Why do some people and some 
countries show more support for development aid than others? Of particular interest is the 
more specific question of how and why such support varies with levels of economic 
development in the countries within which it is measured. In order to provide an answer to 
this last question, other explanations than economic development requires an examination, 
meaning the first question has also to be addressed. Nevertheless, focus will be on economic 
development, as it provides the basis for possible international disagreements based on self-
interest, which makes it particularly interesting. The “why” parts of these questions call for 
investigations going deeper into cognitive processes underlying public opinion on this issue. It 
therefore invites analyses of the reasons respondents give for their expressed opinions and the 
role these play for aggregate levels of support. It also calls for analyses of the possible 
external influences on these reasons, as well analyses of the directions of causality between 
the opinions in question. Some of these questions to be investigated here are inspired by a 
little noticed article called Perceptions of Global Inequality: A Call for Research (Olson 
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1997). While some of the hypotheses posed in that article are too complex to be answered by 
existing survey data, others are not, and some of the questions investigated here still resemble 
those suggested there.   
As mentioned, the most intuitive hypothesis with regard to the main question is that greater 
economic development leads to popular lower support for international aid, as developed 
countries generally must expect an overall economic loss from their aid donations, while 
people in less developed countries may stand to gain from them. This is a simple and 
plausible interest-based hypothesis. In fact, it is the main hypothesis of this project. While it 
may seem obvious, it would be a mistake to take its validity for granted – as later chapters 
will demonstrate. One point to note is that support for aid donations is reported to be strong in 
donor nations, which seems to contradict the idea that there is much interest-based opposition 
to such donations. In addition, one could pose a plausible counter-hypothesis, namely that of 
post-materialism (Inglehart 1997). According to that theory, the increasing economic and 
physical security related to economic growth should gradually turn people away from 
materialist values, towards an emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression. It is also 
held to predict a shift towards environmentalism, humanitarianism, and cosmopolitanism. 
Thus, according to this theory, greater economic development might be related to greater 
support for international aid, as international obligations might be perceived as stronger, and 
the costs of donations less important. In short, we know little about what determines the 
support for international aid at the aggregate level, and we cannot take any answers for 
granted. 
SO WHAT? 
Why should we care about opinions on foreign policy, and aid policy in particular? What does 
it matter? There are several answers to these questions. The first is practical. While the debate 
regarding the impact and effectiveness of development is left for a later section of this 
introduction, there is little doubt aid policies have important consequences. Thus, they clearly 
merit attention and scrutiny. We also know that public opinion influences many forms of 
public policy, as demonstrated, for example, by the literature on dynamic representation 
(Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). Several 
studies suggest this also applies to certain areas of foreign policy (see e.g., Aldrich et al. 2006; 
Hartley and Russett 1992; Jacobs and Page 2005; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). Thus, public 
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opinion on foreign aid may influence actual aid policies, which in turn have important 
consequences. Collier, for example, argues: 
The key obstacle to reforming aid is public opinion. … Public opinion drives [politicians] into 
the “I care” photo opportunities that dominate aid. (Collier 2008: 183) 
While the link between public opinion and policy has also been argued to be weak with regard 
to development aid (Olsen 2001), very little research has been conducted on this issue and the 
evidence is inconclusive. Thus, it deserves more attention. A brief look at the data suggests 
that there may be an effect of public support on development aid donations, at least cross-
sectionally, as illustrated by Figure 1.1 below. Looking only at the early members of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), there is a reasonably strong relationship 
between support and donations, with a correlation of .66 (N = 10).2 Of course, this is not 
strong evidence that public opinion influences aid policy, but it is at least consistent with such 
a conclusion. This, then, is the first answer to the “so what” question; these opinions may be 
of considerable consequence. 
                                                
2 The countries that joined (and remained in) the DAC later (i.e. after 1985) are shown in grey. These 
countries, in particular Greece and Spain, blur the picture somewhat, because their donations are lower 
than their public support would suggest, compared to other countries. This could be due to the shorter 
period in which aid donations appear to have been a relevant issue, and the presence of greater 
domestic policy challenges, but this is not the place to test such explanations. 
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Figure 1.1. National aid donations over public support for aid, EU, 1999.  
Note: Countries that joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) before 1985 are shown in black, while 
those who joined later are shown in grey with hollow circles. The line is a linear least squares fitline based on the first group 
of countries. Aid donations are measured as Official Development Assistance (ODA) as percentage share of the Gross 
National Income (GNI), for 1999. The data are from the OECD (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003). Support for aid 
is measured by the percentage of the population who says it is important or very important “to help people in poor countries 
in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop”. The data are taken from the the Eurobarometer 50.1 (Melich 2006), 
conducted in 1999. 
The second reason why the topic matters is theoretical. Theories of international relations 
make assumptions about the nature and the behavior of states, and the sources of this 
behavior. Opinions on foreign aid are particularly useful for starting to assess such 
assumptions empirically. Several strands of international relations theory hold that states have 
an essentially self-interested behavior, and identify domestic political factors, including public 
opinion, as the sources of this behavior. An example with regard to international political 
economy, is the position of Gilpin (2001: 18), who holds that “the economic/foreign policies 
of a society reflect the nation’s national interest as defined by the dominant elite of that 
society”, but also that such policies are determined by “the pressures of powerful groups 
within a national society”, along with other influences. In light of this, we could expect public 
opinion on international matters to reflect national interests, underpinning the assumed self-
interested behavior of states. While Gilpin admits “there is a subjective element in an elite’s 
definition of the national interest”, he also argues “objective factors … are of great 
importance”. Thus, the interests perceived by the public may similarly be derivable from 
objective features. In economic terms, for example, the national interest may involve 
maximizing the national average income, and the appropriate policy to do so may depend on 
objective features of the national economy. As we know little of whether public opinion 
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actually reflects such objectively defined interests as some theories seem to imply, an 
investigation of this matter may teach us more also about international relations.  
Foreign aid is a particularly useful case in this regard. For most policy areas, it is possible to 
identify policies that will increase, if not maximize the national income. Yet, for most of 
them, such as trade policies, or currency regimes, different domestic interests will also be 
fundamentally at odds, public opinion may be swayed in different directions, and the strongest 
groups may succeed in setting policy, whether this promotes the national income or not. 
When it comes to foreign aid, on the other hand, it is less complex. Citizens of donor 
countries must in general expect economic losses from international aid, taking on the burden 
of financing it, while those of recipient countries stand to gain, or at least not lose. While 
considerations that are more complex may also come into play, foreign aid is an economic 
issue with a simpler structure of interests than those of most others. Surveys also (e.g. PIPA 
2001) seem to support the assumption that the public generally perceives development aid as 
a tool for alleviating human suffering and promoting economic development abroad, rather 
than for promoting national interests. Thus, opinions on aid are interesting as they may both 
be shaped by altruistic motives and interests that conflict with them, and may say something 
about the relative strength of the two.  
The last reason why this topic deserves attention is more ethical. The debates on the effect of 
foreign aid, and conflicts between interests and principles, make this area suited for studying 
political psychology. This, in turn, may improve the processes by which we form our 
opinions. Identifying unacknowledged influences on our political behavior, and confronting 
us with these, may alert us to cognitive mechanisms that are ethically hard to justify. An 
example is the possible influence of self-interests on opinions on foreign aid. As illustrated 
by, for example, the work of normative theorists such as Rawls and Barry, when principles 
are chosen for serving the interests of the actors choosing, we tend not to regard them as 
genuine ethical beliefs. Thus, results indicating such a pattern could provoke reflection as to 
whether commonly held beliefs are indeed genuine, impartial and properly considered. As 
Miller (1992: 589) notes, “disagreement of this sort is not fundamental in the sense that 
people who understand what justice is should be willing to revise their beliefs when these are 
shown to be biased by self-interest.”  
Some may still question whether the average survey respondent has a considered opinion on 
these issues. What if he or she does not think in terms of general moral principles, but produce 
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“opinion statements” on the fly, as Zaller (1992) suggests? A possible answer is that it does 
not matter. Even if people do not hold “opinions,” but rather have different “response 
probabilities” based upon their averaging across considerations they find salient – as Zaller 
holds – their attachment of salience to such considerations implies a value judgment. If people 
in developed countries find an “additional tax contribution” a more salient negative 
consideration than they find “to help people in poor countries” a positive one, it is 
consequential. If people are asked to explain their responses they will at least tend to 
rationalize and justify them post hoc, in terms of principles, even if that was not how they 
came up with the response. If their expressed opinions reflect their political behavior in 
general, they are important regardless of how considered they are. Collier (2008: 184), for 
example, argues that aid agencies need to reform their practices, taking more risks, but that 
they are unable to do so, due to “ordinary citizens who support vociferous lobbies without 
bothering to get informed.” 
WHAT WE KNOW 
As the later chapters will demonstrate, the main question of this study spurs other, smaller, 
and more specific questions, which relate to several different literatures. The full body of 
literature thus made relevant will not be reviewed here, but rather discussed in later chapters, 
where appropriate and necessary. At this point, it appears most useful to focus on studies of 
immediate relevance to the main question of this project. That is, studies of opinions on 
international aid, and particularly those that relate them to economic development. The 
discussion is kept short, and even some studies of opinions on aid that are left aside to be 
discussed later, as they are mainly relevant to later chapters. 
Several international organizations and public agencies regularly monitor public opinion on 
development aid, producing a number of reports on the topic. In addition to national surveys, 
several international ones have included questions regarding development aid, such as the 
International Social Survey Programme ISSP (ISSP 1999), the World Values Survey 
(EVS/WVS 2006), the Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center 2007b), and 
several of the European Commission’s Eurobarometers (EB).  The EB is a main source of 
data on the topic, having been repeated several times, in several countries, with the same 
questions. A notable finding from the EB reports is that support for the donation of aid 
appears to be consistently high, with 75 to 95% of the respondents saying it is important or 
very important “to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to 
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develop”. The report based on the EB 62.2 also notes that “[t]he striking point in the results is 
the high proportion of respondents who position themselves at the extreme end of the answer 
scale: at the European Union level as many as 53% respond that it is “very important” to help 
people in poor countries” (TNS 2005: 26). Along the same lines, an OECD report assessing 
earlier survey data notes that, “[p]ublic support in OECD DAC Member countries for helping 
poor countries has remained consistently high for almost two decades: there is no aid fatigue” 
(Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 10). 
While these reports contain much information, they are mainly descriptive, reporting 
aggregate results for different groups of respondents – countries, age groups, occupational 
groups etc. The EB 62.2 (TNS 2005: 26), for example, shows that respondents who are 
younger, have higher education, or  live in urban areas are more supportive of aid than others. 
The same holds for managers and students, compared to other occupational groups, and for 
people who place themselves to the left on the political left-right scale. In addition, people 
who were born outside of Europe, but now reside in the EU, as well as those who have at least 
one parent born outside of Europe, are more supportive of aid than others are. While this 
information is interesting, it is generally not given a theoretical framework, nor is it based on 
analyses that take the causal structure into account. Considerable amounts of data have been 
produced, and reports based on them present only the most readily available information. 
Most notably, they tend not to provide analyses of between-country differences, which is the 
focus of this study.  
A few other studies have looked at international differences in the support for aid donations, 
and of particular interest are those that investigate the role of economic development in 
explaining these differences. Lübker (2004) uses data from the ISSP (1999) to relate support 
for international aid to GDP per capita. Looking mainly at a bivariate aggregate analysis, he 
finds that the most developed countries in the world tend to show somewhat lower support. 
However, the analysis “failed to explain why support differs greatly within the developed 
world”, and he notes that “the level of income alone cannot account for the variance between 
countries” (Lübker 2004: 123). Using a multilevel model, including 17 developed countries, 
Paxton and Knack (2008) find, contrary to their expectation, that “the GDP of a society has a 
significantly negative effect on support for foreign aid” (Paxton and Knack 2008: 16). They 
provide no explanation of this finding, but find it interesting that: “in contrast to the generally 
positive effect of socio-economic status on support for foreign aid at the individual level, in 
the aggregate, richer countries do not exhibit greater support for foreign aid” (Paxton and 
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Knack 2008: 16). It should be noted, however, that this latter finding is based on a selection of 
only developed countries, and thus cannot be assumed to hold more generally. In short, the 
few studies that relate support for aid to economic development fail to give clear answers, in 
part due to the limitations of the analyses, whether in sophistication or country coverage.  
As a preliminary step, it may also be useful to look at the development of opinions on aid over 
time, something the Eurobarometer data allows at least to some extent. Unfortunately, earlier 
attempts to do so appear somewhat unreliable,3 so it is may be worth turning to the original 
data. Since the EB 36.0 in October-November 1991, surveys with the same or virtually the 
same question have been repeated for a total of seven times until the EB 71.2 in May-June 
2009.4 Combining these datasets and aggregating them up to the country level, we get a small 
set of panel data for a selection of European countries. Figure 1.2 shows the data over time, 
for the countries whose data are available from each of the seven surveys.5 As can be seen, 
public opinion on this matter generally moves in the same direction in different countries, 
suggesting it responds to shared external influences, such as global economic trends, 
international events or crises, or debates with an international reach. It can also be noted that, 
although there may have been a slight drop in support from 2005 to 2010, support over the 
period as a whole appears to have increased somewhat. In most countries support is higher in 
                                                
3 For example, the report based on the EB 62.2 (TNS 2005) shows a plot of support for the EU as a 
whole, but the pattern is somewhat different from – and even inconsistent with – the one presented 
below. The problem appears to lie in the report, since is also conflicts with earlier reports. For the EB 
44.1, for example, the report shows 95% support in the EU as a whole, while the earlier report (INRA 
1996) says it is 77%, and finds no country with a share above 90%. For the EB 46.0, on the other 
hand, the reported number appears to be too low, compared to the number given in the original report 
(INRA 1997), which appears to be more correct.  
4 In the two first surveys, the EB 36.0 and 44.1, the questioning differed from those of the later ones. 
Respondents were asked: “Here is a list of problems that people of [this country] are interested in to 
varying degrees. [show card] Could you please tell me for each one whether you personally consider it 
is a very important problem, important, not very important, or not at all important?” One of the issues 
listed was “Helping poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc.”. Thus, the word “develop” 
was introduced later when the question was asked only in relation to development aid and not other 
issues. However, the differences are slight, and do not have an obvious impact on the trends. 
5 These are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
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the last than the first survey, and towards the end, none of the countries show as low support 
as some did in the beginning.     
  
Figure 1.2. Support for aid from 1990 to 2010 for twelve EU countries with complete data. 
Note: Respondents who say it is important or very important “to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, 
Asia, etc. to develop” are coded as supporters. The countries included are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal. The data sources are the EB 36.0 (Reif 
1998a), 44.1 (Reif 1998b), 46.0 (Melich 2000), 50.1 (Melich 2006), 58.2 (Soufflot de Magny 2007), 62.2 (European 
Commission 2007), and 71.2 (European Commission 2009).  
 
FOREIGN AID AND ITS IMPACT 
Just as the presence of inequality and poverty within a country generates calls for 
redistributive measures, international inequalities and, especially poverty within countries 
whose governments appear unable respond, tends to create calls for international 
redistributive measures. However, such policies are even more controversial than are those 
implemented within countries. In practice, calls for international action against poverty have 
resulted in the donation of foreign aid, a term that refers to voluntary transfers of public 
resources from one country to another, at least in part motivated by a desire to improve the 
conditions of the recipient country. A more formal definition is this: “a voluntary transfer of 
public resources, from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an 
international organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at 
least a 25 percent grant element, one goal of which is to better the human condition in the 
country receiving the aid” (Lancaster 2006: 9).6 While foreign aid has sometimes been given 
                                                
6 This resembles OECD’s definition of official development assistance (ODA) which is given below. 
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such a wide interpretation as to include military assistance, most governments and 
organizations now leavesuch aid out of their aid figures.  
A more important distinction is that between development aid and humanitarian aid. 
Humanitarian aid usually refers to short-term efforts to reduce suffering or save lives, in 
response to humanitarian crises that may result from natural disasters or violent conflict. Such 
aid generally takes the form of logistical and material assistance. Development aid, on the 
other hand, aims to improve social and economic conditions in the long-term, by addressing 
deeper obstacles to development. The OECD define official development assistance (ODA) 
as: “Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are 
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent 
rate of discount)” (OECD 2007: 546). If we stick to the common definition of humanitarian 
aid as short-term responses to immediate crises, the kind of aid in focus of this project is 
development aid, although the distinction is often blurred. 
Both within and outside academic circles, there are intense debates regarding the impact and 
desirability of development aid, and they are about as old as such aid itself (see for example 
Friedman 1958). In part, this is due to different views on what aid is to achieve. If the main 
goal is to create economic growth, and eventually remove the need for further aid, as many 
have though and still think, there is indeed much room for debate. While there are many 
notable advocates of aid, vocal critics argue that it fails to produce growth, and instead creates 
bad incentives, invites corruption and is misused (see for example Easterly 2006; Moyo 
2009). Another concern has been that volatile and temporary aid flows may lead to “Dutch 
disease”.7 That is, an appreciation of the real exchange rate and increased demand for 
domestic non-tradable goods and services, at the expense of private investment and tradable 
industries (e.g., Younger 1992). Unfortunately, whether conclusions are drawn in favor of aid 
or not, they are often based on anecdotal evidence. Advocates and critics appear equally able 
to muster evidence of development aid successes and failures, respectively, and so 
disagreement on whether aid promotes growth continues 
However, there is an increasing body of statistical studies on the impact of aid. Academic 
interest in this issue grew considerably after the publication of an article by Burnside and 
                                                
7 A term coined by The Economist in 1977, to describe the effect of natural gas on the Dutch economy.  
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Dollar (2000: 847), which found that “aid has a positive impact on growth in developing 
countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of 
poor policies”. This provided both a rationale for giving aid, and had implications for who the 
recipients ought to be – governments implementing good policies. Easterly, Levine, and 
Roodman (2004) attempted to replicate the analysis, based on a dataset expanded in terms of 
time and country coverage (see also Easterly 2003). However, with the new data they “no 
longer find that aid promotes growth in good policy environments” (Easterly, Levine, and 
Roodman 2004: 779). Still, they do “not argue that aid is ineffective”, but rather “note that 
adding additional data to the […] study of aid effectiveness raises new doubts about the 
effectiveness of aid”. In their reply, Burnside and Dollar (2004), argued that the interaction 
between policy and aid is non-linear, and that the evidence does to some extent still support 
their claims.  
While research has been conducted on the relationship between aid and growth for many 
years now, no consensus can be said to have emerged. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) 
conduct a meta-analysis of 97 studies published before 2005, and argue that the 
“preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not been effective”. The study “failed to 
find evidence of a significantly positive effect of aid”, and the authors thus conclude that “if 
there is an effect, it must be small” (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009: 457). Other scholars 
argue aid has significant detrimental effects fitting the model of Dutch disease, and suggest 
this may explain why aid often appears not to have a positive effect on growth (Arellano et al. 
2009; Rajan and Subramanian Forthcoming). In short, many empirical studies give reason to 
doubt the effectiveness of aid in generating economic growth. 
However, studies of this kind face numerous challenges. As Wright and Winters (2010: 63) 
note, “[o]ne difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid in fostering economic 
growth is that we know significant amounts of aid were never intended to bring about 
economic growth but rather were given to governments for geopolitical reasons”. The 
motivations for donating aid may also have changed over time. Claessens, Cassimon, and Van 
Campenhout (2009), for example, find that bilateral aid has become more responsive to 
poverty and to the quality of policy and institutional environment in recipient countries. Thus, 
separating aid by type, or motivation, however difficult, may be crucial to obtain meaningful 
results. One recent attempt to distinguish the effect of aid intended to generate growth from 
that given for other reasons found a positive long-term effect on growth of the first kind of aid 
(Minoiu and Reddy 2010). However, another study, that attempts to do the same and 
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comments on an earlier version of the mentioned study, fails to find a similar effect (Rajan 
and Subramanian 2008). In short, it may be too early to conclude on the effect of aid on 
growth. There may even be reason to doubt that all the questions economists and policy-
makers would like to see answered on this issue can be (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007).  
The apparent failure of aid at the macro level stands in contrast to the apparent success at the 
micro level, something Mosley (1986, 1987) have referred to as the micro-macro paradox. 
While macro-level studies have failed to yield clear evidence that aid generates economic 
growth, most individual development projects appear successful. Aid projects usually have 
evaluation mechanisms, and general studies reviewing their success present a largely positive 
picture. Most aid projects are reported to succeed in terms of their own objectives, and few 
are found to do harm, even when they do not succeed (e.g. Cassen 1986, 1994). There may be 
several reasons for this apparent discrepancy, but the most obvious is that different outcomes 
are in focus. As White (1992: 165) notes, “[p]roject benefits counted at evaluation may well 
not contribute to increased national income”.   
This is a reminder that generating growth need not be the only goal of aid – if it is to be one at 
all. It is worth noting the position of Easterly (2007: 331), who believes “development 
assistance was a mistake”:  
[I]t doesn't necessarily follow that foreign aid should be eliminated. Once freed from the 
delusion that it can accomplish development, foreign aid could finance piecemeal steps aimed 
at accomplishing particular tasks for which there is clearly a huge demand – to reduce malaria 
deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain roads, to provide scholarships for 
talented but poor students, and so on. 
The kind of aid Easterly calls for may blur the distinction between humanitarian aid and 
development aid. It is motivated by humanitarian concerns and aimed at specific problems, 
but without being short-term disaster relief. However, while it is neither directly aimed at 
creating long-term economic growth, it may still fall under the definition of development aid, 
insofar as this entails promoting the “welfare of developing countries”, as the OECD 
definition does. Leaving this aside, the point is that there appears to be a potential for aid to 
play a positive role even if it does not generate economic growth.8 Although the present study 
                                                
8 The main challenge to this idea is that such aid also may lead to Dutch disease – especially if aid 
flows are unstable over time (cf. Arellano et al. 2009). 
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is generally agnostic about the general effectiveness of aid and its impact on growth, this 
potential is part of what makes aid deserve scholarly attention, along with public opinion on 
the issue.  
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
The following four chapters address different aspects of the general topic, each having their 
own hypotheses and analyses, and a discussion of relevant literature. They are ordered 
according to a logic progressing from the more general to the more specific, as the later 
chapters address questions that arise from the earlier ones. In this sense, the earlier chapters 
provide rationales for the investigations in the later ones, while the latter make the answers of 
the former more complete.  
Chapter 2 addresses the main questions in a straightforward way.9 That is, it looks at macro-
level explanations of international differences in opinions on aid, with a special focus on the 
role of economic development. The main hypothesis is that people in more developed 
countries are less supportive of international aid than those of less developed countries, and 
that, in this sense, there is disagreement between them. Other hypotheses, that are both 
interesting in their own right and that may help bring forward and clarify the role of economic 
development, are also assessed. One is that egalitarian attitudes increase the support for aid at 
the individual level, while another is that this helps explain between-country differences, as 
some countries are more egalitarian than others. A third hypothesis is that greater domestic 
social and economic challenges decrease the support for aid. To assess these hypotheses, 
hierarchical regression models are employed, using opinion data from the ISSP (1999) that 
include a good indicator of support for aid, and covers a good range of countries. When other 
salient explanations are taken into account, the level of economic development is found 
highly influential, which means that there is considerable disagreement between the citizens 
of more and less developed countries. Among developed countries the effect of GDP appears 
due to the length of the period in which a country has been donating aid, which is strongly 
related to the level of development. The analysis also finds support for the hypothesis that 
domestic challenges reduce support, while egalitarian attitudes fail to explain much of the 
overall pattern. 
                                                
9 It is based on a paper presented at the CEU Graduate Conference on Development and Participation, 
Budapest, June 19-21, 2009, and at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, DC, September 2-5, 2010. 
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Chapter 3 starts from the observation that Chapter 2 only establishes there is a relationship 
between the responses in question and economic development, without going deeper into 
what explains the pattern. It could be the product of self-interest, but it does not necessarily 
need to be, as it could be due to, for example, a greater skepticism regarding the impact of aid. 
This could make a considerable difference with regard to how we interpret the pattern. Thus, 
Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the different kinds of reasons respondents give for their 
opinions. Of particular interest is whether these explain between-country differences, and 
whether other macro-level variables help to explain them. Only respondents’ tendency to state 
they are not interested in aid appears able to explain national levels of support for aid. 
Interestingly, such disinterest is positively related to GDP per capita, as well as the length of 
the period in which a country has been donating aid. The analysis also suggests these 
variables are related to greater skepticism regarding the impact of aid, but it is not clear 
whether this affects the aggregate support for aid.  
Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the role of beliefs regarding the impact of aid, and questions 
the assumption that such beliefs are exogenous determinants of the level of support for aid.10 
Because skepticism regarding the impact of aid tends to be seen as highly legitimate reasons 
for not supporting aid, the chapter hypothesizes that those who are less inclined to support aid 
in the first place may develop a greater skepticism regarding its impact. This hypothesis is 
based on the theory of cognitive dissonance and the assumption that individuals who do not 
support aid, yet believe it works and would help people in need, are likely to experience 
dissonance, and therefore adjust their beliefs or opinions. This is investigated using two 
research designs involving different datasets and indicators. The first deals with reciprocal 
causation using a two-stage instrumental variable approach. The second design uses indicators 
that avoid the challenge of reciprocal causation, but may suffer from the presence of a 
particular confounder. Thus, propensity score matching based on several measures of this 
confounder is used, before the effect on various measures of beliefs in effectiveness are 
estimated. Both analyses find significant effects of support for aid on beliefs regarding 
effectiveness.  
                                                
10 It is based on a paper presented to the EUI Colloquium on Political Behavior, Florence, November 
25, 2010, and at the 68th Annual National Midwest Political Science Association Conference, 
Chicago, IL, April 22-25, 2010. 
 16 
Chapter 5 departs from the observation that the selection of countries in Chapter 2 leaves out 
the poorest countries of the world.11 It therefore turns to an alternative indicator from Pew 
Research Center (2007b) with wider country coverage, and examines its relationship with 
economic development. It shows that when it comes to the very least developed countries 
respondents tend to express greater satisfaction with – or less critical attitudes towards – 
current international aid efforts. Two hypotheses are presented that may account for this. One 
is parallel to the model of the public as thermostat (Wlezien 1995), suggesting that when 
countries receive more aid, their citizens become more satisfied with current aid levels and are 
less likely to call for more aid. The other hypothesis is that respondents in the least developed 
countries have a general tendency to give less critical assessments on large range are issues. 
These hypotheses are assessed in a multi-level mixed-effects logit analysis, which provides 
support for the latter hypothesis. That is, the respondents are less critical in countries whose 
level of development is very low, suggesting that particular care should be taken when 
responses from these countries are compared to those from other countries.  
                                                
11 It is based on a paper presented to the EUI Colloquium on Political Behavior, Florence, March 10, 
2010 and at the 69th Annual National Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, 
March 31 - April 3, 2011.  
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2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND OPINIONS ON AID 
In national politics, it is often taken for granted economic that self-interests influence the 
distributive principles people endorse and the policy preferences they express. The expected 
pattern is typified by traditional class conflicts. However, when it comes to international 
issues, it is less clear what to expect, and we know little of the behavior actually 
demonstrated. With regard to development aid, for example, people in donor countries appear 
highly supportive (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003). Thus, they seem to behave 
altruistically and to disconfirm the hypothesis that they might be less supportive than the 
citizens of recipient countries. Still, this issue has not received sufficient attention for a 
conclusion to be reached. What explains support for international redistribution – in the form 
of aid – has not been much explored with regard to macro-level explanations across levels of 
development. Prior studies leave open even the already outlined, fundamental question: do 
nationally defined economic interests explain international differences in opinions on 
international aid? This question needs to be answered in tandem with a consideration of other 
potential explanations, but it will receive most attention.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the question posed above is interesting in part because the 
opinions in question may influence policy, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Public opinion has not 
only been shown to influence domestic policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; 
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995), but also foreign policy (e.g. Shapiro and Jacobs 
2000).12 In international relations theory, states are often assumed to pursue national interests, 
and given the link between public opinion and policy, we are led to the question of whether 
foreign policy is in part defined by self-interested national constituencies.13 The best way to 
address this matter may be to focus on issues where individual self-interests generally overlap 
within countries, and it is argued here that international aid is such an issue. 
                                                
12 As discussed in Chapter 1, the link between public opinion and policy has been argued to be weak 
with regard to development aid (Olsen 2001), but the evidence on this matter is inconclusive and the 
issue deserves more attention.  
13 Of course, much international relations theory (e.g. Gilpin 1987; Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979) sees 
states as self-interested actors without necessarily drawing the link to public opinion. However, adding 
the assumption that governments pursue what they believe their constituents would want leads to the 
hypothesis that the opinions of these constituencies are informed by self-interest.  
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The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section discusses relevant theory and previous 
findings, before a set of hypotheses are introduced. Then, the indicators to be used in the later 
analysis are discussed along with selected relationships at the aggregate level. A subsequent 
section reports and discusses a set of hierarchical regression analyses. This is followed by a 
further discussion of the interpretation and generalizability of the findings. A short conclusion 
ends the chapter by discussing the results in a wider perspective and in relation to the other 
chapters.  
THEORY AND PRIOR WORK 
In the sphere of domestic politics, self-interest has been found to influence normative and 
empirical beliefs regarding economic inequality and redistribution. In the US, for example, an 
early study by Form and Rytina (1969: 29) could note that “about seven-tenths of the rich and 
one-tenth of the Negro poor felt the federal government had done too much for the poor”. 
Similarly, Robinson and Bell (1978: 128) later found support for the “underdog principle”, 
according to which “underdogs will tend to favor equality”, while “individuals who 
objectively benefit from the stratification system in comparison with others are more likely to 
judge its inequalities to be just”. Although the amount of variance explained this way varies, 
the pattern appears widespread. Thus, even the studies that seek a fuller picture of what 
explains preferences for domestic redistribution tend to confirm its presence in the process 
(e.g. Alesina and Ferrarab 2005; Fong 2001).  
One might expect to find a similar pattern with regard to international aid comparing the 
public opinions of different countries. Citizens of more developed countries could be said to 
“objectively benefit” from the current structure of international political economy, in terms of 
having a higher average income. Thus, they may be less likely to see international inequalities 
as unfair, and be less in favor of aid. While many foreign policy issues have a nature that 
makes for national interest-based political conflicts, international aid may provide an 
attractively simple case. Here, individual interests may be easily defined and tend to coincide 
within countries. Countries that are potential net contributors of aid transfers could be said to 
have an objective interest in limiting them, whereas potential recipients have an interest in 
increasing them. Admittedly, it has been argued that international aid can lead to welfare 
improvement even in donor countries (Hatzipanayotou and Michael 1995), and potential 
domestic benefits are often pointed out by proponents of aid. Nevertheless, the main argument 
for giving aid is to help recipients achieve such goals as human development, economic 
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growth, or democracy. Survey data seem to support the assumption that the public generally 
perceives development aid as a tool for promoting such goals, rather than domestic interests 
(e.g. PIPA 2001). If development aid is accordingly perceived as redistribution in a zero-sum 
game, this simple model would make this issue well-suited for identifying any influence of 
nationally defined interest on public opinion.  
A couple of studies relating opinions on aid to macro-level variables may indeed suggest 
opinions on aid are shaped by interests. While most research on such opinions tends to be 
descriptive and bivariate (e.g. INRA 1996, 1997; Lübker 2004) or to stay at the individual 
level (e.g. Chong and Gradstein 2008), Paxton and Knack (2008) employ a multilevel model 
that includes 17 developed countries. Looking at GDP per capita, they find that, contrary to 
their expectation, “the GDP of a society has a significantly negative effect on support for 
foreign aid” (Paxton and Knack 2008: 16). They provide no explanation of this finding, but 
find it interesting that: “in contrast to the generally positive effect of socio-economic status on 
support for foreign aid at the individual level, in the aggregate, richer countries do not exhibit 
greater support for foreign aid” (Paxton and Knack 2008: 16). The other study that relates 
support for aid to GDP per capita mainly relies on a bivariate aggregate analysis (Lübker 
2004). It finds a relationship at the aggregate level, as the populations of the most developed 
countries tend to show somewhat lower support, but it also finds that:  
support for international redistribution turns out to be far higher in a number of almost equally 
wealthy countries (Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). [... In addition,] at 
very similar income levels, people in Latvia (6,428 PPP$ per capita) are the strongest 
opponents of international redistribution, while people in Brazil (7,173 PPP$ per capita) 
almost unanimously support it. This already indicates that the level of income alone cannot 
account for the variance between countries. (Lübker 2004: 123) 
Thus, the analysis “failed to explain why support differs greatly within the developed world” 
(Lübker 2004: 123).  
While these studies take some steps toward understanding the role of GDP (per capita) in 
shaping opinions on international aid, they do not provide a complete picture. If GDP “cannot 
alone account for the variance”, other explanations must have been omitted, and we do not 
know what effect of GDP remains – or appears – once these omitted variables are properly 
taken into account. Paxton and Knack’s study may be the most valuable with respect to the 
topic in question, but the fact that their sample only includes aid donors – countries that are 
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relatively well developed – means that the generality of their finding is uncertain. It tells us 
something about differences among donor countries, but it is not clear what, and it does not 
necessary demonstrate an interest-based pattern of redistributive preferences at the 
international level. The clearest prediction at the international level is that there would be 
disagreements on a broader scale, when potential net contributor countries are compared to 
recipient ones. Paxton and Knack’s findings may, however, be a regional variation of this, as 
the least developed countries in their sample are EU members that, as Noël and Thérien 
(2002: 645) note, “have themselves benefited from European regional development 
programs” (cf. INRA 1996, 1997). Thus, their citizens may interpret the questions as 
pertaining also to intra-European transfers, or they may be more positive toward international 
transfers because of their own positive experiences. 
In light of this, we may benefit from studying a wider selection of countries, which would 
also be interesting because some evidence suggests that there cannot be much disagreement 
across levels of development. Public agencies monitoring the support for development aid in 
donor countries continue to conclude that there are large majorities supporting the donation of 
aid, and broad consensus regarding its importance. As an OECD report puts it, “[p]ublic 
support in OECD DAC Member countries for helping poor countries has remained 
consistently high for almost two decades: there is no aid fatigue” (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and 
Wegimont 2003: 10). However, the report also notes: 
It may therefore seem a paradox that, for all these strong political declarations and 
commitments, global aid flows to developing countries have been declining continuously since 
the early 1990s. Indeed, the volume of ODA as a share of the combined gross national income 
(GNI) of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Member countries fell from 
0.33 per cent in 1992 to 0.22 per cent in 2001, far from the 0.7 per cent share they have 
committed to (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 11). 
This suggests that the cited support may have little substance – an issue to be discussed 
further below (as well as in the general Appendix to this thesis, which discusses the 
measurement of public support).  
Before that, alternatives to interest-based explanations deserve attention. An obvious 
hypothesis reflects the theory of “the public as thermostat” (Wlezien 1995, 1996), which is 
part of the literature on dynamic representation (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; 
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). As most survey questions on public policy ask 
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whether respondents want more or less of something, compared to the current state of affairs, 
they can be said to capture relative (as opposed to absolute) policy preferences. In national 
contexts, classic system theories of democracy suggest that relative policy preferences should 
respond to policy outputs, producing feedback to the system (Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953, 
1965). This is exactly what Wlezien (1995, 1996) finds, arguing that the public works like a 
thermostat (cf. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Franklin and Wlezien 1997; Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010). That is, the public adjusts its calls for more or less spending on an issue 
according to what it gets, so that “the public’s preference for more (less) policy – its relative 
preference […] – represents the difference between the public’s preferred level of policy […] 
and policy […] itself” (Wlezien 1995: 985-986):  
Relative preference = Absolute preference – Policy.  (1) 
Thus, the question of whether survey questions capture absolute or relative preferences – or a 
mixture – is crucial. As will be clear below, the measure used in this chapter is phrased as a 
question of preferences relative to the current situation, asking whether aid should be 
increased. However, it does not refer to the policies of specific countries, and this could 
potentially obscure a pattern of thermostatic responsiveness, as respondents may have 
different assessments of current levels of aid in general and current levels of aid donated by 
their own country. Nevertheless, this potential explanation deserves consideration. 
Another alternative hypothesis stands in even clearer contrast to that of self-interest. The 
assumption that people are self-interested actors has had an exceptionally strong theoretical 
and empirical standing in many fields, not least in economics. It has been so commonplace 
that much work has been done just to demonstrate that people are not always and completely 
self-interested (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; for an overview, see: Fehr and Schmidt 2006; 
Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan 1981). Rather than 
disconfirming the role of self-interest, these studies add nuance to the traditional model by 
demonstrating that normative beliefs play an independent role in determining behavior, in 
addition to interest. Similar effects seem to be present with regard to development aid and 
international redistribution. Paxton and Knack, for example, find an effect of left-right self-
positioning.14 Perhaps more relevant, however, Lumsdaine (1993) finds that Americans 
                                                
14 Also of possible relevance, Chong and Gradstein (2008) find greater support for aid among those 
who are more satisfied with the people in office and expressing greater confidence in the government. 
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supporting domestic social spending tend also to support the donation of development aid. 
This may suggest that attitudes toward international aid reflect a more general egalitarianism. 
It may further explain why aid policies seem to reflect domestic welfare regimes (Lumsdaine 
1993; Noël and Thérien 1995). That is, domestically generous welfare-states also tend to be 
more generous in terms of the share of GDP allocated to ODA. If opinions on both domestic 
and international redistribution are informed by egalitarian beliefs, countries in which 
egalitarianism is stronger on average may both develop more generous welfare states and 
development aid policies. In this light, it may be of significance that countries tend to form 
clusters on major value dimensions based on, for example, their religious and ideological 
heritage (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Ideology, measured, for example, in terms of left-
right self-placement, may explain opinions on international aid both at the individual and 
aggregate level. This is a clear alternative to the interest-based hypothesis, as ideology tends 
represent a deeper commitment to values that inform attitudes on a number of issues (cf. e.g. 
Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Noël and Thérien 2008; Noël, Thérien, and Dallaire 2004). 
Admittedly, individual ideology, especially as it relates to national redistribution, tends to 
correlate with interest measured as income, as mentioned above. However, a similar 
connection can hardly arise at the international level, as individual interests with regard 
national redistribution are much clearer and do not overlap with those related to international 
redistribution which are more clearly identified at the country level. Thus, with regard to 
international aid, ideology should provide a clear alternative to the self-interest.  
However, while support for international aid may reflect a general egalitarianism, among 
certain donor countries, a negative aggregate level relationship has been identified between 
support for domestic and international redistribution (Noël and Thérien 2002). Of crucial 
importance here, however, is to distinguish between policy preferences that are absolute or 
“ideal” and those that are relative to current policies and circumstances, as explained above 
(cf. Wlezien 1995).15 Noël and Thérien’s measure of support for domestic redistribution is 
                                                                                                                                                   
However, while this could reflect deeper values concerning for example the proper role of the state, it 
could also merely reflect current political satisfaction.  
15 This could help explain Paxton and Knack’s negative relationship between support for development 
aid and GDP, as their most important indicator measures relative support (Paxton and Knack 2008). 
The most supportive countries do indeed seem to be ones whose aid levels currently make up small 
shares of GDP. However, they only find a significant effect of actual donations of ODA/GNI when 
excluding US and Japan, and GDP appears to explain more than ODA.  
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based on a question regarding the importance of “working towards reducing the number of 
very rich or very poor people” in the country (cf. Reif and Marlier 1996). In other words, it 
regards how important is it to work for greater national equality (than that which obtained at 
the time of the survey). Thus, Noël and Thérien interpret their finding as evidence that the 
perception of facing greater challenges related to national inequality reduces concerns about 
international inequality. “When equality has been institutionalized as an important principle, 
the public acknowledges the results and support for foreign aid is high; when this is not the 
case and domestic disparities remain important, redistribution at home appears more pressing 
and international justice less so” (Noël and Thérien 2002: 645). While this interpretation is 
based on a bivariate analysis of only ten countries, it does appear to hold, at least for these 
countries. In general, this argument may imply that citizens living in countries facing greater 
social and economic challenges (or those perceiving that they are) will show less support for 
development aid. However, Noël and Thérien also argue that some of those challenges, those 
related to inequality, are of a kind that are addressed by Leftist governments, and will 
therefore be less prevalent where the political Left has been strong and where there is a 
socialist welfare state. This is measured by the cumulative cabinet power of the Left (Huber, 
Ragin, and Stephens 1993) and the socialist attributes of the welfare state (cf. Esping-
Andersen 1990), respectively. Noël and Thérien find negative correlations between these two 
variables and the aggregate of calls for domestic redistribution, which in turn has a negative 
correlation with calls for international redistribution. These two variables have also been 
found to be important determinants of foreign aid (Noël and Thérien 1995; Thérien and Noël 
2000). Thus, such institutional and political variables also deserve attention.   
Lastly, there is the possibility that international differences in opinions on aid are due to 
differences in beliefs regarding the impact of aid. In light of the debates regarding the effect 
of aid outlined in Chapter 1, it is not surprising that many people are skeptical about giving 
aid. Public agencies surveying the support for aid frequently cite concerns about waste and 
inefficiency as a major reason for non-support (e.g. Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 
2003; TNS 2005). If people were perfectly rational, and their goals were to achieve a certain 
level of development in all countries, then those believing aid to have less effect (but still a 
positive one) might want a higher level to aid to make up for the waste. However, it is more 
likely, as is often assumed, that greater skepticism regarding the positive impact of aid leads 
to lower support for aid. If the goal is to minimize waste, rather than achieving a certain level 
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of development, this makes sense. It also makes sense if respondents believe aid has no 
positive effect, or even a negative one.  
What is important noting here, is that beliefs regarding the impact of aid may correlate with a 
country’s experience with aid, as such experience, for example, may involve a greater public 
interest and therefore also more negative press coverage when projects have failed or research 
has questioned aid policies. Thus, such beliefs may also correlate with economic 
development, as more developed countries tend to give more aid. In other words, beliefs 
regarding the impact of aid may provide alternative explanations of why aid donations or 
economic development may have negative effects on support for aid. Unfortunately, this 
cannot be tested in the present analysis, but it will be tested in the next chapter, which uses 
survey data regarding respondents’ reasons for their opinions. 
HYPOTHESES 
The following set of hypotheses will be assessed in this chapter:  
1. Citizens of economically developed countries (as likely net contributors of international 
aid) will show less support for it than those of less developed countries.  
2a. Citizens who place themselves to the left on the left-right scale will show more support for 
international aid.  
2b. The relationship in Hypothesis 2a helps explain macro-level patterns, due to between-
country differences in left-right self-placement.  
3. Citizens of aid donating countries facing social and economic challenges will show less 
support for international aid than will those of such countries that fare better. Similarly, 
citizens of countries where equality has been institutionalized as an important principle, as 
the Left has been strong or a socialist welfare state has developed, will show more support 
for aid. 
4. Citizens of countries that currently donate more aid are less in favor of increasing aid 
donations.  
INDICATORS AND MACRO-LEVEL PATTERNS 
The paradox identified by the OECD report mentioned above (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and 
Wegimont 2003) suggests that the choice of indicators deserves particular attention, as do the 
demonstrated role of framing effects when it comes to opinions on other international issues 
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(Hiscox 2006). The indicators relied upon by the OECD report (as well as Eurobarometer 
reports) to draw the conclusion that support for aid is consistently high may not be well 
suited. The most relevant Eurobarometer question, on which the OECD report partly relies, 
asks: “In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all 
important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” 
(e.g. Melich 2006). An advantage of this question is that it asks respondents to rate 
importance of actually giving help, rather than just to express their concern for poor 
foreigners. However, helping others to develop is not weighted against other goals that 
respondents are also likely to care about. Any respondent just marginally more interested than 
completely indifferent about living conditions for people in less developed countries, are 
likely to attach some importance helping them develop. Thus, the support detected by this 
question does not necessarily imply much substantial commitment. Facing trade-offs against 
increased taxes, increased budget deficits or reduced domestic spending, respondents 
expressing support may still have other priorities. The pressure they generate on politicians 
may still place a relative emphasis on other goals than helping people in other countries.16  
Thus, indicators that mention political trade-offs, and thereby make the responses less a priori 
predictable, may be better suited. Such responses are more likely to tap deeper commitments 
influencing consequential political behavior. Therefore, support for international aid is here 
measured by an indicator from one of the International Social Survey Programme’s waves on 
Social Inequality (ISSP 1999): “Turning to international differences, do you agree or 
disagree… […] People in wealthy countries should make an additional tax contribution to 
help people in poor countries.” A possible problem here is that people may favor drawing 
funds from other budget posts rather than increasing tax levels. Apart from this, however, the 
mentioning of taxation is an advantage, as agreement with this statement requires that 
respondents are willing to make the trade-off and (have developed countries) bear the costs of 
increased aid. A further advantage is that the question is cast in general terms, referring to 
“wealthy” and “poor countries” rather than being tied to the current national level of aid.17 
                                                
16 See the general Appendix to this thesis for a comparison of how the wording of relevant survey 
questions influence the level of support detected. 
17 Nevertheless, the role of national aid donations will be considered below, in accordance with the 
hypotheses above. The ODA measure reports donations for 1999 in current USD, while ODA / GNI 
gives ODA as a share of GNI. The data are from the OECD (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 
2003).  
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This means the data may be more comparable across donor countries, and even allows the 
question to be asked in aid-receiving countries. Thus, a last advantage is that the ISSP survey 
encompasses countries representing a wide range of development, including the Philippines at 
the lower end.  
The selection of countries for which the indicator is available is of some consequence when it 
comes to the macro-level indicators. As implied by Hypothesis 1, national redistributive 
interests are assumed to reflect levels of economic development, which here will be measured 
by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for 1999, converted to constant 2005 
international US dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.18 The bivariate 
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable is illustrated in Figure 2.1 
below. It is worth noting that all the countries in the lower end of the spectrum, apart from the 
Philippines and Chile, are post-Communist ones. By 1999, these countries were in a process 
of economic transition. This means that the GDP values at the time may fail to capture the 
level of economic development and relative international standing in this regard.  
 
Figure 2.1. Aggregate support for increased international aid over GDP per capita, ISSP, 1999. 
Note: Both GPD and survey data are from 1999. Post-Communist countries are marked with circles, others with solid dots. 
The indicator of support is the same binary one as described for Model 4 below. In this figure, as well as Figure 2.2, the 
observation of Germany is a population-weighed mean of the eastern and western ISSP sample. 
                                                
18 The data are taken from the World Bank (2008). Whereas this chapter often refers (national) 
incomes, as this makes sense theoretically, it is strictly speaking inaccurate, given the use of GDP. 
Nevertheless, the inaccuracy is slight: for the countries in question, the gross national income (GNI) 
and GDP correlate at 0.99. In fact, the PPP-conversion is of greater consequence, reducing the 
correlation to 0.95. 
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Indeed, at the time of the survey, GPD had been stable or declining since the beginning of the 
political and economic transitions about ten years earlier, in all included post-Communist 
countries but Poland and Slovenia. This is illustrated by Figure 2.2 below, which plots the 
support for aid over the proportional change in GDP from 1989 to 1999.19 For some of the 
countries the economic decline was severe, demonstrated by Russia’s forty percent drop. This 
may explain why these countries appear as outliers in Figure 2.1. Despite scoring low in terms 
of GDP at the time of the survey – and despite the fact that the mentioned countries were all 
receiving some form of ODA at that point (World Bank 2008) – the populations of these 
countries may still have perceived their countries as developed ones. This becomes clearer if 
one puts GDP aside, and rather looks at for example literacy rates. Thus, respondents in these 
countries may, especially in the long run, see themselves as likely donors rather than potential 
recipients of development aid. If this is so, the variable measuring ten-year GDP-change, 
serves to capture some of the error introduced by using current GDP as a measure of relative 
international economic standing and the corresponding roles of countries as potential donors 
or recipients. Notably, Figure 2.2 does suggest that the ten-year growth variable explains 
some of the outliers in Figure 2.1. This is also supported by the fact that the bivariate 
correlation with aggregate support is stronger for GDP measured in 1989 than in 1999 (-.47 
versus -.33).20 
However, the low or negative growth also suggests that the post-Communist countries at the 
time of the survey were facing severe social and economic policy challenges at home. If the 
argument above is correct, that their citizens saw these countries as potential aid donors, this 
may be relevant to Hypothesis 3 above – that domestic challenges reduce the support. While 
having the advantage of capturing how all countries fared in the ten-year period, rather than 
just those experiencing transitions, the GDP-change variable is still strongly related to the 
post-Communist transitions (with a correlation of -.62 if the latter are identified by a dummy 
variable). This suggests that it will also partly capture some of their other features, such as 
                                                
19 GDP is measured the same way for 1989 as for 1999. For the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, 
1990 GDP is used in place of missing 1989 data. 
20 For these macro-level correlations, the World Bank data refer to Germany as a whole, whereas in 
the analyses reported below, the eastern and western samples are treated as separate clusters of 
individual level observations (sharing the same macro-level data). Thus, the macro-level correlations 
have 25 observations, whereas the analysis below operates with 26 clusters. This is of minimal 
consequence, however.  
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high unemployment and sharp increases in economic inequality and poverty. The latter are 
circumstances explicitly cited by Noël and Thérien as causes for lower support for 
development aid among major donor countries.21 The GDP-change variable does indeed have 
a strong and significant correlation with unemployment.22 It is less related to unemployment 
change (which only looks at change over the last five years to maximize the number for 
countries for which data are available). With regard to income inequality (the gini coefficient), 
the relationship is insignificant and the direction is opposite of what one might have expected 
(growth is related to greater inequality).23 The data do not permit looking at the relationship to 
changes in inequality, however, which may be more relevant. As unemployment, 
unemployment change, and the gini coefficient may be more direct measures of domestic 
policy challenges, their roles are considered in the analysis section below.  
 
                                                
21 Thus, Figure 2 may also suggest an additional explanation for the negative effect of GDP on support 
for increased aid within the group of donor countries. The least developed and most supportive among 
them, such as Cyprus, Portugal and Spain have indeed experienced solid economic growth in the ten 
years prior to the survey. Thus, in line with Noël and Thérien’s argument, their citizens may feel that 
their domestic challenges are under control, and that one can afford sending aid abroad.  
22 Cf. Table 2.4 in the Appendix. The unemployment variable is the standardized unemployment rate 
as reported by the OECD. The data are taken from Huber et al. (2004). The unemployment change 
variable measures the five-year change in this the standardized unemployment rate. 
23 This measure is taken from the World Bank (2008). As many countries have available data for 2000, 
these are used as far as possible. For other countries, an average of available years between 1995 and 
2002 are used. In most of these cases, the observations used are close in time to the survey (1999). 
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Figure 2.2. Aggregate support for increased international aid over the proportional change in GDP per capita from 
1989 to 1999, ISSP surveyed countries, 1999. 
As mentioned above, the analyses below will also include the socialist attributes of the 
welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) and the cumulative cabinet power of the Left. The latter 
variable measures Left seats as percentage of all parliamentary seats held by government 
parties and summarizes the scores for each year between 1946 and 1999. The data are taken 
from Huber et al. (2004). In order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, left-right self-placement will 
be used as a measure of general ideological orientations. This variable will be included at the 
individual level, in order to test Hypothesis 2a – that individual attitudes are related across the 
domains of domestic and international redistribution. However, if this holds true and there are 
systematic differences between countries in basic attitudes, the variables will compete with 
the macro-level variables in providing explanations of the aggregate patterns. As the focus of 
this chapter is mainly on macro-level explanations of between-country differences in 
opinions, the most important individual level controls are those that are likely to vary 
substantially between countries, having the potential to explain international differences. 
However, the inclusion of an individual level hypothesis calls for some general individual 
level controls as well. Thus, the analysis below will control for age and formal education, in 
addition to the mentioned variables.24  
                                                
24 Education is measured by two dummies: one for secondary education and another for university 
education (whether the education is completed has not been taken into account). The missing values 
for these variables have been imputed by multiple imputation, for each country separately. It would 
also be desirable to include household income, but this variable has been left out because it is missing 
for Israel. Including it in the analysis, excluding Israel does, not appear to make much of a difference, 
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In order to assess Hypothesis 1, that respondents disagree over international aid, depending on 
their country’s level of development, we need to compare a wide range of countries, which 
the ISSP data allows to some extent. However, looking at the plots above, it is also clear that 
there are notable differences among developed countries. As such differences are apparent 
even looking exclusively at aid donors, they are less likely to be the result of self-interest. In 
addition, Hypotheses 3 and 4 can only be appropriately applied to aid donating countries, and 
even the assumption that the Left-Right dimension has a similar meaning across countries 
appears more plausible looking at a narrower selection of countries. Thus, in order to 
understand differences among developed countries, it may be more helpful focusing on these 
countries only. The question of whether or not to compare developed and developing 
countries has a parallel in comparative welfare state research, where researchers choosing 
different approaches to case selection have produced widely diverging results (for overviews, 
see e.g. Uusitalo 1984; Wilensky 2002). For understanding the development of welfare states 
in developed countries, focusing on these countries alone has come to be considered the best 
option, and the same logic can be applied here. Thus, to move beyond the comparison of more 
and less developed countries, and better understand the differences among the former, 
additional analyses including OECD DAC countries will be conducted.  
Among DAC countries, self-interest provides less clear expectations. In other words, in this 
universe, the effect of economic development, which may appear present looking at the plots 
above, may be more indirect, through some other variable, related to development. Looking at 
the plots above, there is one feature in particular that appears related both to support for aid 
and to economic development. This is not the amount of aid that is donated (although to some 
extent that too), but the period for which the country has been a donor. The most supportive 
DAC countries are all among the most recent joiners of the DAC (ignoring the fact that 
Portugal joined in 1960, and then withdrew in 1974, before it joined again and stayed from 
1991).25 This could be an indication that countries for which international aid has been an 
issue for about 40 years (at the time of the survey), have populations who know their country 
is an aid donor and likely to be among those bearing the costs if aid is to increase. However, 
                                                                                                                                                   
however. Income has a small and significantly negative effect, but the standard deviation of its random 
effects is almost as large as the fixed effect.   
25 The DAC years variable used below measures the number of years that had passed since a country 
first joined the DAC (without withdrawing) at the time of the survey. 
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alternative interpretation if this variable proves relevant, such as skepticism about aid 
effectiveness increasing over time as more projects have been subjected to scrutiny and more 
failures may have been reported. This will be further investigated in the next chapter where 
the effect of such variables on respondents’ reasons for non-support will be investigated. For 
now, we can only assess whether the length of DAC countries’ membership, and thus their aid 
programs, has an effect of support. If it does, this may help explain the possible effect of GDP 
among these countries, as more developed countries have joined the DAC and started 
donating aid earlier.   
ANALYSIS 
The analysis of individual opinions is best conducted at the individual level, making the most 
of the available data and drawing stronger causal inferences. However, the inclusion of 
macro-level variables in the same analysis calls for an adjustment of the degrees of freedom 
used in calculating the variances (and standard errors) of their estimated effects. The same 
adjustment is called for by the fact that the set of individual level observations is made up of 
samples drawn from different populations. This could be dealt with by using clustered 
standard errors.26 Another alternative, however, is modeling the cluster differences, estimating 
models including random components, which is a better option (see e.g. Guo and Zhao 2000; 
Leeuw and Meijer 2007; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The analyses reported 
below are such models, all of them including random components for the intercepts. With 
regard to the individual level variables, this is more efficient than using robust standard errors. 
The proportion of the overall variance due to country-differences in intercepts – the variance 
to be explained by between-effects – is given by the intra-cluster correlation coefficient, ρ. 
Before introducing independent variables (i.e. for the total variance), ρ is 0.092 (p < 0.000). 
The substantial significance of this between-cluster variance can be seen from Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2 above. Excluding post-Communist samples, ρ is 0.068 (p < 0.000), and including 
only DAC countries, it is 0.066 (p < 0.000).  
The dependent variable has been recoded into a binary indicator of explicit agreement (agree 
and strongly agree are coded as one). The binary coding and logistic link function do not 
much affect the results, but this alternative avoids treating the original ordinal variable as a 
scale and takes ceiling effects into account. The number of countries will be referred to as J, 
                                                
26 Estimating only within-effects, taking out differences in cluster means, is not an option here, as the 
between-effects at the macro-level are of main interest. 
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the number of explanatory variables at the lower level (X) as P, and the number of 
explanatory variables at the upper level (Z) as Q. Using summation notation, the mixed-
effects (logit) models to be estimated can be expressed with the following equation:    
€ 
ln prij1− prij
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ = γ + γpXpij
p=1
P
∑ + γqZqj
q=1
Q
∑ + uj +γij   (1) 
where the subscript j is for the country (j = 1 … J) , i is for individual respondents (i = 1 … 
nj), p are for explanatory variables at the lower level (p = 1 … P) and q at the upper level (q = 
1 … Q). The coefficients denoted γ form the fixed part of the model, while the residual error 
term at the country-level is referred to as uj. 
Table 2.1 below reports six regression models, all including random intercepts at the upper 
level. Model 1 includes all countries, except the post-Communist ones. It only includes GDP 
per capita, which has a strong and significant effect, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Model 2 
includes the post-Communist countries, and also adds the ten-year GDP-change variable, 
which appears to account for some of the differences between these and other countries. Both 
these variables have strong and significant effects, which would be consistent with both 
Hypothesis 1 and 3 – that economic challenges reduce the support for aid donation. Together, 
the two variables explain 46 percent of the between-country variance. Model 3 is also based 
on all samples and further includes Left-Right self-positioning, age and education at the 
individual level, all of which have significant effects. As expected, respondents who place 
themselves to the left are more supportive of aid, as are older respondents, and those with less 
education.  
However, as mentioned, there are also clear differences among aid donating countries, such as 
Spain and Portugal on the one hand, and most other OECD countries on the other. To better 
understand such differences, the remaining models look only at OECD DAC countries. Model 
4 is similar to Model 3, but is based only of this new selection. All variables still have 
significant effects with the expected signs. However, while Left-Right self-placement has a 
significant effect, it appears to add little when it comes to explaining between-country 
differences. Running Model 4 without Left-Right self-placement yields a ρ that is only 
marginally larger. Similarly, the inclusion of Left-Right self-placement does little to explain 
the effect of GDP. Model 5 introduces the DAC-years variables, which has a significantly 
negative effect. It also renders both GDP variables insignificant and reduces ρ notably. Thus, 
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this variable appears to explain why there is an effect of GDP even among donor countries. 
More developed countries joined DAC earlier, and now show lower support for aid. As the 
GDP variables are insignificant, they are dropped from Model 6, which has almost as low a ρ 
as Model 5, and a lower BIC value, suggesting this is a better model – the other being 
overfitted.  
Table 2.1. Hierarchical logistic regressions of support for increased aid, ISSP, 1999. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
 Ex. post-C. Inc. post-C. Inc. post-C. DAC only DAC only DAC only 
GDP per capita / 10 000 -0.529*** -0.442*** -0.417*** -0.464*** 0.016  
 (0.131) (0.101) (0.103) (0.162) (0.247)  
ΔGDP, 1989-1999, prop.  2.117*** 2.061*** 4.920*** 1.349  
  (0.506) (0.517) (1.462) (1.970)  
Left-Right, self-pos.   0.309*** 0.387*** 0.388*** 0.389*** 
   (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Education, secondary   -0.355*** -0.207*** -0.206*** -0.207*** 
   (0.036) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Education, university   -0.520*** -0.104* -0.105* -0.106* 
   (0.041) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Age   0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DAC years     -0.034** -0.037*** 
     (0.015) (0.008) 
Constant 1.273*** 0.561*** 0.478** -0.255 0.177 0.600** 
 (0.355) (0.213) (0.223) (0.501) (0.464) (0.265) 
N 19749 29249 29249 15435 15435 15435 
N of Clusters 17 26 26  14 14 14 
Rho 0.068 0.059 0.062 0.032 0.023 0.025 
BIC 25298.02 37868.77 37174.05 19827.07 19832.13 19813.99 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The countries 
included in the most encompassing selection are those surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme in 1999. 
Table 2.2 goes on to test the remaining variables, few of which have interesting effects. 
Model 1 shows that the socialist attributes of the welfare state only has a weak and 
insignificant effect. The inclusion of this variable makes the DAC-years variable insignificant, 
but this is because data are missing for the crucial countries Spain and Portugal. Model 2 
shows that the cumulative power of the Left, has a moderate effect with the expected sign, 
significant at the ten-percent level. Again the DAC-years variable is insignificant, but this is 
also because data are missing for Spain and Portugal. Model 3 shows that total ODA 
donations have no discernible effect, and the same is true of ODA as a share of GNI in Model 
4. Model 5 shows that unemployment-change over the last five years does have a notable and 
significant effect, with the expected sign, as increasing unemployment reduces the support for 
aid. A model including current levels of unemployment is not reported, as this variable proves 
irrelevant. Also in model 5, the DAC-years variable is insignificant due to missing data for 
Spain and Portugal.   
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Table 2.2. Hierarchical logistic regressions of support for increased aid, ISSP, 1999. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
 DAC only DAC only DAC only DAC only DAC only DAC only 
Left-Right, self-pos. 0.408*** 0.392*** 0.389*** 0.389*** 0.394*** 0.415*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) 
Education, secondary -0.128** -0.135** -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.157*** -0.243*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.056) 
Education, university -0.020 -0.010 -0.106* -0.106* -0.041 -0.155** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.064) 
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DAC years -0.014 0.014 -0.035*** -0.037*** 0.009 -0.036*** 
 (0.028) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Socialist attributes 0.025      
 (0.027)      
Cumulative Left power  0.007*     
  (0.004)     
ODA, current USD, 1999   -0.000    
   (0.000)    
ODA / GNI, 1999    -0.030   
    (0.395)   
ΔUnemployment, 5-year     -0.098***  
     (0.029)  
Gini index      -0.006 
      (0.019) 
Constant -0.410 -1.463** 0.577** 0.607** -1.270*** 0.813 
 (1.077) (0.596) (0.265) (0.280) (0.431) (0.757) 
N 12094 13158 15435 15435 13158 12593 
N of Clusters 11 12 14 14 12 12 
Rho 0.010 0.009 0.024 0.025 0.005 0.024 
BIC 15791.26 17115.71 19813.67 19823.63 17107.28 16259.94 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The countries 
included in the most encompassing selection are those surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme in 1999. 
Table 2.3 investigates whether any other variables than DAC-years are able to explain away 
the GDP-effect among DAC countries. The models parallel those in Table 2.2, but include the 
two GDP variables instead of DAC-years. It appears that these variables fail to do what the 
DAC-years variable does, as the only model in which the two GDP variables are insignificant 
is Model 2, which includes cumulative Left power. As mentioned above, missing data for 
Spain and Portugal means that these crucial countries are excluded. The cumulative Left 
power variable itself is insignificant, so the fact that the GDP variables are insignificant 
cannot be credited this variable. In sum, only the DAC-years variable appears able to explain 
why DAC members with different levels of economic development differ so clearly. 
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Table 2.3. Hierarchical logistic regressions of support for increased aid, ISSP, 1999. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
 DAC only DAC only DAC only DAC only DAC only DAC only 
GDP per capita / 10 000 -0.290* -0.147 -0.437*** -0.441** -0.202* -0.420** 
 (0.168) (0.157) (0.170) (0.174) (0.104) (0.176) 
ΔGDP, 1989-1999, prop. 2.534* 1.818 4.534*** 4.981*** 2.077** 4.166*** 
 (1.319) (1.480) (1.660) (1.466) (0.896) (1.606) 
Left-Right, self-pos. 0.407*** 0.392*** 0.387*** 0.387*** 0.396*** 0.414*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) 
Education, secondary -0.121* -0.137** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.160*** -0.244*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.056) 
Education, university -0.008 -0.010 -0.105* -0.104* -0.038 -0.155** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.064) 
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Socialist attributes 0.019      
 (0.023)      
Cumulative Left power  0.004     
  (0.004)     
ODA, current USD, 1999   -0.000    
   (0.000)    
ODA / GNI, 1999    -0.171   
    (0.486)   
ΔUnemployment, 5-year     -0.093***  
     (0.025)  
Gini index      0.010 
      (0.022) 
Constant -0.512 -0.805** -0.206 -0.277 -0.739*** -0.468 
 (0.389) (0.342) (0.507) (0.502) (0.236) (0.994) 
N 12094 13158 15435 15435 13158 12593 
N of Clusters 11 12 14 14 12 12 
Rho 0.008 0.009 0.031 0.032 0.003 0.033 
BIC 15791.26 17115.71 19826.85 19836.59 17107.28 16259.94 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The countries 
included in the most encompassing selection are those surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme in 1999. 
In sum, the results above do seem to support Hypothesis 1 – that citizens of more 
economically developed countries show less support for aid than those of less developed 
countries. However, this pattern is also found among developed countries, and this is 
apparently due to the fact that more developed countries stared donating aid much earlier than 
a few less developed donors, such as Portugal and Spain. People in countries that have 
donated aid for a longer period of time are less supportive of aid. The results also support 
Hypothesis 2a – that ideology plays an important role at the individual level. More leftist 
individuals are more supportive of international aid. However, the analyses give little support 
to Hypothesis 2b – that ideology helps explain between-country differences to a significant 
degree. Also Hypothesis 3 – that people in countries facing social and economic challenges 
show less support – finds support in the analyses. Long-term economic growth increases the 
support for aid, while increasing unemployment reduces it. Levels of economic inequality do 
not appear to have an effect, however. Neither does the degree to which welfare states have 
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socialist attributes. There is, however, a weak sign that cumulative Left power may have an 
effect, as this variable is weakly significant in one model. Interestingly, Hypothesis 4 – that 
national levels of aid donations reduce public support – does not appear to hold. Neither total 
ODA donations, nor ODS as a share of GNI shows an effect.  
CONCLUSION 
While the citizens of developed countries readily express their concern for less fortunate 
foreigners along with their disapproval of the current level of international inequality, it is 
hard to assess what level of commitment is involved. One way to put such opinions into 
perspective is to compare them to those of other, less advantaged people. That is one of the 
aims of this chapter. It conducts a more advanced analysis of a broader selection of countries 
than has been done in previous research. The analysis suggests that interests may play an 
important role in determining individual support for international aid, as the level of 
development is shown to have a strong effect. Citizens of countries that are likely contributors 
rather than recipients of international redistributive transfers are much less likely to support 
them. In this sense, international politics parallels domestic politics.  
However, even among aid donors there is a negative effect of GDP, which appears to result 
from the fact that more developed countries have donated aid longer. It appears harder to find 
support for increasing international aid in countries that have already donated aid for several 
decades. This may still be consistent with an interest-based explanation, as citizens of these 
countries may be more aware of their country’s status as a donor, but it may also suggest a 
process of resignation is taking place, as people receive critical reports about aid, or grow 
tired of the issue. This illustrates a limitation of this analysis – it stops short of looking at the 
reasons for people’s opinions, which may help us better understand why such relationships 
appear. This is the topic of Chapter 3. 
The analysis has a few other limitations. It is not based on a random sample of the world’s 
population or all of its countries, so the results are not statistically generalizable to other 
countries than those included. As a representation of the world, the selection of countries is 
particularly biased in terms of economic and human development. The present analysis lacks 
the empirical evidence to back up any claim about opinions in the countries harboring the 
poorest half of the world population (measured by average income). It appears plausible that 
these opinions will conform to the revealed pattern, and thus be at least as supportive of 
international aid as those in the least developed country included in the analysis. However, 
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poorer countries generally receive more aid, and their people may therefore be more content 
with the current levels. Low levels of human development may also mean that their people 
know less about the extent of international inequalities. It is also possible that they perceive 
international moral obligations as weaker, or attribute their national poverty to local causes 
calling for local solutions. Thus, Chapter 5 looks at the issue of generalization and the extent 
to which the least developed countries can be included in the analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2.4. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated individual level indicators. 
 DV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. GDP per capita / 10 000 -0.416 1.000      
2. ΔGDP, 1989-1999, prop. 0.538 0.262 1.000     
3. DAC years -0.821 0.622 -0.440 1.000    
4. Left-Right, self-pos. 0.688 -0.290 0.479 -0.482 1.000   
5. Education, secondary -0.359 0.070 -0.176 0.367 -0.463 1.000  
6. Education, university -0.367 0.524 -0.226 0.411 -0.420 -0.037 1.000 
7. Age 0.097 -0.261 0.018 -0.004 0.046 0.117 -0.326 
8. Socialist attributes 0.247 0.152 0.273 -0.323 -0.085 0.108 -0.173 
9. Cumulative Left power 0.440 0.162 0.445 -0.341 0.126 0.309 -0.417 
10. ODA, current USD, 1999 -0.400 0.181 -0.416 0.440 -0.161 -0.363 0.367 
11. ODA / GNI, 1999 -0.161 0.416 0.212 0.194 -0.103 -0.004 0.094 
12. ΔUnemployment, 5-year -0.602 -0.162 -0.191 0.074 -0.118 -0.387 -0.380 
13. Unemployment, 0.250 -0.565 -0.523 0.070 0.358 -0.100 -0.078 
14. Gini index 0.263 -0.336 -0.016 -0.368 0.193 -0.167 0.288 
Note: DV refers to the dependent variable, support for international aid, 1999. The correlations pertain to the selection of 
DAC members. While the analysis of DAC members reported in the text has up to 14 clusters, treating the Eastern and 
Western German samples as separate clusters, these correlations are based on up to 13 observations, as Germany is treated as 
a single observation (weighting the survey samples by population size). When socialist attributes are involved, New Zealand, 
Spain and Portugal are excluded because of missing data. The same is the case with Spain and Portugal and cumulative left 
power, unemployment and unemployment change. Gini inequality data are missing for Australia and Japan.  
Table 2.5. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated individual level indicators, cont. 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
8. Socialist attributes -0.180 1.000      
9. Cumulative Left power 0.161 0.729 1.000     
10. ODA, current USD, 1999 0.119 -0.538 -0.596 1.000    
11. ODA / GNI, 1999 -0.242 0.846 0.718 -0.159 1.000   
12. ΔUnemployment, 5-year 0.189 -0.375 -0.190 0.582 -0.114 1.000  
13. Unemployment, 0.036 -0.035 -0.185 -0.107 -0.169 -0.152 1.000 
14. Gini index 0.103 -0.793 -0.772 0.283 -0.760 -0.245 -0.018 
Note: DV refers to the dependent variable, support for international aid, 1999. The correlations pertain to the selection of 
DAC members. While the analysis of DAC members reported in the text has up to 14 clusters, treating the Eastern and 
Western German samples as separate clusters, these correlations are based on up to 13 observations, as Germany is treated as 
a single observation (weighting the survey samples by population size). When socialist attributes are involved, New Zealand, 
Spain and Portugal are excluded because of missing data. The same is the case with Spain and Portugal and cumulative left 
power, unemployment and unemployment change. Gini inequality data are missing for Australia and Japan.  
 
 
Table 2.6. Descriptive statistics for pre-imputed individual level variables, DAC members. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Support int. aid (dep. var.) 15435 0.429 0.495 0 1 
Left-right, self-pos. 13119 3.459 1.670 1 7 
Education, secondary 15898 0.503 0.500 0 1 
Education, university 15898 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Age 16161 46.458 16.687 16 96 
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Table 2.7. Data on current aid donations for ISSP countries, 1999. 
 ODA in billion $ ODA of GNI DAC-years Aid receipts / GNI 
Australia 96.0 0.26 33 . 
Austria 54.2 0.26 34 . 
Bulgaria . . . -2.12 
Canada 178.9 0.28 39 . 
Chile . . . -0.10 
Cyprus . . . -0.57 
Czech Republic . . . -0.55 
France 577.1 0.39 39 . 
Germany 551.0 0.26 39 . 
Hungary . . . -0.55 
Israel . . . -0.90 
Japan 1548.7 0.35 39 . 
Latvia . . . -1.38 
New Zealand 14.4 0.27 26 . 
Norway 143.5 0.91 37 . 
Philippines . . . -0.86 
Poland . . . -0.71 
Portugal 31.1 0.26 8 . 
Russian Federation . . . -1.03 
Slovak Republic . . . -1.57 
Slovenia . . . -0.14 
Spain 140.8 0.23 8 . 
Sweden 178.2 0.70 34 . 
United Kingdom 338.7 0.23 38 . 
United States 928.6 0.10 38 . 
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3. SELF-REPORTED REASONS FOR NON-SUPPORT OF AID 
In Chapter 2, we saw that people of more economically developed countries were less in favor 
of international aid transfers than those of less developed ones. We also saw that the 
differences among aid donors may be due to the fact that more developed donors have been 
donating for a longer time. Still, the earlier analyses leave open a few questions regarding 
what explains the pattern identified in Chapter 2. This could make a considerable difference 
for how we interpret the pattern, but we know very little in this regard. If it is the result of 
self-interest, the implications may be very different from those of a situation in which it 
results from greater skepticism regarding the impact of aid. This chapter aims to narrow this 
gap, although the focus is broader, directed at the question: What reasons explain citizens’ 
degree of support for aid in donor countries and, in particular, the negative relationship 
between such support and GDP per capita? While this chapter aims to use the best data 
available on this question, even these data have limitations that put notable restrictions on the 
analyses. For example, the analysis of between-country differences inevitably becomes a low-
N exercise, requiring parsimonious modeling. Nevertheless, the question addressed here is 
sufficiently important in light of the general topic of the thesis to merit attention, and the 
analysis does provide several qualified answers.  
The chapter starts by discussing explanations that may be relevant to understanding non-
support of aid, and by proposing a set of hypotheses in relation to these. The hypotheses are of 
two kinds: The first regards the impact of different types of expressed reasons for non-support 
of aid on the national levels of support. The second regards how such reasons are influenced 
by objective circumstances at the national level. After this first section, a discussion of how 
best to measure the reasons for respondents’ opinions on aid follows. Then, in the analysis 
section, the limitations of the data are discussed, and the proposed hypotheses are tested to the 
extent the data allow. The conclusion sums up the findings and includes a more general 
discussion. 
HYPOTHESES 
The analysis in this chapter will focus on the reasoning behind support for aid, looking at 
people’s expressed reasons and how these relate to external circumstances. In this sense, the 
question refers to two stages. One (let’s call it stage a) regards how people’s reasons relate to 
(aggregate) levels of support, the other (stage b) regards how people’s reasons relate to 
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external circumstances. Hypotheses will be put forward with regard to both, based on the 
theories discussed in the last chapter. The specific wording of each hypothesis is also slightly 
influenced by the available data, which will become apparent in the empirical sections.  
Of course, since explaining the negative effect of GDP per capita on support for aid is the 
main aim here, the variables related to each hypothesis will be of particular interest to the 
extent they are empirically related to economic development. For most of them, such a 
relationship appears plausible. In light of Chapter 2, it would be interesting to test whether 
“interest” influences support, but it is clear that the data employed here do not allow for such 
a test, as this is something that generally needs to be inferred from behavior. Nevertheless, it 
is also clear that some of the hypotheses to be tested are more compatible with an interest-
based model than others are, which is discussed below.  
As a simple explanation, we may expect the public’s degree of cosmopolitanism, understood 
as concern for people in less developed countries, to influence support for aid. Relating this 
idea to the available survey data, introduced below, we find indicators capturing explicit 
disinterest, which can be seen as measuring a lack of such concern. Both these ways of 
referring to this idea are used below. While this kind of concern may influence support 
through other expressed reasons for non-support, as will be discussed below, it may also have 
an effect of its own, and for now this direct effect is the question. The hypothesis is this: 
1. a. Support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where concern for people in 
less developed countries is lower and disinterest is more frequently cited as a reason 
for non-support. 
Identifying plausible external influences on such concerns may be more difficult than it is for 
other reasons for non-support, as these reasons may be expressions of deeper values and not 
have immediate external causes. Nevertheless, it may seem plausible that non-supporters in 
more developed countries have fewer alternative reasons to point to, since their countries are 
doing relatively well, and therefore are more likely to state disinterest as their reason. It is also 
worth noting, as illustrated by the effect of economic development identified in chapter 2, that 
respondents in more developed countries are more likely to be paying for increases in 
international aid, as they are the best placed to do so. If respondents find such prospects 
unattractive, and have few other reasons for not supporting aid, they may find that stating 
their disinterest is the best way out of the dilemma. It may even be an accurate statement. 
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Further, if such reasons are to explain the pattern in which support declines with economic 
development, they will have to depend positively on such development. Thus, the following 
hypothesis deserves attention: 
1. b. Disinterest with regard to less developed countries is greater and is more frequently 
cited as a reason for non-support in more economically developed countries. 
However, if this hypothesis appears to hold, we saw in the previous chapter that, among the 
countries in question (all donor countries) the effect of economic development may be due to 
the length of a country’s aid experience. While the OECD report cited earlier (Mc Donnell, 
Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003) concludes there is no fatigue in the public support aid, the 
relevant hypothesis here could be interpreted as saying there is one. This may explain the 
possible effect of economic development on disinterest as a reason for non-support. Thus, we 
want to check whether disinterest is higher in countries that have donated aid longer (as 
measured by the length of their continuous membership in the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC): 
1. c. Disinterest with regard to less developed countries is greater and is more frequently 
cited as a reason for non-support in countries that have donated aid for a longer 
period. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, support for aid may also depend on current levels of 
aid, as suggested by the model of “the public as thermostat” (Wlezien 1995). A crucial 
question, however, is whether survey questions capture absolute or relative preferences – or a 
mixture. As in most other policy areas the questions regarding aid tend to be phrased as 
relative to current policy, such as the ISSP (1999) question in the previous chapter, or the Pew 
(2007b) question “Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not 
doing enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic 
development, reducing poverty, and improving health?” However, as will be clear below, the 
most relevant dataset for this chapter is the Eurobarometer (EB) 50.1 (Melich 2006), whose 
most relevant question for capturing support for aid is this: “In your opinion, is it very 
important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor 
countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” This question does not ask 
whether current levels of aid are sufficient, or whether they should be increased or decreased 
– it does not refer to the current levels at all. Thus, strictly speaking, the question is a measure 
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of absolute rather than relative preferences, and might not respond to current levels of policy. 
It simply asks: “How” important? Nevertheless, as discussed in the general appendix at the 
end of this thesis, the EB and ISSP indicators are strongly correlated (with a coefficient of 
.92). 
If the EB indicator measures absolute preferences, as it appears to at face value, this may 
introduce another problem as well, as such preferences may influence policy over time, in 
accordance with the theory of dynamic representation (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; 
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). The countries in which absolute support is higher may 
donate more aid, although the evidence on this matter is inconclusive, as discussed in the 
introduction (Chapter 1). This relationship has the opposite direction of that regarding the 
effect of such donations on relative preferences. Thus, the former effect may blur the pattern, 
and make it harder to detect the latter effect – the possible public response to policy, which 
could explain lower support in donor countries. However, even if the indicator appears to 
measure absolute preferences, it is not unlikely that its aggregate to some extent will behave 
as a relative preference, as some respondents may take current levels into account. This may 
be revealed in the analysis, as the indicator’s relationships with alternative indicators and 
current policy are examined. The theory of the public as thermostat gives rise to the 
hypothesis that support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where current donations 
are greater. At stage a, this means that: 
2. a. Support for donation of aid is lower in countries where the level of current 
donations is perceived as higher and where this level is more frequently cited as a 
reason for non-support. 
This involves a further assumption. The survey question does not refer to specific countries – 
it does not ask “how important is it this country gives aid”. For international differences in aid 
donations to influence public support, respondents must interpret the question as pertaining to 
their country, or have their opinions influenced by the national context while applying them 
more generally. Again, this is not unlikely.  
At stage b, we can hypothesize that: 
2. b. The level of current donations is perceived as higher and is more frequently cited as 
a reason for non-support when actual current donations are greater. 
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In addition, whether respondents deem a certain level of donations to be sufficient should 
depend on their preferred level of donations, according to the thermostatic logic. This level 
may be an expression of their level of concern or interest regarding the matter. Thus, we may 
expect the extent to which current levels are seen as sufficient to depend on the level of 
concern or explicit disinterest:  
2. c. The level of current donations is perceived as higher and is more frequently cited as 
a reason for non-support where levels of disinterest are greater.  
Fortunately, most of the other relevant explanations of public support should affect absolute 
preferences, and so have effect, regardless of whether relative or absolute preferences are 
captured. Most notably, according to the findings of Noël and Therien (2002) mentioned in 
Chapter 2, support for the donation of aid is lower when respondents are more concerned 
about policy challenges at home. Noël and Therien focus on inequality and argue support is 
greater in countries where equality has been institutionalized through redistributive policies 
and welfare states. More generally, we may expect support to be undermined by any 
perceived domestic social and economic challenges. Thus, when it comes to explaining 
between-country differences in support, we have the following hypothesis: 
3. a. Support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where social and economic 
challenges are perceived as greater and are more frequently cited as reasons for non-
support. 
Of course, this requires that the respondents perceive their country as an actual or potential 
donor of aid rather than a recipient. At stage b, we expect that: 
3. b. National social and economic challenges are perceived as greater and are more 
frequently cited as reasons for non-support where actual challenges are greater. 
In addition, absolute preferences may depend on the extent to which respondents value the 
welfare of foreigners as opposed to their nationals, which in want of a better word, we could 
refer to as nationalism, and which may be captured by the indicators needed to test 
Hypothesis 1.  
While all the mentioned types of reasons fit quite well into the framework of absolute and 
relative preferences, there is another type that fits less well, namely the one related to 
inefficiency, mentioned in the previous chapter. Concerns about efficiency changes the whole 
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reasoning about how much we should try to achieve and how much of an effort should be 
made, as it removes the assumption that we can achieve what we want. Nevertheless, we can 
see the preference for avoiding waste as a factor influencing the absolute preference for aid 
donations. At stage a, we have the following hypothesis:  
4. a. Support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where skepticism regarding the 
impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for 
non-support. 
It is not clear what we would expect to explain between-country differences in such beliefs, 
but it could be that countries with more aid experience (donating more over a longer span of 
time) are likely to have seen more debates and negative reports regarding aid effectiveness, 
and therefore demonstrate greater public skepticism: 
4. b. Skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more 
frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries with more aid experience.  
In addition, it is likely that more economically developed countries have fewer social and 
economic challenges that serve as reasons for non-support. This could move non-supporters 
from reasons based on national priorities over to reasons related to inefficiency. Because aid 
donations tend to correlate with economic development, it may be worth controlling for 
economic development to be sure any detected effect of donations is not really due to 
economic development. The hypothesis involved is this:  
4. c. Skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more 
frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries that are more economically 
developed.  
As with Hypothesis 2, it is also possible that the reasons in question depend on the level of 
concern or interest with regard to less developed countries. As will be explained and 
investigated at length in the next chapter, individuals who are less inclined to support aid may 
develop a greater skepticism with regard to its efficiency and positive impact. At the 
aggregate level, this could mean that levels of skepticism are greater in countries where levels 
of disinterest are higher:  
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4. d. Skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more 
frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries where levels of disinterest 
are greater.  
As mentioned, some of these hypotheses are more compatible with an interest-based model 
than others are. If skepticism regarding the effectiveness of aid explains the pattern found in 
Chapter 2, it is probably not due to interests, and the same applies if it is due to a thermostatic 
response to national policy. While national problems may explain international differences in 
support, as Chapter 2 suggests, these are unlikely to explain the pattern in question, as more 
developed countries by definition are in a better situation to solve national problems and tend 
to do so. The hypothesis most compatible with the interest-based model may be that regarding 
levels of concern and disinterest, as suggested in the discussion of that hypothesis. These 
reasons may seem to express that respondents do not think giving aid is worth the cost to their 
country. If respondents in more developed countries, which would be likely to pay for 
increased aid, are more likely to state disinterest and lack of concern for foreigners as their 
reason for non-support, and if these reasons appear to explain aggregate levels of support, this 
may at least be consistent with an interest-based explanation.  
MEASURING REASONS 
If we want to analyze the reasoning behind opinions on development aid, we need data 
referring to people’s justifications of their views. One particular dataset stands out as relevant 
in this regard. This is the EB 50.1, which was conducted by face-to-face interviews, in 
respondents’ homes, in the appropriate national language, towards the end of 1998. As 
mentioned, the main question tapping the support for development aid is: “In your opinion, is 
it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor 
countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” (Melich 2006). In the analysis 
below, this variable has been recoded to range from 0 (not at all important) to 1 (very 
important), with the intermediate answer categories at equal intervals. In the last EB on 
development aid before 50.1, the EB 46.0 (Melich 2000), individuals responding “not very 
important” or “not at all important” were given the open-ended follow-up question: “why 
not?”, and then: “anything else?”. Thus, they were allowed to give up to two reasons for their 
positions, although most gave only one. For the EB 50.1 the equivalent group of respondents 
was given a follow up question, but now the responses from the EB 46.0 were used to 
construct a set of answer categories that were read out and shown to respondents using a card: 
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“From this list, please tell me why you think it is not important to help them?” Respondents 
were allowed to select multiple alternatives from the following list:   
1. First we should solve problems (poverty, unemployment, the economy) in [this country] 
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country] 
3. It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve 
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it 
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money 
6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have 
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms 
8. There will always be rich and poor countries 
9. I don’t know enough about these countries to decide whether it makes sense or not to help 
them 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me 
11. I don’t like foreigners (spontaneous response) 
12. Others (spontaneous response) 
13. Don’t know 
While these are the most detailed and comprehensive comparative date available on the 
reasoning behind people’s opinions on aid, they do have their problems. Most notably, the 
survey designers appear to have adopted the language of the responses from EB 46.0, instead 
of constructing neutral categories that clearly represent one specific reason. Unfortunately, 
this means that certain items may appeal to certain categories of respondents, due to their 
wording, rather than just their content. Some of these indicators also seem to combine several 
kinds of reasons for non-support. For example, the alternative “the more aid we give to poor 
countries, the more children they have” may be an expression of concern about aid 
effectiveness, but also the view that recipient governments should take more responsibility. In 
addition, it may only appeal to a particular subgroup of those who would agree with a more 
neutral statement such as “recipient governments do not make a sufficient effort to limit 
population growth”, or “recipient governments should take more responsibility”. Thus, not all 
of the items are equally useful for identifying particular types of reasons as explanations of 
between-country differences. Still, as these data are the best available, they will be used in the 
analyses below, but certain items may be preferred above others.  
Table 3.11 (in Appendix B) reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in this chapter. 
The stated reasons for non-support (among non-supporters) are the most interesting. The 
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statistics refer to their country-level aggregates, as these statistics are more interesting than 
those at the individual level. Of course, in order to get the correct mean of the pooled 
populations of all countries surveyed, the aggregates would have to be weighed by population 
size, which is not done here. Instead, each country counts as one. As can be seen, the by far 
most frequently cited reason for non-support is that “first we should solve problems (poverty, 
unemployment, the economy) in [this country]”. The average across these samples is 74 
percent, which means a majority of the non-supporters cite this reason, which may be a 
reflection of the fact that any country, at any time, is likely to have some social or economic 
problems. It is also worth noting that the standard deviation of the aggregates for this variable 
is not particularly large, compared to those of the other items. In fact, it is notably smaller 
than those of a few others are. In other words, there is not particularly much variation between 
countries in the propensity for non-supporters to cite this reason – it is common in all 
countries. This further suggests that – even though it is the most common reason – it may not 
be the most important explanation of between-country differences in support.  
The second most cited reason, with an average of 45 percent, is: “The money will be misused 
and will not reach those who need it”. Third, with 34 percent, comes: “Poor countries should 
stop fighting and stop buying arms”. Then, with 22 percent, follows: “This aid is too 
expensive for [this country]”. Then, both with 21 percent, are: “There will always be rich and 
poor countries”, and: “It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation 
does not improve”. With 17 percent, we find: “We (our country/Europe) already give them 
enough money”. An cross-country average of 14 percent say: “The more aid we give to poor 
countries, the more children they have”, and 9 percent say: “I don’t know enough about these 
countries to decide whether it makes sense or not to help them”. The remaining items are 
quite rare, as they have averages of 3 percent or less. 
Most of these indicators seem to fall into two general categories based on the hypotheses 
above, one related to efficiency and waste, and another related to domestic priorities and 
limited concern for people in less developed countries. A couple of answers do not fit such a 
categorization, namely the items “I don’t know enough […]” and “don’t know”. Excluding 
these, an exploratory principal component factor analysis has been conducted, keeping factors 
with an Eigenvalue above one. The results are reported in Table 3.1 below. Orthogonal 
varimax rotation has been used, which clarifies the results somewhat. To make patterns easier 
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to detect, factor loadings above .5 are reported in bold.27 While similar answer categories 
might have served as substitutes, and so be unrelated or negatively related, this does not 
appear to be the case. The pattern that emerges is largely as one would expect from the 
content of the alternatives. In other words, the mentioned general categories of reasons do 
seem to work as underlying dimensions influencing specific responses.  
The analysis results in three extracted factors. The first, with an Eigenvalue of 1.78, seems to 
be an expression of skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid, which we could 
call Waste. The items that load more than .5 on this factor are: “It is a waste of money to help 
poor countries because their situation does not improve”, “the money will be misused and will 
not reach those who need it”, “the more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they 
have”, and “poor countries should stop fighting […]”. The second factor, with an Eigenvalue 
of 1.35 seems to tap domestic priorities that prevail over inclination to donate aid. We could 
call it Priorities. The items that load more than .5 on this factor are the following: “First we 
should solve problems […] in [this country]”, “this aid is too expensive for [this country]”, 
and “we […] already give them enough money”. The last factor, with an Eigenvalue of 1.27, 
differs from the other factors in that it does not acknowledge the goal of helping foreigners. 
Rather than pointing to domestic problems, the items that load more than .5 on this factor 
express disinterest in the fates of foreigners or even a dislike of them: “Poor countries don’t 
interest me”, and “I don’t like foreigners”. Thus, we could call this factor Disinterest. These 
responses are very rare in most countries and seem to represent a distinctive type of non-
support. The only answer that does not load clearly on a single factor is “there will always be 
rich and poor countries”. A possible explanation is that is both be an expression of skepticism 
about effects (“we will never be able to achieve development”) and disinterest (“life is not 
fair, and we have to accept that”). As it is not clear what is expressed by this indicator, it may 
be best to focus on the others.  
                                                
27 An additional advantage of the rotation stems from the fact that the first factor extracted in part may 
be driven by a tendency to use more answer categories. The rotation may prevent this from affecting 
the results, which seems to be the case. 
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Table 3.1. Results from a rotated principal component factor analysis yielding three factors, EU, 1998. 
Item Factor 1 (Waste) 
Factor 2 
(Priorities) 
Factor 3 
(Disinterest) 
Unique 
variances 
1. First we should solve problems […] in 
[this country] 
-0.146 0.528 -0.293 0.614 
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country] 0.071 0.668 0.050 0.546 
3. It is a waste of money to help poor 
countries because their situation does not 
improve 
0.518 0.173 0.252 0.638 
4. The money will be misused and will not 
reach those who need it 
0.718 -0.063 -0.132 0.464 
5. We […] already give them enough money 0.141 0.687 0.155 0.485 
6. The more aid we give to poor countries, 
the more children they have 
0.544 0.139 0.246 0.625 
7. Poor countries should stop fighting […] 0.702 0.098 -0.071 0.492 
8. There will always be rich and poor 
countries 
0.395 0.290 0.218 0.712 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me -0.061 0.072 0.710 0.487 
11. I don’t like foreigners (spontaneous 
response) 
0.010 0.016 0.678 0.540 
Note: N = 2883, factor loadings above .5 are in bold. The Eigenvalues are 1.78, 1.35 and 1.27, respectively. The cumulative 
explained variance is .44. Orthogonal varimax rotation has been used.  
The results above provide a useful basis for constructing measures for further analysis. They 
confirm several of the categories of reasons implied by the hypotheses above, namely 
disinterest, focus on national problems, and concerns about efficiency. The factor analysis 
does not, however, produce a separate factor that is relevant to test Hypothesis 2 – that 
expressed support is relative in the sense that it responds thermostatically to greater donations. 
The item that appears most relevant in this regard, Item 5, “we already give them enough”, 
loads strongly on the Priorities factor, and thus appears intertwined with the other items that 
also does so. Nevertheless, because it appears well suited to test Hypothesis 2, it will be kept 
separate from the other items in the analysis below.  
Because several of the available items tap the same general dimensions, and because the 
number of degrees of freedom at the country level is severely limited, it is helpful to construct 
indices. A few considerations are relevant here. First, because the items, at least for some 
respondents, may serve as substitutes, and because the degree to which this is true may vary 
by country, it is best to keep as many items as possible. Second, it is not necessarily true that 
respondents who use more than one item from a category of reasons feel this reason more 
strongly. As mentioned, some items may be substitutes, and some may appeal more to certain 
respondents than they do to others. Thus, some respondents may use more items than others 
do, for other reasons than the strength of their opinion. In short, indices of an additive form 
may be unsuited. Instead, the indices used below are coded as binary indicators that take on 
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the value of one for respondents who have used at least one item within the category of 
responses in question. This has the advantage that the aggregation provides the share of these 
respondents who cite at least one reason from each category.  
The indices are as follows. National Priorities is based on Item 1, “first we should solve …”, 
and Item 2, “this aid is too expensive for this country”. Ineffectiveness is based on Item 3, 
“waste of money … because their situation does not improve”, Item 4, “money will be 
misused”, Item 6, “more aid … more children”, and Item 7, “poor countries should stop 
fighting”. Already enough will refer to the single relevant indicator, Item 5. Disinterest is 
based on Item 10, “poor countries don’t interest me”, and Item 11, “I don’t like foreigners”.  
Figure 3.1 shows how the first two indices relate to each other, by plotting the share of non-
supporters in each country who make use of reasons related to national priorities over the 
share that mentions efficiency-related reasons. As can be seen, Spain stands out as country in 
which people give few reasons of either type – which is interesting as it is usually also a 
country with greater support than others. Greece and Portugal stand out as countries in which 
non-support is more based on domestic priorities than concerns about efficiency, while 
countries such as the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark stand out with more efficiency 
concerns and less emphasis on domestic priorities, compared to other the countries.  
 
Figure 3.1. Share of non-supporters who cite at least one reason related to domestic priorities over the share who cite 
at least one effectiveness-related reason, for samples within EU countries, 1998. 
Figure 3.2 shows how the last two indices relate to each other, by plotting share of non-
supporters in each country who think their country already gives enough over the share who 
cites disinterest as a reason. This plot shows a clear positive relationship between the two, as 
respondents are more likely to say “we already give them enough” in countries where they are 
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also more likely to say they are not interested in poor countries or dislike foreigners. A 
plausible interpretation is that respondents who are not interested have a lower absolute 
preference for the donation of aid, and therefore find that aid is sufficient at lower levels than 
others do. In this sense, this fits with the thermostatic model, in which relative preferences 
depend on both policy and absolute preferences.  
There are, however, also a couple of notable outliers in the plot. Ireland scores higher on 
disinterest than any other country, but is at about the same level as the those at the top when it 
comes to the share saying current aid donations are enough. The West German sample is also 
an outlier, as the share disinterest is low, while the share who say “we already give enough” is 
higher than in any other sample. It is notable that the East German sample fits the general 
pattern much better, which could suggest that the respondents in West Germany at the time of 
the survey felt they were already sacrificing enough due to the German reunification, and 
therefore had a lower absolute preference for the donation of foreign aid. As can be seen in 
Appendix B, without these two outliers (and excluding Luxemburg for other reasons), the 
correlation is corresponding to the plot is .78. Including them, it is .45. 
 
Figure 3.2. Share of non-supporters who say “we  ... already give them enough” over the share who cite disinterest as 
a reason for non-support, for samples within EU countries, 1998. 
Table 3.12 (in Appendix B) reports bivariate correlations between aggregates of the 
mentioned items and the macro-level variables used in the analysis below. The correlations 
between the items, and their correlations with the dependent variable give some further clues 
with regard to what the items capture and to what extent they may serve as explanations. As 
mentioned, although “first we should solve […]” is by far the most common reason, it may 
not be the most important explanation of between-country differences. Indeed, several items 
show stronger correlations with the dependent variable. It is further worth noting that the 
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aggregate correlations are broadly consistent with the factor analysis, as the items loading on 
each factor tend to correlate considerably. In addition, the separation of “we already give 
them enough” from the national priorities factor appears justified at the aggregate level, as 
this item has no positive correlation with the two items remaining in the index (-.24 and -
0.07), while these two items correlate at .70 among themselves.  
ANALYSIS 
We both want to assess the impact of external circumstances on the tendency for non-
supporters to cite particular types of reasons, and the impact of these reasons on support for 
aid. Starting with the hypotheses related to the first topic, instead of those regarding the 
impact of various reasons on support, will help us assess the validity of the measures of these 
reasons, serving as convergence based tests of construct validity.28  
Disinterest 
As mentioned, with regard to the category of reasons referred to as disinterest, there are few 
plausible external explanations. Still, there is Hypothesis 1b above, which holds disinterest 
increases with the level of development. Figure 3.3 below plots the share of non-supporters 
citing disinterest-related reasons over GDP per capita. It shows a positive relationship as 
hypothesized. Although the relationship appears curvilinear, due to the zero bound on the 
outcome, it can be approximated with a linear model, as shown in by the correlations reported 
in Appendix B. The correlation corresponding to Figure 3.3, where Luxembourg is excluded 
for its extreme value on the GDP variable, is .47 and is significant at the 5 percent level in a 
one-tailed test. When Ireland, which has an unusually high value on disinterest, is also 
excluded, the correlation is .59. This supports the hypothesis that disinterest is more 
frequently cited as a reason for non-support where the level of economic development is 
higher.  
                                                
28 Appendix A reports individual level analyses of how different reasons relate to the strength of 
respondents’ non-support. The appendix also includes analyses of how socio-economic traits relates to 
support for aid and to the use of different reasons for non-support. 
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Figure 3.3. Share of non-supporters who cite disinterest as a reason over GDP per capita, EU, 1998.  
Note: Luxembourg is excluded, being an extreme outlier on the GDP measure. 
However, we also have Hypothesis 1c – that disinterest increases with the length of a 
country’s aid experience. Figure 3.4 below plots the share of non-supporters citing disinterest-
related reasons over the DAC-years variable introduced in Chapter 2. Again, we see a quite 
strong relationship, if we ignore the outlier of Ireland. The correlation between the two 
variables are .34 (N = 15). However, if we exclude Ireland (and Luxembourg for 
comparability with the correlations for GDP) the correlation is .73 (N = 13) – stronger than 
for GDP per capita. This picture also appears in regressions, where DAC-years is the only 
significant variable when Ireland is excluded. (Including Ireland, the GDP variable is only 
significant [p = 0.09] when the DAC-variable is left out, and neither is significant when both 
are in the same model.) Thus, we do seem to find some support for both Hypothesis 1b and 1c 
– disinterest is higher in more developed countries, and this may appear due to the length of a 
country’s aid experience. More developed countries have donated aid longer, and their 
citizens are more likely to say they are not interested in poor countries as a reason for not 
supporting aid.  
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Figure 3.4. Share of non-supporters who cite disinterest as a reason over DAC years, EU, 1998.  
Thermostat 
Hypothesis 2b holds that the public detects current policy, so that greater donations lead more 
respondents to cite the level of current donations as a reason for non-support. In order to test 
the role of the level of actual donations, we need a relevant measure. An obvious alternative is 
the value of official development aid (ODA) donations, given in US dollars.29 Another 
alternative is ODA donations as a share of the gross national income (GNI). This measure 
takes into account that smaller economies have less to give, and that nominally small 
donations may be large when the size of the economy is taken into account. As both these are 
relevant, and we need to limit the number of variables in the analysis, a factor score has been 
constructed from the two, and will be referred to as the aid donation index.30  
Table 3.2 reports three models where the share of non-supporters who say “we already give 
them enough” is regressed on disinterest and the aid donation index.31 As was already 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 above, there is a strong relationship between the dependent variable 
and disinterest. As that figure also illustrated, West Germany is an outlier in this regard, and 
                                                
29 This measure is constructed by multiplying data on ODA as a share of GNI by GNI (in current US 
$) for 1999. The GNI data are taken from the World Bank (2009b). The data on ODA donations as a 
share of GNI, which are both used in this calculation and included in the analysis, are taken from the 
OECD (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 33). Data for 1999 are used instead of 1998, as 
data for Greece are missing for 1998.  
30 The two variables have also been tested standing alone, but the factor score outperforms both. 
31 In these analyses, Germany and UK are treated as single entities, since their macro-level data are for 
the whole countries. This is why the number of observations falls to 15 from 17 above. 
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here, where Germany is treated as a single unit, this causes Germany to be an outlier. If it 
were included in Model 3 in the table, it would have a standardized residual of 2.386, while 
no other residual would be above 2. Since West Germany obscures what is otherwise a clear 
pattern, and this is likely to be due to the particular circumstances related to German re-
unification, Germany has been excluded from the analyses in Table 3.2. (The results that 
obtain when it is included are reported in Table 3.10 in Appendix B, and demonstrate that the 
estimates are not very different, although the standard errors are larger and the explained 
variance is lower). Model 1 includes only disinterest, which shows a strong effect, explaining 
almost 40 percent of the variance (in terms of the adjusted R2). Model 2 includes only the aid 
donation index, which has a more modest effect, explaining some 12 percent of the variance. 
When the variables are entered together in Model 3, this picture remains largely the same, 
with the model explaining slightly more than 50 percent of the variance.  
Table 3.2. Regressions of “already … enough” on aid donations and disinterest, excl. outlier, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Disinterest 1.139***  1.113*** 
 (0.381)  (0.335) 
Aid donations  0.028* 0.027** 
  (0.017) (0.013) 
Constant 0.106*** 0.163*** 0.109*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) 
N 14 14 14 
R2 0.43 0.19 0.59 
R2, adjusted 0.38 0.12 0.52 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Overall, then, we do seem to find support for Hypothesis 2B, albeit moderate. The public does 
seem to detect the level of aid donations and adjust its opinion accordingly. Figure 3.5 below 
corresponds to Model 2 in Table 3.2 and plots the share of non-supporters who say “we 
already give them enough” over index of aid donation. Although the general picture is a bit 
blurred, it conforms to what we would expect from Hypothesis 2B – greater donations 
increase the tendency for respondents to say current donations are enough. Still, there appears 
to be a notably stronger effect of disinterest on the propensity to who say “we already give 
them enough”. 
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Figure 3.5. Share of non-supporters saying “[w]e already give ... enough” over aid donations, EU, 1998.  
Domestic Priorities 
Turning to domestic priorities, the relevant Hypothesis is 3b – that respondents more 
frequently cite domestic priorities as reasons not to support aid when challenges are in fact 
greater. In particular, it is interesting to gauge the role of the variable that proved highly 
influential in Chapter 2, namely the proportional ten-year change in GDP per capita, from 
1989 to 1999. Figure 3.6 below plots the share of non-supporters who cite at least one reason 
related to domestic priorities over this variable. Ireland is excluded as its growth measured 
this way makes it an extreme outlier. The plot may give a hint of a relationship with the 
expected sign, but it is not significant at any acceptable level, and the adjusted R2 of this effect 
would be .04. Thus, this provides little evidence that the public considers actual national 
challenges in explaining non-support of aid. 
 
Figure 3.6. Share of non-supporters who cite domestic priorities as reasons over the proportional ten-year change in 
GDP per capita, EU, (end of) 1998. 
Note: Ireland is excluded, as its extreme growth as measure by the present indicator makes is an outlier.  
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However, if used as a test of construct validity, this also suggests that the measure may have 
low validity. This appears particularly likely given the strong effect found in Chapter 2 of 
national challenges on the support for aid donations. It should also be noted, as can be seen 
from Table 3.12 in Appendix B, that one of the measures used to construct the index of 
national priorities correlates much stronger with the GDP change variable than the other does. 
That is, while “first we should solve …” has a modest correlation of -.25, the response “this 
aid is too expensive for [this country]” has a strong correlation of -.72, which is significant at 
the one percent level. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.7. It may appear that the 
former item is so frequently used in all countries – it is the most common response – it fails to 
detect actual differences between the countries. The latter, on the other hand, refers directly to 
the economic costs of giving aid, and may thereby be better able to capture the effect of 
economic problems. Thus, while the index of reasons related to national priorities lends little 
support for Hypothesis 3b, item 2 used separately appears to yield considerable support, 
which is consistent with the findings in Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 3.7. Share of non-supporters who say “this aid is too expensive for [this country]” over the proportional ten-
year change in GDP per capita, EU, (end of) 1998. 
Note: Ireland is excluded, as its extreme growth as measure by the present indicator makes is an outlier.  
Inefficiency 
Lastly, we have the reasons non-support related to inefficiency. Three hypotheses were 
suggested above as explanations of these, pointing to the level of national engagement or 
experience with aid donations, the level of economic development, and levels of disinterest. 
Table 3.3 reports five regression models related to these hypotheses. Model 1 includes only 
disinterest, which has a weak and insignificant effect. Model 2 includes only the aid donation 
index introduced above, which has a significant effect, and an adjusted R2 of 42 percent. 
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Figure 3.8 below illustrates this relationship. Model 3 includes only GDP per capita, which 
also has a significant effect, and an adjusted R2 of 55 percent. Model 4 includes both the 
DAC-years variable introduced in the previous chapter, measuring the number of years a 
country has been a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Also this 
variable has a strongly significant effect, explaining 39 percent of the variance. Model 5 
includes all these variables, and yields a significant effect only for the GDP variable.  
Table 3.3. Regressions of inefficiency on disinterest, aid donations and GDP, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Disinterest 0.900    -0.350 
 (1.213)    (1.054) 
Aid donations  0.106***   0.049 
  (0.033)   (0.044) 
GDP per capita / 10 000   0.328***  0.290* 
   (0.080)  (0.181) 
DAC years    0.008*** -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.004) 
Constant 0.581*** 0.624*** -0.244 0.414*** -0.101 
 (0.073) (0.033) (0.214) (0.076) (0.384) 
N 14 14 14 14 14 
R2 0.04 0.46 0.58 0.44 0.66 
R2, adjusted -0.04 0.42 0.55 0.39 0.51 
Note: * p<0.20, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.02. Luxemburg is excluded from all the models, due to its extreme GDP per capita value. 
Thus, the results appear to support both Hypothesis 4b and 4c. Skepticism regarding aid 
effectiveness is more often cited as a reason by non-supporters in countries that donate more 
aid, as well as countries that have donated aid for a longer period. However, countries that 
donate more aid are also more economically developed, and the level of development appears 
to have a stronger effect, and more robust effect. In part, this may be due to more 
economically developed countries having fewer economic challenges that serve as reasons for 
non-support, leading non-supporters to cite ineffectiveness as a reason more often. When it 
comes to Hypothesis 4d – that ineffectiveness is more frequently cited as a reason for non-
support where disinterest is greater – the results appear to offer little support. However, as can 
be seen from the correlation tables in Appendix B, separating the items contained in the index 
of disinterest may alter this picture a bit. In particular, the item “foreign countries don’t 
interest me” correlates at 0.56 with the index of inefficiency-related reasons in Table 3.13 (the 
corresponding p-value is 0.059). Still, the support for Hypothesis 4d is limited. 
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Figure 3.8. Share of non-supporters citing reasons related to inefficiency over aid donations, EU, 1998. 
Impact on Support 
What remains is the main question of this chapter: What explains non-support for aid at the 
aggregate level? Why do some countries’ populations express less support than others do? 
Trying to answer this question in the analysis below, the above indices of cited reasons will be 
related to support. As country-level data from other sources are not included in the analyses, 
each sample will be aggregated separately to maximize the number of observations. This 
gives a western and an eastern German sample and one for Northern Ireland in addition to 
Great Britain.  
As a preliminary step it may be useful to inspect bivariate plots and identify potential outliers. 
Figure 3.9 plots support for aid over the index of disinterest, and demonstrates a strong 
relationship between the two, only disturbed by Ireland. This observation is completely at 
odds with the pattern displayed by the other countries, by scoring unusually high on 
disinterest, yet being among the most supportive samples. Thus, unless another variable can 
be included that explains this, Ireland may create problems in the analysis. As, can be seen 
from the correlation tables in Appendix B, the correlation corresponding to this plot is -.26 
when Ireland is included, and -.73 when it is excluded (along with Luxemburg and Germany).  
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Figure 3.9. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing disinterest as a reason, EU, 1998.  
Note: Aggregate support is based on an individual level scale from 0 (not at all important) to 1 (very important). 
Figure 3.10 plots support for aid over the share of non-supporters who say “we already give 
them enough”. Again, there appears to be a relationship with the expected sign, but it is 
notably weaker than that shown above. As can be seen from the correlation tables in 
Appendix B, the corresponding correlation is -.47. Figure 3.11, in Appendix B, shows the 
support for aid over the index on inefficiency-related reasons. It does not show a very clear 
relationship, although it suggests Belgium may be an outlier, excluding which a weak 
relationship might appear. Figure 3.12, also in Appendix B, plots support for aid over the 
index of national priorities, and fails to show a clear relationship between the two.  
 
Figure 3.10. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing the current level of aid, EU, 1998.  
As a last step, Table 3.4 reports models in which support for aid is regressed on the indices of 
reasons for non-support. When all four indices are included in a single model, as they are in 
Model 5 in Table 3.8 in Appendix B, it turns out that Ireland has a standardized residual of 
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2.31, while the second largest, that of Belgium, is only -1.72. Therefore, Ireland has been 
excluded from all the models in Table 3.4. Table 3.9 in Appendix B excludes both Ireland and 
Belgium for comparison.  
Model 1 in Table 3.4, which includes only the variable “already enough”, attributes this 
variable a significant effect explaining 25 percent of the variance, in terms of the adjusted R2. 
As would be expected from the plot discussed above, Model 2, which includes only national 
priorities, does not attribute a significant effect to this variable. The same is true of 
ineffectiveness, which is the only variable in Model 3. Disinterest, on the other hand, which is 
the only variable in Model 4, is attributed a highly significant effect with the expected sign 
that explains 50 percent of the variance. When all these variables are entered together in 
Model 5, only disinterest is attributed a significant effect, which is slightly weaker than that 
estimated in Model 4. The explained variance is also about the same as in that model. The 
other variables all retain the expected sign, but fail to reach significance. 
Table 3.4. Regressions of support on expressed reasons, excl. one outlier, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Already enough -0.517**    -0.183 
 (0.212)    (0.230) 
National priorities  -0.164   -0.183 
  (0.202)   (0.148) 
Ineffectiveness   -0.150  -0.067 
   (0.120)  (0.110) 
Disinterest    -1.935*** -1.607*** 
    (0.485) (0.537) 
Constant 0.770*** 0.810*** 0.776*** 0.754*** 0.959*** 
 (0.040) (0.160) (0.079) (0.023) (0.144) 
N 16 16 16 16 16 
R2 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.53 0.64 
R2, adjusted 0.25 -0.02 0.04 0.50 0.51 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed tests.  
In sum, the only hypothesis that receives unambiguous support with regard to explaining 
international differences in support is Hypothesis 1a, that support is lower where disinterest is 
cited as a reason for non-support. This may not be surprising, but it is nonetheless important. 
Model  1 above could seem to support Hypothesis 2a, that support shows a thermostatic 
responsiveness to national aid donations. However, the fact that its effect is much weaker, and 
statistically insignificant, when controlled for disinterest, undermines this interpretation. A 
better interpretation may be that the levels of aid respondents judge sufficient depends on the 
level of interest or concern, which itself has an effect on support, causing spurious correlation.  
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Hypothesis 3a, that support is lower where national challenges are cited as reasons for non-
support receives little support. This is somewhat surprising, given that Chapter 2 found a 
strong relationship between national economic problems and support, and this may again put 
the construct validity of the involved measures in doubt. It was mentioned above that the 
index of national priorities may have low validity. However, if Item 2, “this aid is too 
expensive” were used instead of the index in the above analysis, its estimates would still be 
insignificant, and the estimates of the other variables would hardly change. Thus, the 
dependent variable may also be thrown in doubt, and a likely problem is that it refers to the 
“importance” of helping other countries, without relating it to other policy objectives, 
allowing respondents to acknowledge its importance, while they might not support an increase 
in actual aid.  
Hypothesis 4a, that support is lower where inefficiency is more frequently cited as a reason 
for non-support does not receive strong support. It should be noted, however, that in Model 3 
in Table 3.9 in Appendix B, where Belgium is excluded, inefficiency is attributed a significant 
effect. The only problem is that when the other variables are included in Model 5, this effect 
is cut in half and rendered insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 4a receives little support here. 
Nevertheless, as the next chapter will illustrate, using other indicators, there may be 
something to the idea that support for aid is influenced by beliefs regarding effectiveness.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to explore which explicit reasons explain respondents’ degree of support 
for international aid. Explaining differences between countries is the most interesting as this 
may also help explain why more economically developed countries tend to show less public 
support. It was expected that one could distinguish between four categories of reasons for 
non-support: disinterest, thermostatic responsiveness, national priorities, and ineffectiveness. 
A factor analysis confirmed this with one possible exception – expressions of thermostatic 
responsiveness correlate with national priorities.  
Several hypotheses receive support in the analyses above, in particular those regarding the 
relationships between particular reasons for non-support of aid, and the objective 
circumstances that give rise to them. In more economically developed countries, respondents 
are more likely to cite disinterest as a reason for not supporting the donation of aid. However, 
this relationship appears due to the fact that more developed countries have donated aid 
longer, and disinterest is more widespread in such countries. This is interesting in light of 
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Chapter 2, which suggested the differences in support among aid donors also in part is due to 
the length of their aid experience. The present results may suggest the public grows tired of 
aid over time. It also appears that greater national donations of aid lead more respondents to 
see the “we already give them enough” as a reason not to support aid – in accordance with the 
notion of a thermostatic response. However, respondents’ use of this alternative appears to 
depend even more on disinterest than actual donations. In addition, while greater national 
economic challenges – measured by (low) economic growth over ten years, does not appear to 
influence respondents’ propensity to cite reasons related to domestic priorities in general, it 
does increase their tendency to say that “aid is too expensive” for their country. Concerns 
about wasted resources and aid inefficiency may appear to increase with greater national 
donations and the length of a country’s aid experience, but the level of economic development 
may appear more important in this regard.  
When it comes to explaining the between-country variance in support for aid (stage a) with 
the reasons cited for non-support, the hypotheses fare less well. Only one type of reasons 
appear to have a statistically significant effect, namely that of disinterest, which for its part 
appears to be highly influential. It appears that half of the international variation in support 
can be explained by disinterest. While the results also seem to suggest there is an effect of 
respondents saying “we already give them enough”, this ultimately appears to be a result of 
disinterest rather than actual aid donations, undermining the interpretation of this as a 
thermostatic response. The reasons related to national priorities and ineffectiveness are not 
found to have clear and strong effects.  
However, given the effect found of national economic challenges on support in Chapter 2, the 
mentioned results may put the construct validity of the measure of support in doubt. As 
mentioned, a possible problem is that the indicator refers to absolute preferences for aid 
donations rather than relating them to current levels of aid to capture relative preferences. 
Another is that the donation of aid is not set up against other policy objectives, so that the 
indicator fails to capture the importance attributed to donating aid within a frame of necessary 
trade-offs. This is likely to explain why the relationship between support and economic 
development is blurred in this analysis. It is also likely to explain why national priorities are 
not found to have an effect on support, despite national economic problems proving 
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influential in chapter 2.32 Respondents may find the donation of aid important, and yet think 
their national problems should be given priority for the time being. Similarly, this may in part 
also explain why the effect of reasons related to inefficiency is unclear, and why there is no 
clear evidence of a thermostatic response. Thus, the analyses in this chapter hardly make for 
strong conclusions dismissing any of these hypotheses.  
Still, we see that the only explanation receiving strong support is that of disinterest. In 
addition, we see that disinterest increases with economic development and the length of a 
country’s aid experience. Disinterest is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in 
the countries that would be likely to pay for increased aid. As this reason may be seen as an 
expression respondents do not think giving aid is worth the cost to their country, these 
findings may appear consistent with the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 2, that self-interest 
causes individuals in more economically developed countries – those that are potential aid 
donors – to be less in favor of international aid than individuals in other countries. However, 
the results also suggest a slightly more nuanced picture, as the effect of economic 
development on support among aid donors may be indirect, and work through the length of a 
country’s aid experience, which may gradually exhaust public support. 
                                                
32 It should also be noted that this effect could not possibly explain the relationship that is of most 
interest here, the negative effect of economic development on support for aid. The economic 
challenges as measured here are negatively related to economic development, as greater increases in 
production (fewer challenges) are related to greater overall production. Greater increases in production 
give fewer domestic challenges as potential reasons for not supporting aid. Rather than helping to 
explain the negative effect of economic development, economic challenges would provide an 
additional explanation. 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSES 
Another way to analyze the data, turning to the individual level, is to investigate how socio-
economic characteristics affect both the support for aid, and the use of different reasons to 
explain non-support. While this does not directly explain between-country differences in the 
support for aid, it may yield information about what groups tend to support aid or not, and 
what reasons they tend to use. This may also tell us something about the nature of the items 
measuring the reasons. Table 3.5 reports several regression models, all of which report “fixed 
effects”, i.e. they are models where the country means are removed, so that between-country 
differences do not affect the results. Model 1 and 2 take the support for aid as the dependent 
variable. Model 1 includes age, education and income.33 Model 2 adds respondent 
cooperation, as coded by the interviewer, ranging from excellent (1) to bad (4).34 This variable 
is included to give further clues as to which respondents use which reasons. Model 1 shows 
that younger respondents, those with higher education, and those with higher income express 
a stronger support for the donation of aid. When respondent cooperation is introduced in 
Model 2, the effect of income is reduced and rendered insignificant, suggesting that the 
former variable intervenes in the causal relationship. Respondents who show less cooperation 
in the interview situation also show less support for aid.  
Overall, it is clear that the independent variables do not explain much of the propensity to use 
any of the reasons investigated. Nevertheless, there are a few significant effects that may be 
interesting. Respondents with higher education are less likely to say that “first we should 
solve problems […] in this country” and that “the more aid we give […] the more children 
they have”. As mentioned, these respondents are also more likely to support aid. Those with 
higher income are more likely to be concerned about the impact and effectiveness of aid, 
saying “It is a waste […] because their situation does not improve”, and that “the money will 
be misused and will not reach those who need it”. They are also more likely to say that “Poor 
countries should stop fighting”. Thus, it seems that respondents with higher incomes to a 
                                                
33 Education is measured as the year in which education was ended. Where respondents are still in 
education, the value has been set equal to present age. To avoid rare and extreme values, the variable 
has been set to vary from 14 to 25, with values outside this range being set to the closest accepted 
value (14 or 25). Income is measured in quartiles (lowest = 1, highest = 4). 
34 The missing values for each of these variables have all been imputed using the available values of 
the other. The imputation was done for each sample separately, to accommodate differences in means, 
and the relationships between the variables.  
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greater extent place responsibility for underdevelopment with people in poor countries. This 
may parallel the pattern in which such respondents are more skeptical with regard to national 
redistributive policies.  
Older respondents behave much the same way as those with higher income, being more likely 
to state the three mentioned reasons related to efficiency and local fighting. In addition, they 
are less likely to say that “poor countries don’t interest” them, and somewhat less likely to 
point to domestic problems. However, it is also worth recalling that age differs from income 
when it comes to support for aid, as older respondents are less supportive of aid than younger 
ones.  
When it comes to respondent cooperation, those who are less cooperative are more likely to 
point to domestic problems. Interestingly, they are also less likely to say that “[m]oney will be 
misused” – the expression of concerns about efficiency that has the most neutral and nuanced 
wording. In addition, they are less likely to say “poor countries should stop fighting”, and 
more likely to say “poor countries don’t interest me” and “I don’t like foreigners”. This may 
illustrate the problem with the wording of the alternatives. Less cooperative respondents, 
appear more likely to use alternatives that lack nuance and contain implicit or explicit 
prejudice towards foreigners and poor countries.  
While this is only indicative with regard to how different reasons affect the support for aid, it 
may be worth noting which categories show more and less support, and which reasons they 
tend to use. For example, that older respondents tend to be more concerned about efficiency, 
and also tend to be less supportive of aid, or that those with lower education are more 
concerned about domestic problems, and less supportive of aid. For income, which has a less 
clear effect on the support for aid, the picture is less clear, as higher incomes are positively 
related to support for aid, and for concerns about aid effectiveness. 
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Table 3.5. Fixed effects linear and logistic regressions of support for aid and reasons for non-support on socio-
economic variables and respondent cooperation, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Support Support Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
Education 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.043*** -0.017 0.003 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) 
Income quartile 0.005** 0.002 -0.056 0.024 0.095* 0.102** 0.089 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.050) (0.051) (0.053) (0.045) (0.055) 
Age -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.005* 0.003 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Respondent coop.  -0.027*** 0.135** -0.007 -0.077 -0.159*** -0.007 
  (0.003) (0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.052) (0.063) 
Constant 0.525*** 0.583***      
 (0.015) (0.016)      
N 15187 15187 2883 2883 2883 2883 2883 
R2, adj./pseudo 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 3.6. Fixed effects logistic regressions of reasons for non-support of aid on socio-economic variables and 
respondent cooperation, EU, 1998 (continued form Table 3.6). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 Item 9 Item 10 Item 11 
Education -0.046** -0.006 -0.004 0.029 -0.044 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.040) (0.050) 
Income -0.026 0.088* -0.057 -0.090 -0.077 -0.028 
 (0.059) (0.045) (0.052) (0.073) (0.120) (0.156) 
Age 0.004 0.005** -0.002 -0.003 -0.026*** -0.008 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Respondent coop. -0.113 -0.161*** -0.059 0.097 0.234* 0.506*** 
 (0.069) (0.053) (0.061) (0.084) (0.122) (0.153) 
N 2883 2883 2883 2883 2693 2746 
R2, pseudo 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The number of observations for the two last models is lower, because countries in 
which these rare responses did not occur at all are excluded.  
At the individual level, we are unable to analyze the impact of reasons for non-support on the 
full scale of support, as the survey only asks the relevant questions to non-supporters. 
However, we do know whether these respondents say helping people in poor countries is “not 
very important” or “not at all important”. This allows us to analyze how the reasons relate to 
the strength of respondents’ non-support, which is done below. 
Table 3.7 below therefore reports a fixed effect logistic regression of the two categories of 
non-support on the indicators included in the factor analysis above. “Not at all important” is 
given the highest value (one), so positive coefficients means that items are related to stronger 
opposition. First, it should be noted that the analysis does not explain much of the variance, 
with a pseudo R2 of .04. Nevertheless, there are several highly significant coefficients, and 
some of them are negative – suggesting that some reasons for non-support are related to more 
moderate stances. The only priorities-related reason with a significant coefficient is “this aid 
is too expensive”, which is related to stronger opposition to aid. The disinterest-related items 
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(10 and 11) are both highly significant and positive, again suggesting strong relationships 
with greater opposition. With regard to the waste-related items the picture is less clear. Two 
of them have significantly positive coefficients, namely “it is a waste of money […] because 
their situation does not improve” and “the more aid we give to poor countries, the more 
children they have”. However, another item has a significantly negative effect, namely “the 
money will be misused and will not reach those who need it”. 
This points us towards an important concern: How these items relate to support for aid may 
depend as much on question wording as on the logic or the type of the reasons in question. 
The items that are related to moderate positions (i.e. “not very important”) also appear to be 
more moderate and nuanced. In addition to the “money will be misused”-item, this applies to 
“there will always be rich and poor countries” and “I don’t know enough about these 
countries to decide”.  
We should also note that the items that get negative coefficients in this analysis would be 
unlikely to receive negative coefficients if we had the whole scale of the support available. 
The concerns that are related to moderate oppositions are still reasons for showing lower 
support. Similarly, the items that do not get significant estimates may still be important when 
the whole scale is taken into account. They just do not influence the degree of non-support.  
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Table 3.7. Fixed effects logistic regression of “not at all” versus “not very” important to help, EU, 1998. 
Item Model 1 
1. First we should solve problems […] in [this country] 0.135 
 (0.105) 
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country] 0.439*** 
 (0.102) 
3. It is a waste of money […] because their situation does not improve 0.323*** 
 (0.113) 
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it -0.283*** 
 (0.097) 
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money 0.025 
 (0.115) 
6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have 0.391*** 
 (0.122) 
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms -0.128 
 (0.100) 
8. There will always be rich and poor countries -0.291** 
 (0.114) 
9. I don’t know enough about these countries to decide […] -0.355** 
 (0.163) 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me 1.390*** 
 (0.223) 
11. I don’t like foreigners (spontaneous response) 1.173*** 
 (0.283) 
N 2883 
N of Clusters 15 
R2, pseudo 0.04 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVES, CORRELATIONS AND ADDITIONAL AGGREGATE ANALYSES 
 
Figure 3.11. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing inefficiency as a reason, EU, 1998.  
 
 
Figure 3.12. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing national priorities, EU, 1998.  
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Table 3.8. Regressions of support on expressed reasons, incl. outliers, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Already enough -0.481**    -0.362 
 (0.222)    (0.321) 
National priorities  -0.089   -0.084 
  (0.200)   (0.208) 
Ineffectiveness   -0.152  -0.055 
   (0.122)  (0.157) 
Disinterest    -0.675 -0.287 
    (0.507) (0.573) 
Constant 0.770*** 0.757*** 0.783*** 0.715*** 0.863*** 
 (0.042) (0.159) (0.080) (0.028) (0.202) 
N 17 17 17 17 17 
R2 0.24 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.27 
R2, adjusted 0.19 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed tests.  
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Table 3.9. Regressions of support on expressed reasons, excl. two outliers, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Already enough -0.396**    -0.117 
 (0.213)    (0.255) 
National priorities  -0.043   -0.158 
  (0.193)   (0.156) 
Ineffectiveness   -0.200**  -0.103 
   (0.100)  (0.125) 
Disinterest    -1.674*** -1.410** 
    (0.569) (0.624) 
Constant 0.756*** 0.724*** 0.819*** 0.747*** 0.947*** 
 (0.039) (0.151) (0.067) (0.024) (0.148) 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
R2 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.40 0.53 
R2, adjusted 0.15 -0.07 0.17 0.35 0.35 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed tests.  
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Table 3.10. Regressions of “already ... enough” on aid donations and disinterest, incl. outlier, EU, 1998. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Disinterest 0.926**  0.937** 
 (0.507)  (0.436) 
Aid donations  0.037** 0.037** 
  (0.018) (0.016) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.172*** 0.128*** 
 (0.030) (0.017) (0.025) 
N 15 15 15 
R2 0.20 0.25 0.46 
R2, adjusted 0.14 0.19 0.36 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.11. Descriptive statistics for macro-level variables.  
Support for aid, aggregated from EB 50.1:     
a. Support of aid, from not at all important (0) to very important (1)  0.683 0.076 0.537 0.830 
Macro-level variables: Mean SD Min Max 
b. ODA, in 100 billions, current US $ 1.822 1.869 0.126 5.771 
c. ODA / GNI 0.402 0.260 0.150 1.010 
d. Aid donation index 0 1 -1.256 1.571 
e. GDP per capita, 1998, PPP, 2005 USDa  26496 3760 19086 31304 
f. ΔGDP, 1989-1999, proportionalb 0.212 0.079 0.112 0.388 
g. National Priorities 0.785 0.099 0.623 0.931 
h. Inefficiency 0.625 0.156 0.372 0.859 
i. Disinterest 0.047 0.036 0.000 0.137 
Reasons for not supporting aid, aggregated from EB 50.1:     
1. First we should solve problems […] in [this country] 0.739 0.108 0.575 0.898 
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country] 0.221 0.071 0.115 0.345 
3. It is a waste of money […] because […] does not improve 0.209 0.090 0.055 0.422 
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it 0.446 0.167 0.175 0.746 
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money 0.172 0.075 0.069 0.318 
6. The more aid we give […] the more children they have 0.137 0.076 0.019 0.227 
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms 0.335 0.129 0.052 0.525 
8. There will always be rich and poor countries 0.210 0.084 0.071 0.323 
9. I don’t know enough about these countries […] 0.091 0.042 0.034 0.160 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me 0.032 0.028 0.000 0.109 
11. I don’t like foreigners (spontaneous response) 0.020 0.018 0.000 0.056 
12. Others (spontaneous response) 0.024 0.021 0.000 0.062 
13. Don’t know 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.034 
Note: The table is based on the same 15 observations as Figure 3.5 above, where the United Kingdom and Germany are 
treated as single observations.  
a Luxembourg is excluded from the  analyses involving this variable, as it has the extreme value 52580. Therefore, these 
summary statistics are also based on the 14 other countries. 
b Ireland is excluded from the  analyses involving this variable, as it has the extreme value 0.847. Therefore, these summary 
statistics are also based on the 14 other countries. 
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Table 3.12. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregates, including outliers. 
 a.  b.  c.  d.  e.  f.  g.  h.  i.  
b. ODA, in 100 billions, current US $ -0.09 1.00        
c. ODA / GNI 0.07 0.07 1.00       
d. Aid donation index -0.02 0.73 0.73 1.00      
e. GDP per capita, 1998a  -0.34 0.44 0.50 0.62 1.00     
f. ΔGDP, 1989-1999, proportionalb 0.15 -0.17 0.29 0.09 0.12 1.00    
g. National Priorities -0.21 -0.02 -0.45 -0.32 -0.42 -0.34 1.00   
h. Inefficiency -0.32 0.38 0.62 0.68 0.76 -0.13 -0.32 1.00  
i. Disinterest -0.26 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.47 -0.20 0.32 0.20 1.00 
1. First we should solve […] -0.14 -0.02 -0.40 -0.29 -0.45 -0.25 0.98 -0.36 0.23 
2. This aid is too expensive […] -0.43 0.35 -0.30 0.03 -0.11 -0.72 0.61 0.13 0.08 
3. […] situation does not improve -0.05 0.46 0.73 0.81 0.66 -0.12 -0.38 0.71 0.12 
4. The money will be misused […] -0.17 0.28 0.67 0.65 0.60 -0.12 -0.27 0.94 0.06 
5. We […] already give them enough  -0.47 0.49 0.23 0.50 0.69 0.13 0.06 0.54 0.45 
6. […] the more children they have -0.71 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.71 0.00 -0.18 0.75 0.35 
7. […] should stop fighting -0.58 0.24 0.42 0.45 0.62 -0.14 -0.10 0.89 0.23 
8. […] will always be rich and poor  -0.47 0.35 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.06 -0.36 0.76 0.04 
9. I don’t know enough […] -0.28 -0.09 0.72 0.43 0.55 -0.05 -0.32 0.84 0.16 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me -0.13 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.38 -0.16 0.17 0.29 0.91 
11. I don’t like foreigners -0.34 0.31 -0.02 0.20 0.47 -0.15 0.43 0.08 0.71 
12. Others (spontaneous response) 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.13 -0.32 -0.27 -0.08 
13. Don’t know -0.41 -0.18 -0.28 -0.32 -0.08 0.00 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  
2. This aid is too expensive […] 0.57 1.00        
3. […] situation does not improve -0.37 0.04 1.00       
4. The money will be misused […] -0.27 0.14 0.66 1.00      
5. We […] already give them enough  0.06 0.23 0.52 0.44 1.00     
6. […] the more children they have -0.22 0.20 0.51 0.61 0.68 1.00    
7. […] should stop fighting -0.18 0.23 0.46 0.80 0.54 0.76 1.00   
8. […] will always be rich and poor  -0.33 0.13 0.76 0.70 0.58 0.73 0.64 1.00  
9. I don’t know enough […] -0.37 -0.04 0.54 0.84 0.26 0.53 0.81 0.67 1.00 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me 0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.20 0.34 0.39 0.27 -0.01 0.27 
11. I don’t like foreigners 0.40 0.22 0.16 -0.07 0.41 0.18 0.12 0.21 -0.02 
12. Others (spontaneous response) -0.36 -0.42 0.01 -0.39 -0.33 -0.33 -0.41 -0.25 -0.33 
13. Don’t know -0.25 -0.19 -0.34 -0.17 -0.25 0.25 0.22 -0.24 0.00 
 10.  11.  12.  13.       
11. I don’t like foreigners 0.38 1.00        
12. Others (spontaneous response) -0.17 0.12 1.00       
13. Don’t know 0.07 -0.22 0.23 1.00      
Note: The table is based on the same 15 observations as Figure 3.5 above. 
a Luxembourg is an outlier on this variable and is excluded, which makes N for these correlations 14. 
b Ireland is an outlier on this variable and is excluded, which makes N for these correlations 14 (except for with GDP where it 
is 13). 
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Table 3.13. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregates, excluding outliers. 
 a.  b.  c.  d.  e.  f.  g.  h.  i.  
b. ODA, in 100 billions, current US $ 0.01 1.00        
c. ODA / GNI 0.12 0.25 1.00       
d. Aid donation index 0.09 0.74 0.83 1.00      
e. GDP per capita, 1998a  -0.37 0.43 0.55 0.63 1.00     
f. ΔGDP, 1989-1999, proportionalb 0.25 -0.01 0.17 0.11 0.12 1.00    
g. National Priorities -0.35 -0.03 -0.43 -0.31 -0.49 -0.39 1.00   
h. Inefficiency -0.33 0.29 0.74 0.67 0.75 -0.22 -0.40 1.00  
i. Disinterest -0.73 0.41 0.04 0.26 0.65 -0.18 0.17 0.36 1.00 
1. First we should solve […] -0.24 -0.03 -0.41 -0.30 -0.52 -0.35 0.99 -0.45 0.10 
2. This aid is too expensive […] -0.48 0.11 -0.20 -0.08 -0.17 -0.69 0.72 0.07 0.26 
3. […] situation does not improve 0.00 0.38 0.85 0.81 0.66 -0.05 -0.41 0.72 0.34 
4. The money will be misused […] -0.17 0.25 0.75 0.66 0.57 -0.35 -0.33 0.95 0.14 
5. We […] already give them enough  -0.61 0.43 0.37 0.51 0.71 0.03 -0.04 0.46 0.78 
6. […] the more children they have -0.71 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.72 -0.19 -0.16 0.75 0.76 
7. […] should stop fighting -0.63 0.07 0.52 0.40 0.60 -0.26 -0.16 0.88 0.43 
8. […] will always be rich and poor  -0.40 0.32 0.73 0.69 0.80 -0.02 -0.30 0.82 0.45 
9. I don’t know enough […] -0.33 -0.04 0.75 0.49 0.57 -0.14 -0.36 0.91 0.13 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me -0.64 0.36 0.12 0.28 0.60 -0.28 -0.06 0.56 0.84 
11. I don’t like foreigners -0.49 0.48 0.05 0.31 0.49 -0.05 0.39 0.12 0.75 
12. Others (spontaneous response) 0.43 0.41 0.03 0.26 0.15 0.51 -0.30 -0.19 0.02 
13. Don’t know -0.37 -0.23 -0.37 -0.38 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.22 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  
2. This aid is too expensive […] 0.70 1.00        
3. […] situation does not improve -0.39 -0.11 1.00       
4. The money will be misused […] -0.36 0.19 0.70 1.00      
5. We […] already give them enough  -0.07 0.24 0.59 0.31 1.00     
6. […] the more children they have -0.24 0.25 0.52 0.58 0.70 1.00    
7. […] should stop fighting -0.25 0.19 0.44 0.78 0.43 0.76 1.00   
8. […] will always be rich and poor  -0.30 0.13 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.68 1.00  
9. I don’t know enough […] -0.41 0.01 0.60 0.89 0.31 0.58 0.90 0.76 1.00 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me -0.16 0.25 0.40 0.37 0.65 0.91 0.57 0.44 0.30 
11. I don’t like foreigners 0.39 0.24 0.20 -0.03 0.59 0.30 0.17 0.37 -0.04 
12. Others (spontaneous response) -0.30 -0.66 -0.01 -0.28 -0.10 -0.28 -0.34 -0.32 -0.34 
13. Don’t know -0.18 -0.21 -0.38 -0.15 -0.19 0.26 0.30 -0.36 0.03 
 10.  11.  12.  14.       
11. I don’t like foreigners 0.31 1.00        
12. Others (spontaneous response) -0.08 0.13 1.00       
13. Don’t know 0.41 -0.17 0.17 1.00      
Note: The table is based on 12 of the 15 observations as Figure 3.5 above, as three outliers are excluded: Luxembourg for its 
extreme value on GDP per capita, Ireland for its extreme value on ten-year GDP change (and disinterest), and Germany for 
West Germany’s tendency to say “we .. already give them enough”, making Germany an outlier with regard to most bivariate 
relationships. 
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4. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND BELIEFS ON AID EFFECTIVENESS  
As we might expect, those believing that governmental aid makes a difference to the lives of 
people in poor countries are more inclined to consider that it is “very important” to give aid to 
these countries.  (TNS 2005: 27) 
That the minority who are non–supporters [of official development aid] mention corruption, 
aid diversion and inefficiency — in addition to preference for their own domestic concerns — 
to explain their attitude is easily understandable. (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 
26) 
Surveys of opinions on development aid may help us understand how public opinion relates to 
international relations. However, any interpretation of responses regarding support for aid 
requires assumptions about the reasons for people’s positions – at the very least. Any reliable 
interpretation would require that their reasons be empirically investigated, as attempted in 
Chapter 3. Most importantly, reasons based on beliefs regarding aid effectiveness ought to be 
separated from other reasons, as they determine the perceived scope for aid to make a 
difference. Low confidence in the effectiveness of aid is commonly seen as highly legitimate 
reasons for showing limited support. However, taking such beliefs into account requires a 
causal model of how they relate to support for aid. As the quotes above suggest, previous 
studies based on existing survey data, assume a one-directional effect of beliefs regarding 
effectiveness on support for aid.  
However, this may be too simple, as reciprocal causation is also plausible. Some theories 
suggest that those less inclined to support aid have reasons to adjust their expressed empirical 
beliefs regarding aid effectiveness. Most importantly, cognitive dissonance theory may 
suggest that individuals wanting to maintain positive self-concepts, while not supporting aid, 
have motivation to be more pessimistic in their empirical beliefs. If this is correct, people’s 
stated beliefs regarding aid effectiveness are not neutral reasons for their positions on the 
donation of aid.  
This is investigated using two research designs, involving different datasets and indicators. 
The first uses data from the EB 62.2 and deals with reciprocal causation using an instrumental 
variable approach. The second design uses indicators from the Eurobarometer (EB) 50.1 that 
avoid the challenge of reciprocal causation, but possibly suffer from the presence of a 
particular confounder. Propensity score matching based on several measures of this 
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confounder is used, before the effect on several measures of beliefs in effectiveness are 
estimated. In both cases, the preliminary results suggest there are significant effects of support 
for aid on beliefs regarding effectiveness. The chapter starts by discussing the theoretical 
background and the assumptions required to form the mentioned hypothesis. Then, the two 
analyses are presented and discussed in two separate sections, followed by a discussion of the 
differences between the two designs as well as the emerging overall result. 
THE PATTERN 
The first analysis will be based data from the EB 62.2, conducted towards the end of 2004 
(European Commission 2007). As in other EBs, the main question tapping support for 
development aid is this: “In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, 
or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to 
develop?”. The dataset also includes a quite direct measure of expressed beliefs in aid 
efficiency, namely the question: “Thinking about development aid provided by the [national] 
Government, is this aid making any difference to improving the lives of poor people in 
developing countries (Africa, Latin America, Asia, etc.)?”. The possible answers are “yes”, 
“no” and “do not know”. For the EU as a whole, 51 percent say “yes”, 32 say “no” and 17 “do 
not know” (TNS 2005). Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain the “do not know” 
responses, but they presumably coincide with the missing values (except for those for 
Bulgaria and Romania where the question was not asked). Nevertheless, the indicator has 
been kept as a binary indicator.  
At the individual level, this variable is quite strongly related to views on the importance of 
giving aid, with a correlation of .18. At the aggregate level, however, the question does not 
readily make for international comparisons, as it specifically refers to the impact of national 
aid donations. For the present purposes, international comparisons are not required, but an 
attempt to make such comparisons may nevertheless be worthwhile. The survey asks its 
respondents: “Do you think the [national] Government helps poor people in Africa, Latin 
America, Asia, etc. to develop? We are not talking here about humanitarian aid (that is 
assistance provided in emergency situations like war, famine, etc.), but about development 
aid.” This is indented to capture whether or not respondents believe their governments are at 
all giving development aid. At the aggregate level, this variable is strongly related to beliefs 
regarding the impact of aid, with a correlation of .74. Running a regression of beliefs 
regarding the impact of aid on this variable and calculating the residuals should result in a 
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more internationally comparable measure. Figure 4.1 below plots aggregate support for aid 
over this measure, and shows a reasonably strong relationship. The corresponding bivariate 
correlation is .62 (N = 27).   
 
Figure 4.1. Support for aid over beliefs regarding the impact of national aid, expanded EU, end of 2004. 
The relationship illustrated in Figure 4.1 appears to support the idea that beliefs regarding the 
impact of aid are important determinants of the support for giving aid. This may appear 
surprising, given that the Chapter 3 failed to identify a significant effect of such beliefs. 
However, a few reasons may help explain this discrepancy. Most importantly, the pattern 
above is likely to be confounded in several ways. Given that this measure of aid impact, as 
mentioned, asks whether national aid makes a difference, respondents are more likely to 
respond affirmative in countries where aid donations are greater, simply because greater 
efforts make it more likely that some result is achieved, and also because aid donations 
correlate with spending on programs to inform citizens in donor countries about aid policies. 
In addition, the indicator of aid support is likely to capture absolute policy preferences, and 
over time to influence national levels of aid donations, as suggested in Chapter 1. Thus, 
support is likely to increase donation, which may increase beliefs that national aid makes 
some difference, which would confound the pattern above.35  
                                                
35 Other explanations are also possible. It should be noted that Chapter 3 is based on a much more 
limited selection of countries due to data availability, which results in lower power for the statistical 
tests. The estimated coefficients of beliefs regarding these beliefs are negative also in Chapter 3, but 
not large enough in relation to their standard errors to achieve a satisfactory level of significance. In 
addition, the indicators used in these tests, and in Chapter 3 in particular, are far from perfect, their 
wording not living up to standards of good practice in survey design. Their validity is probably lower 
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Nevertheless, it may be tempting to interpret this pattern as moderate support for the 
hypothesis that beliefs regarding aid effectiveness explain levels of aid support. However, 
even if the explanation above were proven wrong – if the effect of support of aid does not 
confound this relationship, interpreting it in light of a one-directional causal model, would 
still involve a risk of overestimating the effect, even at the individual level. As will be argued 
at length below, reverse causation is likely in this case, as the support for aid may influence 
beliefs regarding the impact of aid. If this conjecture is correct, a normal regression of support 
for aid on beliefs regarding aid effectiveness would be biased as an analysis of the one-
directional effect, as it would also capture the one in the opposite direction. Thus, we see that 
the bivariate relationship between the two cannot be taken a priori as a one-way causal effect. 
The next section introduces a theoretical underpinning of an alternative causal interpretation 
of this pattern. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
The basic idea of cognitive dissonance theory is that when an individual holds two 
inconsistent cognitions, he or she will experience dissonance – a negative drive state 
(Festinger 1957). This unpleasant experience induces a drive to reduce the dissonance, by 
changing one or more of the cognitions. This theory has inspired much research in 
psychology, and several modifications and further specifications have been suggested (see 
Aronson 1997; Cooper 2007; Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999; Tavris and Aronson 2007). Most 
notably, it has been suggested the theory is more likely to apply whenever individuals’ self-
concepts are involved (Aronson 1960). This means that the initial work, which did not take 
this into account, can be said to implicitly have made the assumption that the individuals in 
question had sufficiently high self-concepts for dissonance to occur (Aronson and Carlsmith 
1962). More specifically, self-concepts may be divided into three aspects, and, accordingly, 
attempts to maintain them can be seen as struggles to maintain a sense of self that is (a) a 
consistent and predictable, (b) a competent, and (c) a morally good (Aronson et al. 1974; 
Aronson 1968).  
This theory, then, may suggest a hypothesis that stands in contrast to the assumption that 
beliefs in development aid effectiveness are given, and can be seen as neutral reasons for 
opinions on whether or not aid should be given. The first point to note in forming this 
                                                                                                                                                   
than that of the present indicator, which may exacerbate the problem of identifying real relationships 
in a test that already has low power.  
 83 
hypothesis is that the norm of relieving human suffering if one can – without large costs to 
oneself – stands reasonably strong in most developed countries. A case in point is Singer’s 
argument (1972: 231), which seems to have a strong intuitive appeal:  
I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical 
care are bad. […] My next point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it. […] This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one. 
Although Singer uses examples where the suffering is due in part to wars and natural 
disasters, he also notes the problem of “constant poverty”, and his argument seems also to 
apply to conditions due to a lack of development, if they are avoidable and equally dire. As 
Singer notes, the intuitive force of this argument is so strong it seems “uncontroversial”. 
Nevertheless, he also notes that the argument “takes […] no account of proximity or distance” 
and “makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly 
do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position”. Singer 
thinks such circumstances may influence the likelihood that we will help, but that they 
nonetheless are morally irrelevant. Thus, interestingly, he provides a moral argument that 
appears to have strong intuitive appeal, but one that also may be more demanding than many 
will accept in practice.   
It is also worth noting that the argument leaves one legitimate reason for not acting to relieve 
suffering, as it only applies “if it is in our power” to do so. As illustrated by the discussion in 
Chapter 1, it is hard to determine what outcomes development aid enables us to achieve. 
Some policy areas are by their nature detached from the experiences of most citizens, making 
them dependent on media coverage and scholarly research for relevant information. Citizens 
may differ considerably in how they sort out the contradictory information they face and how 
they consequently form their beliefs – even descriptive beliefs, on empirical matters. When 
the design and impact of policies are subject to as much controversy and debate as 
development aid is and has been, such differences may be of great consequence. In other 
words, citizens may have considerable scope for forming different beliefs about aid 
effectiveness – and they may still be able to cite examples backing them up. 
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests the following hypothesis: Individuals’ initial inclination 
to support or not support development aid influences their belief in the effectiveness of such 
aid. Not supporting aid, while believing it has a strong impact, is likely to create dissonance 
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for some individuals. In particular, the drive to maintain a sense of self as morally good may, 
among those inclined not to support the donation of aid, induce a motivation to believe aid is 
ineffective, and, thus, that it is not in their power to help. Of course, a similar effect may also 
be present at the other side of the spectrum. Those who are strongly determined to support the 
donation of aid may ignore more information about the problems of aid projects and maintain 
a strong belief in the effectiveness of aid, as this is a condition of their continued support for 
aid.  
The analyses below make a few additional assumptions. The datasets do not include any good 
measures of self-concepts, and the main analyses will not try to measure them. Thus, they can 
be seen as making the assumption that the respondents have self-concepts that are sufficiently 
high for dissonance to occur. Of course, it would be preferable not having to make this 
assumption, as the resulting inaccuracy may make it more difficult to identify relevant 
patterns. A further implied assumption is one suggested by Singer, namely that distance in 
geographical or cultural terms does not provide sufficiently good and legitimate reasons for 
not helping suffering people, if the principle otherwise applies. This is another circumstance 
that may make it harder to identify the hypothesized effect, even if it is present.   
The hypothesis involves a technical challenge, as the most obvious direction of causality is 
the reverse of the one hypothesized. Most studies assume that beliefs regarding aid 
effectiveness influence positions on the donation of aid, whereas the present hypothesis 
implies reciprocal causation, which cannot be detected by ordinary regression analyses. 
ANALYSIS 1 
Thus, we need to avoid the bias caused by reciprocal causation, and we can do so by 
instrumenting the independent variable of interest, by way of a two-stage least squares 
procedure (2SLS).36 As Kennedy notes, instrumenting involves selecting variance that is 
common to the instrumented variable and the instruments. In this sense, one is no longer 
dealing with the same variable, and the “choice of instruments should be constrained by what 
it is a researcher wants to measure” (Kennedy 2008: 146).37 Instruments related to nationalism 
may be preferable here, as nationalism may explain a considerable degree of the variation in 
support for aid, while not being accepted as fully legitimate in all social contexts.  
                                                
36 For formal definitions of instrumental variables, see e.g. Pearl (2000). 
37 Cf. Imbens and Angrist (1994). 
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The two main criteria for an instrument to be valid are: (1) it is correlated with the 
endogenous variable and thus able to predict it, conditional on other covariates (in other 
words, it is not a weak instrument), and (2) the exclusion criterion: it is uncorrelated with the 
error term in the final equation, so that it can be excluded without biasing the estimate (see 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996: for a formal explanation of the criteria). The first can be 
tested empiricaly, as it depends on observables. The seconds is harder to test, and is usually 
justified by theoretical resoning. It invites the question of how many instruments should be 
used. Having two instruments for the endogenous variable allows the instrumental variable to 
have a mean, and three allows it to have a variance. Such “overidentification” allows testing 
of overidentifying restrictions, most notably the exclusion criterion, while an exactly 
identified equation (having a single instrument) precludes this. However, even finding a 
single valid instrument is usually hard, and the use of multiple instruments can exacerbate the 
problem of bias resulting from weak instruments, especially in small samples. Thus, in the 
present analysis, a single instrument is used.  
This instrument is a question regarding the EU. The survey asks the standard EB question: 
“Generally speaking, do you think that [this country]’s membership of the European Union 
is...?” The following alternatives are read out: a “Good thing”, “Neither good nor bad”, or a 
“Bad thing?”. This question is useful as an instrument because EU attitudes are influenced by 
nationalist sentiments (De Master and Le Roy 2000; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; 
Hooghe and Marks 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). Overall, in this dataset, the 
instrument correlates reasonably well – given the individual level data, and the large number 
of respondents – with the variable to be instrumented, the opinions on the importance of 
giving aid (r = .16). However, the correlations vary notably between countries, and in order to 
strengthen the analysis, it is helpful to select the countries in which the instruments are better 
able to predict the variable to be instrumented. Thus, only samples in which the correlation is 
above .20 have been selected. This leaves an initial selection of 4641 respondents in the 
samples from France, Belgium, Eastern Germany, Western Germany, Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. Whether the instruments are still problematically weak will be discussed 
using diagnostics presented along with the analysis.  
Having had a first look at the condition that the instrument predicts the instrumented variable, 
we can turn to the second condition for instruments to be valid, namely its independence of 
the error term in the final equation. That is, the instrument should not be related to the 
dependent variable apart from the correlation resulting from their causation of the 
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instrumented variable and, in turn, this variables’ causation of the dependent variable. Reverse 
causation or third variables affecting both the instruments and the dependent variable would 
violate this condition. This could be the case if views on the EU reflect a general skepticism 
towards elites, government, or public policy (Anderson 1998), which also influences the 
outcome in question. One way to address these problems is to include suspected confounders 
in the analysis, as control variables. However, doing so precludes the otherwise 
straightforward interpretation of the second-stage estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2008). 
Thus, a better alternative, which is used here, is to match the respondents in terms of relevant 
covariates before conducting the IV analysis. Like including controls in a 2SLS procedure, 
this approach will by construction render treatment (i.e. the IV) orthogonal to the covariates. 
In other words, it ensures orthogonal errors in the first stage, which is what justifies the 
exclusion of the IV in the second stage. This procedure is non-parametric and thus avoids 
making functional form assumptions. It also makes the analysis more transparent, and allows 
more confidence that the covariates are properly dealt, as covariate balance can be inspected 
before conducting the analysis. The particular matching procedure used here is often referred 
to as genetic matching as it uses an evolutionary search algorithm to determine the weight 
given to each covariate (Diamond and Sekhon 2008; Sekhon and Mebane 1998). This 
procedure tends to outperform other matching procedures in terms of Mean Squared Error, 
and in some cases, bias (Diamond and Sekhon 2008).  
Fortunately, the dataset provides a wide range of measures likely to capture possibly 
confounding attitudes. Perhaps most important are those explicitly related to the EU, 
democracy and national governance, as these may represent a general attitude towards elites, 
politics and public policy – the most plausible confounder in the present case. One such is the 
following question: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or 
not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?” Another is this: 
“For each of the following, please tell me if you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied? […] The way democracy works in [this country]” The latter 
question was also asked with regard to “Your life in general”. Another question that may be 
relevant is this: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”38 The assumption of the analysis below is 
                                                
38 The alternatives are: “Most people can be trusted”, “You can´t be too careful”, and  “It depends” (if 
given spontaneously). The latter has been recoded to take on the value in the middle of the two others. 
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that these covariates together succeed in capturing any general attitude towards government 
that could confound the results, so that achieving balance in these terms avoids this possible 
problem.  
While limiting the number of covariates facilitates the matching on those included, a few 
demographic ones are also taken into account. These are age, gender and education.39 In 
addition, the respondents are matched on dummies identifying each sample, to ensure that the 
instrument does not depend on respondents’ origin. The instrument is coded as a binary 
variable, where those who say EU membership is a bad thing are 1 and the rest are 0. Figure 
4.2 shows balance before and after matching. Before matching, the p-value for the means of 
the treated and control groups to differ were practically zero for most of the covariates. After 
matching the lowest p-value is 0.288, suggesting the two groups do not differ significantly in 
these terms.  
                                                
39 This is measured as the age at which education was ended. Those who have not received full-time 
education are coded with the lowest group (ending education at the age of 14), those who have not 
completed their education by the time of the survey are on average above 20, and have been coded 
with the highest group (ending education at the age of 22 or above).  
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Figure 4.2. Covariate balance before and after genetic matching. 
Results 
Having identified a suited instrument and achieved balance in terms of possible confounders, 
we can turn to the analysis. Table 4.1 reports a two-stage instrumental variable model. The 
estimates are highly significant at each stage, suggesting the instrument is valid (which is 
discussed further below), and that there is an effect of the support for aid on beliefs regarding 
the impact of aid. It is also clear that in this case we cannot attribute too much weight to the 
exact size of the estimated effect, as it depends on the choice of instrument, and its ability to 
predict the instrumented variable. 2SLS estimates are always more or less biased, and as such, 
their exact size is of secondary interest. In this particular case, the main question is whether or 
not there is an effect, and the analysis suggests there is one.  
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Table 4.1. Two-stage instrumental variable regression of beliefs regarding aid effectiveness, EU, 2004. 
 Stage 1 
Predicting support for aid 
Stage 2 
Effect on beliefs regarding effectiveness 
EU membership bad thing 0.164*** -0.482*** 
 (0.047) (0.186) 
N 1390 1390 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. First-stage Cragg-Donald 
Wald F = 12.207. Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical F-values with regard to Wald test distortion: 10%: 16.38; 15%: 
8.96; 20%: 6.66 (Stock and Yogo 2005). 
Table 4.1 reports an F-statistic for assessing the question of weak identification – that the 
instrument may be too weakly correlated with the instrumented variable (Stock, Wright, and 
Yogo 2002). It is a Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic. With only one instrument, the statistic 
cannot be evaluated in terms of bias relative to OLS, but it can tell us about the 
appropriateness of our significance tests. The statistic is well above the critical value for 15% 
maximum Wald test size distortion (cf. Stock and Yogo 2005), suggesting that the 
significance tests are not considerably distorted by weak instruments.40 
ANALYSIS 2 
The second analysis will be based on the EB 50.1, which was conducted towards the end of 
1998 and is described in Chapter 3. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the main question tapping the 
support for development aid is: “In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very 
important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, 
Asia, etc. to develop?” (Melich 2006). The list of reasons for not finding aid important is 
relevant also here:     
1. First we should solve problems (poverty, unemployment, the economy) in [this 
country] 
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country] 
3. It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve 
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it 
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money 
                                                
40 The analysis also performs well using a Kleibergen-Paap rk LM to test for testing for 
underidentification – making sure the instrument is relevant in terms of being able to predict the 
instrumented variable (the test is an LM version of Anderson 1951). The significant statistic (p-value < 
0.001) suggests that the model is identified. Similarly, the analysis passes the Anderson-Rubin Chi2-
test, which has as a null hypothesis that the coefficient of the endogenous regressor is equal to zero, 
while the overidentifying restrictions hold (Anderson and Rubin 1949; cf. Stock and Wright 2000). 
This hypothesis is rejected as the Chi2 has a p-value of 0.003. 
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6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have 
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms 
8. There will always be rich and poor countries 
9. I don’t know enough about these countries to decide whether it makes sense or not to 
help them 
10. Poor countries don’t interest me 
11. I don’t like foreigners (spontaneous response) 
12. Others (spontaneous response) 
13. Don’t know 
Most of these answers can be categorized as either referring to domestic priorities, or to 
concerns regarding the effectiveness and impact of the aid giving – as illustrated by the factor 
analysis reported in Table 3.1 (Chapter 3). Items 1, 2, 10 and 11 may be seen as reflecting a 
low priority attached to the welfare of foreigners relative to that of fellow citizens, whereas 3, 
4, 6, 8 (and perhaps 7), refer to concerns with the impact of aid. Item 9 does not fit well in 
either category, and, from a theoretical perspective, neither does 5, as it does not specify why 
we “already give them enough”.  
This means that we have indicators for both relative priorities and beliefs in effectiveness. 
With regard to this dataset, the hypothesis in question may suggest that there is an effect of 
these priorities on beliefs in effectiveness, at least if the priorities are seen as less legitimate 
reasons for not supporting the donation of aid. However, in general it is not possible to isolate 
the causal effects between these indicators in either direction. The solution that this dataset 
allows for is to select indicators for which reciprocal causation can be ruled out. In particular, 
item 11 – the spontaneous statement that “I don’t like foreigners” – is unlikely to be affected 
by beliefs regarding effectiveness. Indeed, the response is rather extreme, which is 
demonstrated by the fact that it is given by a mere 2.2 percent of the respondents (in the 
pooled, non-weighted data). A quick glance at the data suggests that this indicator is strongly 
related to low support for aid. As mentioned, only the respondents who find aid “not very 
important” or “not at all important” were presented with the relevant question. Within this 
group of respondents, 64 percent of those saying “I don’t like foreigners” find aid not at all 
important, whereas only 27 percent of the other respondents do. This variable, then, will be 
the main independent variable of interest, serving as an indicator of opposition to aid that is 
strong, but due to reasons that may be less than fully legitimate in all social contexts. The 
question is whether this has an impact on the measures of beliefs in effectiveness. 
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A Methodological Challenge 
There is a serious challenge in using these indicators, however. Reciprocal causation can 
largely be ruled out, due to the extreme nature of the independent variable in question. 
However, the fact that the measures of beliefs in effectiveness are items from a multiple-
response question, and that the independent variable is based on the same, means that 
respondents who have a tendency to use a greater number of answering categories may have a 
greater probability of scoring high on both the independent and dependent variables. In other 
words, the likelihood of a confounding variable being present is great. The problem could be 
reduced by the use of item 11 as independent variable, as this response is given 
spontaneously. However, the potential problem cannot be ruled out a priori, as the mentioned 
category of respondents may also be more likely respond spontaneously. Indeed, preliminary 
analyses comparing suggests that there may be a problem. The only solution is to measure the 
confounder and take it into account.  
Fortunately, the EB 50.1 dataset has other, unrelated modules with questions that also allow 
respondent to make use of multiple answering categories. While excluding the alternatives 
“none of these” and “don’t know”, additive indices have been made from all such questions 
that are not restricted to a few countries. There are five such questions, resulting in five 
measures of the likely confounder (which will be referred to as C1-C5).41,42 Figure 4.3 in the 
Appendix plots the means of an index summarizing the alternatives for not supporting aid 
                                                
41 The first question regards media equipment (C1): “Which, if any, of these are you planning to buy 
in the next six months?”.  Another follows up on respondents who are not interested in at least one 
among a long list of services potentially available through television or internet (C2): “And, from the 
following list, why are you not interested in some of these services?”. The three others ask asks 
respondents (C3): “Which of the following do you consider to be a family?”, (C4): “In your opinion, 
what are the main roles of the family in society today?”, and (C5): “And, what are the main roles of 
the family for you personally?”. 
42 Some of these questions may be less suited than others, as they leave less scope for responses to be 
influences by character traits. For example, the question on people’s planned purchase of media 
equipment and their definition of a family may leave less such scope than those on why they are 
uninterested in certain services and what they think the role of families are in society. Nevertheless, all 
the indices may contain useful information and deserve consideration. Notably, in terms of 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, all of them are significantly related to the measures of beliefs 
in effectiveness. 
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(except “don’t know” and item 11) over C1-C5. As can be seen, the five indices (C1-C5) have 
the expected relationships to the dependent variables. With regard to the key independent 
variable, the relationships are less clear-cut, but still appear to be present, as can be seen from 
Figure 4.4 (below). What is clear is that those few respondents who give the maximum 
number of responses on (C3-5) behave differently from others, having a much greater 
propensity to register on the independent variable – although it should also be noted that these 
categories of respondents are very small. Three dummy variables will be used to identify 
these respondents. It is also clear that for C2 and C4, those using none of the answering 
categories for some reason behave differently (in terms of the independent variable). Their 
greater propensities to register on the independent variable cannot confound the hypothesized 
relationship, but they may inhibit a proper modeling of the relationships with the indices. 
Thus, dummies are constructed to identify these respondents as well. It is further clear, 
especially from Figure 4.3, that the remaining relationship between the indices and the 
variables in question may not be linear. In particular, for C3-C5, values above 5 appear not to 
increase the probability of high values on these variables. The same could be said for values 
above 6 for C2. Thus, these four indices have been transformed so as to stop increasing and 
rather be constant above the mentioned values (i.e. values on C3 above 5 are coded as 5).  
Propensity Score Matching 
We know with almost certainty that we have a confounding variable, but fortunately it 
appears that we can do quite well in measuring it. The fact that the independent variable is 
binary, and thus can be seen as a “treatment”, being present or not, means that propensity 
score matching is a suitable solution to the selection bias that confounding variables introduce 
(see e.g. D'Agostino 1998; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Ho et al. 2007; Pearl 2009; Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983). Such a bias is especially difficult to deal with when the selection depends 
on multiple measures. Propensity score matching overcomes the dimensionality problem by 
reducing the dimensions into a single conditional propensity to be among the treated. The fact 
that the sample is large means that such a design is feasible, despite the exclusion of a large 
number of observations, and the fact that the “treatment” is rare means that it may be 
appropriate, as it helps to focus the analysis on relevant observations. Such a design allows us 
to investigate the extent to which we succeed in neutralizing the influence of the confounding 
variables on the selection into treatment and control groups. It is also attractive for producing 
readily interpretable results, comparing outcomes for treated and non-treated individuals.  
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A propensity score has been estimated for respondents in the pooled sample via a probit 
regression of item 11 on a set of pretreatment covariates: the five (transformed) indices, 
dummies for maximum values on C3-C5, dummies for minimum values on C2 and C4, 
country dummies, and a set of controls.43 Samples for which there is no variation on the 
independent variable are excluded (this applies to Northern Ireland, Spain, and Greece). Only 
those treated units for which there is common support, i.e. those that have propensity scores 
within the range of those of the control units, are kept. Three units are dropped using this 
criterion, leaving us with 59 treated units. One-to-one nearest neighbor matching without 
replacement, based on the estimated propensity score, has been used to match the treated units 
with 59 control units.44  
This matching appears very successful in neutralizing the influence of the tendency to give 
multiple responses on the independent variable. In a repeated probit regression of this variable 
on the matching variables within the matched sample, all the variables are far from having a 
significant impact. However, it may be useful also to inspect the results visually. Figure 4.5 
plots means of the independent variable over initial indices, based on the matched data. As 
can be seen, the initial positive relationships, as well as the particularistic behavior of extreme 
categories that is evident in Figure 4.4 appear to be neutralized. (It should be noted that the 
empty categories do not contain any observations, and therefore do not represent bias in terms 
of zero means.) The need for matching and the extent to which it succeeds can also be seen 
from the quantile-quantile plots in Figure 4.6 below. The two first plots are based on the raw 
data, the second of them including only observations on the common support. Both are 
consistently and considerably below the diagonal, 45-degree line, suggesting that the treated 
and control units are different, and that selection bias poses a serious challenge to causal 
inference. The third plot in Figure 4.6 is based on the matched data, and shows that the 
matching makes the propensity scores of the treated and control units virtually identical at 
every quantile. It is also worth noting that the difference in the mean propensity score for the 
treated and control units is only 0.003 of the standard deviation of the propensity score for the 
                                                
43 These are: left-right self-placement, the age at which education was ended, income quartile of the 
head of household, age, sex, the number of people present during the interview, the duration of the 
interview, and respondent cooperation. 
44 In the reported analysis, allowing replacement would not make a practical difference, as all control 
units would be used only one time in any case. 
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matched observations. The ratio of the variances of the propensity scores of the two groups is 
1.022. Both of these diagnostics are very acceptable. 
Results 
Having preprocessed the data, and thus considerably reduced the problem of selection bias, 
we can turn to more traditional modes of analysis. Table 4.2 reports average treatment effect 
on the treated units (ATT) estimated from the matched data. The results are given for the four 
most relevant indicators related to beliefs in aid effectiveness (items 3, 4, 6, and 8). Positive 
ATTs are estimated for each item, but only the effects on two of these (3 and 6) are 
statistically significant at the five-percent-level. The effect on item 4, however, is significant 
at the ten-percent-level in a one-tailed test. The effect on item 3 may be the most notable, as 
53 percent of the treated think it is a “waste of money to help poor countries because their 
situation does not improve” while only 19 percent of the untreated think so. Thus, the treated 
are almost three times as likely to think so, and the ATT is 0.34.45 Although it has a low t-
value, the effect on item 4 is also notable, as this item has high content validity as an indicator 
of beliefs in effectiveness. The treated are more than 25 percent more likely than the untreated 
to think that the “money will be misused and will not reach those who need it”. 
Table 4.2. Average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs) for efficiency-related reasons, EU, 1998. 
 Item 3 Item 4 Item 6 Item 8 
 It is a waste of money 
to help poor countries 
because their situation 
does not improve 
The money will be 
misused and will not 
reach those who need it 
The more aid we give to 
poor countries, the more 
children they have 
There will always be 
rich and poor countries 
Mean of control group 0.186 0.373 0.169 0.322 
Mean of treated group 0.525 0.475 0.389 0.373 
ATT 0.339 0.102 0.220 0.051 
Standard error of ATT 0.083 0.091 0.081 0.088 
T-statistic 4.084 1.121 2.716 0.580 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
When it comes to interpreting the results, it is worth noting that the hypothesis in focus here 
yields predictions very similar to social desirability effects. That is, the tendency for 
individuals to over-report socially desirable behavior and under-report undesirable behavior 
(e.g. DeMaio 1984; Edwards 1957; Holbrook, Green, and Krosnick 2003; Phillips and Clancy 
1972). Thus, if Singer’s argument does have a strong intuitive appeal, survey respondents 
who do not support the donation of aid may, if they do not exaggerate their support, rather 
                                                
45 While ATTs are reported to save space, it can be noted that using a full set of controls in the final regression does not 
change the results notably. 
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exaggerate their pessimism regarding aid effectiveness – producing a pattern similar to that 
hypothesized above. The difference between the two theories is that social desirability effects 
are more superficial, and not involving an actual change of beliefs. However, while this 
distinction is theoretically meaningful, the issue of whether the identified effect does indeed 
involve truly changed beliefs may not matter for practical purposes. The effect shows that 
expressed beliefs in aid effectiveness are not neutral in any case.  
Furthermore, even if a social desirability effect is present, this would not rule out a dissonance 
effect. In fact, it may give rise to it. Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that individuals 
who see themselves as truthful persons may come to believe the views they express, unless 
they can find some legitimate reason for why they might have acted untruthfully (cf. e.g. 
Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). In addition, it is worth noting that whereas the effect found in 
Analysis 2 might be due to a social desirability effect, this does not seem to be the case with 
Analysis I. In the latter, there is little reason for respondents to over- or under-report their 
beliefs in aid effectiveness, as these are not directly related to question about the donation of 
aid. Thus, the effect seems to require a deeper change of beliefs, suggesting that dissonance 
theory is relevant.  
Leaving theory aside, it is also worth noting that the second analysis uses data only for a 
selection of the respondents that hold rather extreme views, whereas the first analysis uses 
whole national populations, giving a more general picture. The disadvantage of these two 
analytical designs is that they are not optimal for detecting the hypothesized effect. The first 
places a stronger emphasis on getting the causal inferences right than getting the size of the 
coefficients right. The second suffers from the nature of the available indicators. The 
advantage of putting these two rather different designs together is that they increase our 
confidence in the results, as they both lend some support to the hypothesis. It seems 
reasonably clear that beliefs regarding aid effectiveness are not neutral reasons for the support 
or non-support of aid: Those initially less inclined to support the donation of development aid 
express a greater pessimism regarding its effects. However, the effects identified here are 
reasonably small and do not account for the larger part of the variation in beliefs regarding 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, we are looking at an effect that is not only statistically significant, 
but also has substantial implications. The most obvious of these is that expressed beliefs 
regarding the impact of aid cannot be treated as neutral reasons for expressed positions on aid, 
but rather as opinions interrelated with them trough psychological mechanisms. 
 96 
APPENDIX 
 
Figure 4.3. Means of additive index of all alternatives except “don’t know” and Item 11 over five measures of the 
tendency to use multiple answering categories (C1-C5, respectively). 
 
Figure 4.4. Means of the independent variable (Item 11) over five measures of the tendency to use multiple answering 
categories (C1-C5, respectively), based on the pooled (pre-matched) dataset. 
Note: Empty categories do not demonstrate bias (in terms of zero means) as they do not contain any observations.   
 
Figure 4.5. Means of the independent variable (Item 11) over five measures of the tendency to use multiple answering 
categories (C1-C5, respectively), based on the matched data.  
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Figure 4.6. Quantile-quantile plots of propensity scores for treated and controls, pre and post-matched.  
Note: The two plots on the left, plot the raw data; the first plots the whole range of propensity scores, whereas the second, 
only shows scores for which there is common support. The plot on the right plots matched data.  
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5. SURVEY RESPONSES IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter 2 shows that public calls for increased international aid are weaker where the level of 
economic development is higher. This is consistent with an interest-based model, in which 
individuals who might lose from redistribution are more opposed to it. However, this pattern 
has only been identified among middle- and high-income countries. While it appears likely 
that the same picture would hold more generally, this has not been investigated with regard to 
less developed countries. In fact, the little evidence available seems to suggest that the pattern 
may be different. This chapter takes a closer look at this issue. It aims to clarify the general 
picture, using an indicator from a dataset covering a broad range of countries, and to explain 
the pattern found among the less developed countries. 
The chapter starts by discussing the general pattern of satisfaction with current aid levels over 
GDP per capita. The pattern does not conform to the previously identified pattern. At the very 
lowest levels of development, there is a sharp drop in respondents’ calls for more international 
aid. The subsequent section discusses two hypotheses that may explain this. One is that 
national receipts of aid cause respondents to cease their calls for more aid. This hypothesis is 
a version of the theory of the public as thermostat. Another hypothesis is that there is a 
general tendency for survey responses to be less critical where the level of development is 
lower. A measurement-section establishes measures of the variables necessary to test these 
hypotheses. The analysis section sets the hypotheses up against each other in multi-level 
mixed effects logit-models. It is shown that even responses regarding to domestic institutions 
are less critical in less developed countries, and that this is not a product of repressive 
governments or a lack of freedom of speech. Thus, the results favor the explanation related to 
less critical responses. A brief conclusion ends the chapter and adds a bit more discussion.   
THE PUZZLE 
The pattern in which public calls for increased international aid are weaker where GDP per 
capita is higher has only been established among the more developed countries of the world. 
This is because the indicator used to do so, taken from the International Social Survey 
Programme, is available only for a very limited selection of countries. A related indicator with 
wider coverage can be found in Pew’s Global Attitudes Project (Pew 2007). This survey was 
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conducted by face-to-face interviews in 2007.46 The following question was asked in 47 
countries: “Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing 
enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic development, 
reducing poverty, and improving health?” The available answer categories were (1) “Doing 
enough” and (2) “Not doing enough”.47 Respondents who refused to answer or replied that 
they did not know were given their own codes. These have been excluded in the following 
analysis, and the variable has been recoded as a binary indicator, with dissatisfaction (not 
enough) scoring high.48 The binary indicator will be referred to as “dissatisfaction with 
current aid levels”. 
The question is how this indicator, which allows the inclusion of a broader selection of 
countries, relates to GDP per capita. Figure 5.1 plots the aggregate of the indicator over GDP 
data for 2007. It reveals an interesting non-linear relationship. In fact, the pattern appears to 
consist of two different relationships. Within the range of development covered by the ISSP 
indicator, the more developed part of the world, the previously identified relationship is not 
very clearly discernible at first glance. However, the pattern would be more pronounced if we 
took into account circumstances that have proved salient before (in Chapter 2), such as the 
particular situation of the post-Communist countries. It would also become much clearer if we 
did not use PPP conversion, but this is done for the sake of consistency with earlier models. 
Among the less developed countries, however, the relationship is reversed. Lower GDP per 
capita goes together with greater satisfaction with current aid levels, and vice versa. This 
relationship may be counterintuitive, as the countries whose populations on average express 
the greatest satisfaction with current aid levels are among who might benefit the most from 
increased aid. As the implications of this relationship may differ greatly depending on what 
                                                
46 The only exceptions, in which telephone interviews were used, are the US, Canada, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As explained below, these 
countries are not part of the analysis.  
47 For the purposes below, both of these indicators have been aggregated as country means, using the 
supplied weights. Germany and the UK are treated as single observations. The Pew indicator has been 
subtracted 1, so as to become a binary variable.  
48 These respondents are generally fewer than 10 percent of the samples. Judged by the inclusion of 
their share of these samples as independent variables in aggregate level regressions, their exclusion 
does not make a noticeable difference for the analysis conducted here.  
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explains it, further attention is merited. The rest of this chapter will focus on explaining this 
pattern, and the next section presents two relevant hypotheses in this regard.  
 
Figure 5.1. Dissatisfaction with aid levels over GDP per capita, PPP, Pew surveyed countries, 2007. 
Even the relevant sub-section of the overall pattern (that among the less developed countries) 
is non-linear, which means a transformation is in place. Instead of the original values of GDP 
per capita, their natural logarithms will be used. When a fractional polynomial is used to fit 
the aggregate opinions to the transformed GDP values, and outliers are excluded, the overall 
relationship changes direction when the logged GDP is approximately 9.5. Therefore, only 
countries with a value lower than this are selected for the analysis in this chapter. Figure 5.2 
plots the two variables against each other for the selected countries. Within the selected range, 
and with the transformed GDP variable, the relationship is very strong and approximately 
linear. Excluding the outlier Indonesia, the bi-variate correlation corresponding to the plot is 
0.87 (N = 26).  
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Figure 5.2. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over logged (ln) GDP per capita, PPP, for 2007, among Pew 
surveyed countries with a logged GDP below 9.5 (and available data for the analysis below). 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
While the identified pattern may seem counterintuitive, two hypotheses may plausibly explain 
it. The first is related to the theory of the public as thermostat, mentioned in Chapter 2 
(Wlezien 1995, 1996). As the indicator used here asks whether current efforts are sufficient or 
not, it measures policy preferences that are relative to current policies. As mentioned before, 
the model suggests the public adjusts its calls for more or less spending on an issue – 
expressed as such relative preferences – according to what it gets. While this model has only 
been applied to national policies in developed countries so far, it may also apply to 
preferences in less developed countries and with regard to other countries’ policies, as in the 
present case. Thus, in this context, a plausible hypothesis is that the populations of countries 
receiving aid take notice and thus reduce their calls for even more. Although the survey 
question refers to aid as a general phenomenon, without mentioning respondents’ own 
countries, aid received by a respondent’s country may influence their responses. This could be 
if aid receipts receive more media attention in recipient countries than in non-recipient ones, 
or that respondents simply know more about the aid receipts of their own country than those 
of other countries. The first hypothesis to be considered is therefore: 
1. Respondents in countries that receive more foreign aid are less likely to call for more. 
This hypothesis has already been argued to explain the pattern in question. Based on the 
survey data that are used here, a report from the Pew Research Center and Kaiser Family 
Foundation (Brodie et al. 2007) states that “people in those countries that are the biggest 
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recipients of international aid tend to give more credit to wealthy nations than those in other 
countries”. The report classified 18 countries as major aid recipients and found that:  
In 10 out of these 18 countries, a third or more residents say that the wealthy nations of the 
world are doing enough to help poorer nations. Comparatively, in the 16 other low- and 
middle-income countries (which were not classified as major aid recipients) and 13 high 
income countries surveyed, the share is not higher than about a quarter in any country.  
Thus, the report concludes that this “could be a sign that donor assistance is more likely to be 
felt in the places where it is channeled”. However, the report fails to give this explanation a 
strong empirical foundation. The analysis is bi-variate, comparing differences in means of the 
opinions over a dummy variable identifying recipient countries. It fails to consider alternative 
explanations and to make use of interval level information. Thus, it is reasonable to treat this 
explanation as a hypothesis, to be tested against other hypotheses.  
It also worth noting, however, the report says the explanation “is perhaps most evidenced by 
public perceptions in Indonesia, which ranked highest on this question with a majority saying 
donors are doing enough; Indonesians’ recent experience with the 2004 tsunami, and 
significant international response, appears to have reverberated among the public” (Brodie et 
al. 2007: 25). The case of Indonesia may indeed support Hypothesis 1. However, as the 
measures used here do not capture its special circumstances, and it is an outlier in most 
analyses, a dummy will be included to identify it.  
HYPOTHESIS 2 
If Hypothesis 1 fails, the pattern in question may appear particularly striking and 
counterintuitive. An alternative hypothesis is that the pattern has little to do with the content 
of the question and is an artifact of some sort. Comparing aggregate levels of survey 
responses across countries requires that such levels are comparable, and that no country-
specific circumstances influence the responses in ways that are not captured by the analysis. 
Instead of relying on this assumption, we can test whether it is the case. If some unknown 
factor influences the survey responses in ways that have little relation to the specific content 
of the questions, this may apply to more questions than the one we are interested in here, and 
this may allow us to detect a general tendency. With regard to the aid related indicator, 
respondents in less developed countries are less critical, which could be a general pattern.  
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The hypothesis that evaluations of policies and political institutions are less critical where the 
level of development is lower is consistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s arguments regarding 
the effect of modernization on people’s values (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel and 
Inglehart 2009). They argue that self-expression values and emancipative values (which 
correlate very strongly with the former) get stronger as a society develops:  
By providing rising incomes and other resources, modernization raises ordinary people’s 
sense of existential security, modernization leads to growing emphasis on emancipatory 
values. At the same time, rising education, information levels, opportunities to connect with 
people and other resources, broadens people’s action repertoires, further increasing the utility 
of freedom. (Welzel and Inglehart 2009: 136) 
Using Vanhanen’s index of power resources (Vanhanen 2003), Inglehart and Welzel find such 
resources to explain 28 percent of the cross-national variance in emancipative values. The 
index of power resources is closely related to economic and human development as it includes 
such variables as literacy rates, students per 100 000 citizens, the urban share of the 
population and the non-agricultural share of the population. Inglehart and Welzel’s measure 
of emancipative values includes responses regarding gender equality, tolerance vs. 
conformity, autonomy vs. authority, and participation vs. security. In the latter category falls 
questions of whether giving people more to say in government and protecting free speech 
should be given priority over keeping prices stable. Thus, they argue people are more willing 
to accept limitations on democratic freedoms when emancipative values are weak. This is 
relevant here because it means people in less developed countries may give more favorable 
assessments of national policies and institutions than one might otherwise expect. Further, as 
Inglehart and Welzel also note in the passage quoted above, “rising education, information 
levels, opportunities to connect with people and other resources” may also influence people’s 
opinions and political actions. In general, we may find both lower expectations and lower 
levels of information where levels of development are lower, leading to less critical 
assessments of a number of policies and institutions.  
It could also be, however, that the responses are more random, and that their means are 
therefore closer to the middle of the answer categories. Leaving Indonesia aside, the lower 
development, the closer the mean response regarding aid is to 0.5, which is the middle of the 
two answer categories, and this is consistent with such an explanation. For now, the main 
question is whether there is a general pattern that undermine comparisons across levels of 
development, but we may still pose this as two different hypotheses: 
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2. a. Respondents in less developed countries are less critical with regard to many aspects of 
current affairs, including levels of international aid, as self-expression and emancipative 
values are weaker, and levels of information are lower. 
b. Respondents in less developed countries tend to give responses whose means are closer 
to the middle of the answer categories. 
One way to test these ideas is to look for the same pattern in opinions on different, but 
comparable, issues. To differentiate between the two hypotheses, we will have to look at 
whether or not responses do indeed tend toward the middle categories as development 
decreases. If either Hypothesis 2a or 2b appears to hold true, there is a further question that 
may help us understand the underlying mechanism. The question is whether the pattern is a 
result of individual level characteristics or country-level circumstances. In other words, we 
want to know whether it is the same individuals that cause the pattern on one indicator that 
causes it on another. Alternatively, it could be that different individuals within the same 
countries are responsible, which would suggest that there is something about the countries 
that affect all citizens, rather that some citizens being different from the others within these 
countries.  
Responses regarding national institutions should be well suited to capture the hypothesized 
tendency for responses from less developed countries to systematically differ from those from 
other countries. This makes for especially strong tests of Hypothesis 2a and 2b, as the 
relationship we would expect in the case of national institutions is the reverse of what would 
follow from most reasonable evaluations of the objective facts. The present hypotheses 
predicts that these responses show the same pattern as shown above – that people in less 
developed countries are less critical of their national institutions than people in more 
developed countries. Objectively, however, the influence of national institutions appears to be 
more deserving of negative assessments in the less developed countries than in others. 
Corruption and dysfunctional national institutions are frequently cited as barriers to 
development.  
If the pattern predicted by Hypotheses 2a and 2b is present with regard to national institutions, 
only one other explanation appears plausible, namely that repressive governments make 
respondents afraid to speak their true mind. Therefore, it will be necessary see if measures 
related to free speech explain between-country differences in the expressed opinions on 
domestic institutions. If lower development is related to less critical responses, and the extent 
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to which governments deny free speech fails to explain this, Hypothesis 2a or 2b will stand 
out as the most convincing explanation. This would strongly suggest that the same effect is 
responsible for the pattern with regard to the opinions on international aid. This last test of 
Hypothesis 2b, is presented in a separate section, after the main analysis. First, the variables 
need to be operationalized.  
MEASUREMENT 
Aid Receipts 
In testing Hypothesis 1, an important question is how to measure aid receipts. The mentioned 
Pew report (Brodie et al. 2007: 24) classified countries as major aid recipients if they met one 
of four conditions: that they “1) are eligible to receive concessional loans from the World 
Bank (IDA); 2) are a focus country under the United States Government’s PEPFAR program; 
3) have $200 million or more in approved grants to date from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria; or 4) received $1 billion or more in OECD Official Development 
Assistance in 2005.” In other words, four binary indicators were used to create a single binary 
indicator.  
While these indicators are relevant, they have a few problems. Most importantly, number 1, 
eligibility to receive concessional World Bank loans, is by definition linked to GDP per 
capita. Two criteria are used to determine such eligibility (World Bank 2009a). One is the 
“[l]ack of creditworthiness to borrow on market terms and therefore a need for concessional 
resources to finance the country's development program”. The other is “relative poverty 
defined as GNI per capita below an established threshold and updated annually” – for the 
fiscal year of 2010, the threshold is $1,135.49 As creditworthiness is also likely to correlate 
with economic development, the eligibility measure is not far from being a binary measure of 
low GDP per capita. In fact, the bi-variate correlation with the logged GDP variable used here 
is -.90, N = 27. Thus, the problem with this indicator is that even if it were found to have an 
                                                
49 The only difference between gross national income (GNI) – or product (GNP) – and the gross 
domestic product (GDP) is that the former is defined by ownership and the latter is defined by 
location. GNI counts all products produced by enterprises owned by a country’s citizens, GDP counts 
all products produced within a country’s borders. Thus, as only differences in the balance of 
international income receipts and payments set them apart, the two measures are usually strongly 
correlated. 
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effect, it would be hard to know if should be interpreted as a sign that respondents take notice 
of the World Bank funding aid projects, or if might just be an effect of low development. In 
short, it is better to find more direct measures of aid receipts.  
The best candidates in this regard are based on total receipts of official development aid 
(ODA). The World Bank (2009b) provides such data in current USD for 2007. As interval-
level indicators contain more information than binary indicators, Pew’s indicator 4 will be 
replaced by the continuous variable of total ODA receipts (for 2007). In addition to the raw 
data of total ODA receipts, ODA as a percentage of the gross national income (GNI) may be 
relevant, as this helps to take into account the size of the economy of recipient country. Aid 
receipts may appear smaller and receive less attention in a country with a bigger economy. If 
we make an additive index of Pew’s indicator 2 and 3, and include it along with the two ODA 
measures in a principal component analysis, we get a single factor explaining 71 percent of 
the variance for the countries in the analysis (N = 27). This factor will be referred to as (the) 
Aid Receipts (Index). It is preferable to stick to this index, to simplify the analysis below. This 
does not appear to disadvantage Hypothesis 1 in the analysis. This index correlates more 
strongly with the dependent variable than any of the measures do alone (cf. the Appendix).  
Figure 5.3 shows dissatisfaction with current aid levels over the Aid Receipts Index. There 
seems to be a relationship, but it is blurred by a few countries. Indonesia is the greatest 
outlier, which, as mentioned, may be due to the extraordinary aid given after the 2004 
tsunami, which is not captured by the aid measure used here. The best solution to this problem 
may be to include a dummy variable for Indonesia, and interpret its effect as support of 
Hypothesis 1 – albeit weak and exceptional. If we exclude Indonesia, the correlation between 
the Aid Receipts Index and dissatisfaction with current levels of aid is -.72 (N = 26).  
 108 
 
Figure 5.3. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over the Aid Receipts Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed 
countries, 2007. 
Critical Responses 
To test of Hypotheses 2a and b, we also need a measure of how critical the respondents are 
with regard to other issues than current aid levels. The following question appears particularly 
useful: 
As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the 
group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of (read name 
of organization) very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in (survey country)? 
The objects referred to include: (a) our national government, (b) the Prime Minister/President 
(specific to each country), (c) the military, (d) [news organizations/the media] – such as 
television, radio, newspapers and magazines, (e) religious leaders. These indicators will be 
used below. To reduce the possible bias resulting from the fact that they have some missing 
values, and to allow all respondents to be included in the analysis, the missing values have 
been imputed by single imputation.50 This has been done for each country separately, 
allowing the variables different relationships in different countries, and yielding imputed 
                                                
50 Multiple imputation would help to get better estimates of the standard errors of the imputed data, 
and estimates based on them. However, as these variables are used in a factor analysis, this does not 
appear very helpful. Admittedly, the single imputation may lead to slightly underestimated standard 
errors with regard to coefficients based on the index created from the imputed variables, but this 
question should be of minimal practical importance.  
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values with plausible country means.51 Another issue also arises with regard to missing data. 
For a few countries (China, Kuwait and Morocco) some of the indicators are not available at 
all. Thus, we lack the information to get the correct country mean for the imputed values. 
Their missing values for these countries have not been imputed, and the countries will have to 
be excluded.52  
Hypotheses 2a and b suggest that we should be able to extract a factor reflecting the tendency 
for respondents to give critical responses. As a measure of this tendency, an index would 
contain less measurement error than each single indicator. Therefore, a principal-component 
analysis has been conducted both at the individual and aggregate level. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 5.1. It shows that most of the indicators load considerably on a 
single factor. At the individual level, the factor has an Eigenvalue of 2.30, and the proportion 
of the variance the factor accounts for is .46. The latter number is not very good, but 
acceptable – especially given the fact that these measures obviously capture more than what 
we are interested in. Cronbach’s Alpha for the five indicators is 0.71, which is also 
acceptable. The indicator that has the most of unique variance is, perhaps not surprisingly, the 
one regarding religious leaders (e). If it were dropped, the scale would perform better in terms 
of the mentioned parameters, but it has nevertheless been kept, as it does provide some 
additional information. Based on this analysis, a factor score has been constructed, which will 
be referred to as (the Index of) Critical Responses. Table 5.1 also reports the results of a 
similar analysis at the aggregate level, which shows a similar picture, except for the fact that 
(e) loads more strongly than (c). As would be expected, the aggregation cancels out some 
measurement error, and the factor performs better in terms of the Eigenvalue and the variance 
explained.  
                                                
51 The variables used in the imputation include the unimputed versions of the five indicators to be 
imputed, and responses to the same question with regard to immigrants and large companies. In 
addition, the following additional variables  are used: respondents’ self-placement on a “ladder of life” 
(i.e. life satisfaction), opinions on growing trade and business tied with the outside world, the extent to 
which respondent claims to follow international news, the age at which the respondent completed full-
time education, and the age of respondent.  
52 In addition, in the few developed countries in which interviews were conducted by telephone (cf. 
footnote above), the samples were split, and one part was not asked the relevant questions. The 
missing values for these respondents have neither been imputed. However, this does not affect the 
analysis below, as the countries of these respondents are not included. 
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Table 5.1. Principal component analyses of critical responses regarding national institutions, Pew, 2007. 
 Loadings, individual 
Uniqueness, 
individual 
Loadings, 
aggregate  
Uniqueness,  
aggregate 
Our national government   0.775 0.399 0.861 0.259 
The Prime Minister/President 0.785 0.384 0.876 0.233 
The military 0.658 0.567 0.670 0.551 
News organizations/the media 0.584 0.659 0.738 0.456 
Religious leaders 0.554 0.693 0.718 0.484 
Eigenvalue 2.297  3.017  
Explained  variance 0.460  0.604  
N = 36184 at the individual level, N = 44 at the aggregate level. 
Figure 5.4 plots the Index of Critical Responses over GDP per capita and shows a strong 
relationship between the two variables. However, it also shows that Ethiopia, for reasons 
unknown, is an outlier. Therefore, when this index is used, a dummy will be used to identify 
Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also excluded from the correlations reported in the Appendix – even 
from those where it would not be an outlier, to make the correlations directly comparable. 
Excluding Ethiopia, the correlation corresponding to the plot is .55 (N = 26).  
Table 5.7 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the items in the index. The items are 
coded from 1 to 4 where 1 is “very good” and 4 “very bad”. As the table shows, the mean 
responses for all respondents in the analysis tend to be around 2 (and very few countries have 
means above 2.5). In other words, we can reject Hypothesis 2b, which holds mean responses 
in less developed countries tend toward the middle of the answer categories. In Figure 5.4, 
these responses move away from the middle, in a less critical direction – consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a. Lower economic development is linked to a tendency for respondents to give 
less critical responses also with regard to national issues. 
  
Figure 5.4. The Index of Critical Responses over logged (ln) GDP per capita, PPP, for less developed, Pew surveyed 
countries, 2007. 
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Figure 5.5 plots the responses regarding whether “wealthier nations of the world are doing 
enough” over the Index of Critical Responses. Again, there is a strong relationship. If we 
exclude the outliers Ethiopia and Indonesia, the bi-variate correlation is .71 (N = 25, cf. the 
Appendix). These bi-variate patterns provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 2a, but we 
still need to control for the most plausible alternative explanation before we conclude.  
 
Figure 5.5. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over the Index of Critical Responses, for less developed, Pew 
surveyed countries, 2007.  
ANALYSIS 
The dependent variable is from the same dataset as one of the independent variables of 
interest, namely the Index of Critical Responses. Thus, the relationships of interest are not 
only among aggregates at the country level, but also at the individual level, making a 
hierarchical model well suited. In order to allow the individual level relationships to differ 
between countries, a mixed-effects model will be used (see e.g. Guo and Zhao 2000; Leeuw 
and Meijer 2007; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Further, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, which makes a logit model more appropriate than a linear regression model.53 
The models to be estimated will include all the variables mentioned above: GDP per capita 
(the effect of which would ideally be explained by the other variables), the Aid Receipts 
Index, the Index of Critical Responses, and dummy variables identifying Ethiopia and 
Indonesia. The models will include random coefficients for the Index of Critical Responses 
along with random country intercepts. The number of countries will be referred to as J, the 
number of explanatory variables at the lower level (X) as P, and the number of explanatory 
                                                
53 Respondents who failed to use one of the two available answer categories are excluded. 
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variables at the upper level (Z) as Q. Using summation notation, the mixed-effects (logit) 
models to be estimated can be expressed with the following way:   
  (1) 
where pr is the probability that the outcome Y is 1 (dissatisfaction) as opposed to 0, the 
subscript j is for the country (j = 1 … J) , i is for individual respondents (i = 1 … nj), p are for 
explanatory variables at the lower level (p = 1 … P) and q at the upper level (q = 1 … Q). The 
coefficients denoted γ form the fixed part of the model. The random parts of the model – the 
random coefficients and the residual error term at the country-level – are referred to as upj and 
uj, respectively. The standard deviations of the random effects will be referred to as σ(up), and 
that of the random intercepts (i.e. country-level error term) simply as σu. 
Table 5.2 reports results from four hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regression analyses. 
Model 1 is a random intercept model that only includes the natural logarithms of GDP per 
capita along with the dummies for Ethiopia and Indonesia. Model 2 further includes Aid 
Receipts, which has a weak and insignificant effect. The Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) increases for Model 2 compared to Model 1, suggests the model is over-fitted and that 
Aid Receipts adds little to explain the outcome variance. Model 3 further includes the Index 
of Critical Responses, while Model 4 drops Aid receipts, its effect being even weaker in 
Model 3 than Model 2. The BIC is decreased from Model 2 to Model 3 and further reduced in 
Model 4, suggesting that the Index of Critical Responses improves the model, while the Index 
of Aid Receipts, which is dropped in Model 4, does not. It is also worth noting that the 
dummy for Ethiopia is rendered insignificant in Model 3 and 4, suggesting it is no longer an 
outlier when the Index of Critical Responses is included.  
In addition to the individual level version of the Index of Critical Responses, the country 
means of this variable are included separately, to see whether between-country differences in 
this variable may have an effect in addition to the individual level relationship. This appears 
to be the case, as both versions of the variable have significant estimates. Including these two 
versions of the Index of Critical Responses in Model 3 and 4 does not appear to explain much 
additional variance (as the standard deviation of the random country-level intercepts is only 
moderately reduced), however. Neither is the effect of GPD more moderately than reduced in 
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Model 3 and 4, as can be seen from Table 5.5 in the Appendix (which reports predicted values 
for the highest and lowest observed GDP values for all the models in Table 5.2). 
Thus, while the Index of Critical Responses has a significant effect, and reduces the effect of 
GDP per capita, it fails to fully remove this effect and present itself as an intervening variable 
in this relationship. However, it should also be noted that the Index of Critical Responses is 
strictly speaking not a direct measure of a tendency for respondents to give critical responses, 
but a measure constructed of a specific set of responses that are likely also to be influenced by 
substantial matters. As a measure of a tendency for respondents to give critical responses it 
must contain a considerable degree of measurement error. In a more developed causal model, 
both the Index of Critical Responses and the opinions on aid would be modeled as influenced 
by the actual underlying tendency to give critical responses, and as such containing error if 
used directly as measures of it. GDP per capita, on the other hand, is a measure with little 
error. Thus, if the underlying tendency to give critical responses is strongly related to GDP 
per capita, as these results suggest, it is likely the error contained in the Index of Critical 
Responses makes it less related to the opinions on aid than GDP is, even if it is a measure of 
an intervening variable. The mere fact that there is a similar pattern in opinions on national 
institutions as in opinions on aid – a pattern is hard to explain by other means – is a strong 
suggestion that these patterns result from other factors than the substance of the relevant 
survey questions. In other words, the analysis does provide notable support for Hypothesis 2b.  
An interesting question is therefore whether the Index of Critical Responses has a greater 
effect at the individual level or the country-level. The significant estimate for the individual 
level estimate demonstrates that individuals who tend to be less critical regarding national 
institutions also tend to be less critical of current levels of international aid. However, the 
significant estimate for the country-level means of the index suggests there is an additional 
effect at the country-level, as respondents are less likely to be critical of current levels of 
international aid if they are in a country where people in general also tend to be less critical of 
their national institutions. Table 5.4 in the Appendix reports additional models including these 
variables, and it appears that the country level relationship demonstrated in Figure 5.5 above 
is not so much explained by the individual level effect as the country-level effect. Both the 
standard deviation of random country-level intercepts and the effect of GDP are lower in 
Model 6, which contains only the means of the index, than in Model 5, which contains the 
individual level variable. Furthermore, Model 4, which includes both, does no better than 
Model 6 in these regards.  
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Table 5.2. Hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regressions of dissatisfaction with aid levels, Pew, 2007. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed part,  (γp) Critical Responses   0.326*** 0.327*** 
lower level     (0.041) (0.041) 
Fixed part,  (γq) Critical Responses, mean   0.381* 0.416** 
upper level     (0.202) (0.197) 
 Aid Receipts  -0.181 -0.077  
   (0.130) (0.113)  
 ln(GDP per capita) 0.787*** 0.657*** 0.590*** 0.637*** 
  (0.088) (0.126) (0.108) (0.084) 
 Indonesia, dummy -1.612*** -1.633*** -1.588*** -1.577*** 
  (0.421) (0.407) (0.334) (0.337) 
 Ethiopia, dummy 0.906** 1.095** 0.047 -0.084 
  (0.449) (0.454) (0.490) (0.456) 
Intercept  (γ)   -5.171*** -4.110*** -3.389*** -3.764*** 
  (0.734) (1.039) (0.900) (0.719) 
Random part   (up) σ(uCritical Responses)    0.178*** 0.178*** 
    (0.035) (0.035) 
Intercept   (u) σu  0.351*** 0.342*** 0.318*** 0.322*** 
  (0.061) (0.059) (0.049) (0.049) 
 N 23463 23463 23463 23463 
 N of Clusters 27 27 27 27 
 BIC 24345.25 24353.44 24041.15 24031.55 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are given in parentheses. σ denotes standard 
deviations of random components. 
It is also worth noting that both the random intercepts and the random effects for the Index of 
Critical Responses are highly significant. The latter are illustrated in Figure 5.6 below, which 
plots them (in grey) along with the fixed part of the estimated effect of the individual level 
version of the index (in black, with a 95 percent confidence interval). While the effects differ 
significantly between countries, the plot also illustrates that they are somewhat similar, and all 
in the same direction. Table 5.6 in the Appendix reports predicted values that correspond to 
the presented figures. It shows, as illustrated by Figure 5.6, that an individual scoring the 
highest value of the Index of Critical Responses has a predicted probability of dissatisfaction 
with current aid levels of .91, whereas the same for one scoring the lowest is .68 (in a country 
whose average score equals the average among all countries). 
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Figure 5.6. Predicted probabilities of dissatisfaction with current aid levels over the Index of Critical Responses, based 
on Model 4.  
Note: The solid black line gives the fixed part of the effect; the dotted lines give a 95 percent confidence interval for the fixed 
effect, while the gray lines give the country-specific effects. The other independent variables have been kept at their mean 
(except for country dummies, which have been kept at zero). 
Figure 5.7 below illustrates the total effect of the Index of Critical Responses by plotting 
predicted outcomes for values of the index ranging from the highest to the lowest observed at 
the individual level, for both the highest and the lowest observed national means. The figure is 
based on Model 4 in Table 5.2, and shows that an individual scoring the highest in a country 
whose average score is also the highest among all countries has a predicted probability of 
dissatisfaction with current aid levels of .94, whereas the same for one scoring the lowest in a 
country whose average score is the lowest is .58. Based on a model without GDP (Model 7 in 
the Appendix), the corresponding numbers would be .98 and .42, as illustrated by Figure 5.11 
in the Appendix. The mean predictions for individuals in two such countries, based on the 
same model, would be .93 and .56, respectively. 
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Figure 5.7. Predicted probabilities of dissatisfaction with current aid levels, over the Index of Critical Responses, 
within the countries that score highest and lowest on the Index of Critical Responses, based on Model 4.  
Note: The solid lines give the fixed part of the effect, while the dotted lines give a 95 percent confidence interval for these 
effects. The other independent variables have been kept at their mean (except for country dummies, which have been kept at 
zero). 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
As mentioned, as a last step, we may want to consider the possibility that a correlation 
between repressive governments and aid receipts generate a spurious correlation between 
expressed dissatisfaction with aid and dissatisfaction with the government. This could be the 
case Hypothesis 1 were true while repressive governments caused respondents to be afraid to 
give critical responses.  
Thus, we need a measure of freedom of speech. Two datasets are particularly useful in this 
regard. Freedom House’s (2008) Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights & Civil Liberties contains data on several political and civil rights for 2007. 
Particularly relevant are the following three measures (all of which are among the four that 
make up Freedom House’s index of civil liberties): D. Freedom of expression and belief, E. 
Associational and organizational rights, F. Rule of law. The first captures, among other 
things, whether there are “free and independent media and other forms of cultural 
expression”, and whether there is “open and free private discussion”. The latter is assessed 
answering the following two questions: “Are people able to engage in private discussions, 
particularly of a political nature (in places including restaurants, public transportation, and 
their homes) without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities?” and “Does the 
government employ people or groups to engage in public surveillance and to report alleged 
antigovernment conversations to the authorities?”. Thus, these measures should capture the 
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extent to which respondents have reason to be afraid to give critical responses. The three 
measures correlate at .88 or higher (N = 193).  
The other dataset is the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2009), which 
provides measures of very similar concepts. Of particular interest is “Freedom of Speech”, 
“Freedom of Assembly and Association”, and “Independence of the Judiciary” (for variable 
descriptions, see: Cingranelli and Richards 2008). These are broadly equivalent of the above 
measures. The three measures correlate at .55 or higher (N = 192). A principal component 
analysis of all six mentioned measures yields a factor that explains 79 percent of the variance, 
and has a Cronbach’s Alpha of .86 (N = 189). In addition, the CIRI dataset provides a 
“Physical Integrity Rights Index”, which is based on four measures of politically motivated, 
unlawful, violence by the government: Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, 
and Disappearance (details on its construction can be found in: Cingranelli and Richards 
1999). A principal component analysis of this index and the score resulting from the analysis 
explained above yields a factor that explains 85 percent of the variance. A factor score has 
been constructed based on the latter analysis, and will be referred to as (the) Freedom of 
Speech (Index). 
Figure 5.8 plots the Index of Critical Responses over the Freedom of Speech Index. While the 
plot does not show a very clear relationship between the two variables, if we exclude 
Ethiopia, the bi-variate correlation is .38 (N = 26). This is a notable relationship, although it 
needs a one-tailed test to be statistically significant at the five percent level (p = .055).  
 
Figure 5.8. The Index of Critical Responses over the Freedom of Speech Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed 
countries, 2007. 
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We want to test both the hypothesis that repressive governments make respondents less 
critical against the alternative that low development does so. Table 5.3 reports plain OLS 
regressions at the aggregate level, with the Index of Critical Responses as the dependent 
variable. Ethiopia is identified by a dummy in all models, as it is an outlier in most cases, and 
it could bias the results. Model 1 includes the Freedom of Speech Index, which has a positive, 
but insignificant estimate. Model 2 adds GDP per capita, which has a positive and significant 
estimate, increasing the explained variance to 37 percent. In this model, the already 
insignificant estimate for the Freedom of Speech Index is cut in half. Model 3 drops the 
Freedom of Speech Index, while the other estimates remain largely unchanged. Thus, there is 
little sign of repressive governments causing respondents to hold back unfavorable 
assessments of domestic institutions.  
Table 5.3. Regressions of Critical Responses on Freedom of Speech and GDP per capita, Pew, 2007. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Freedom of Speech 0.147 0.077  
 (0.109) (0.097)  
ln(GDP per capita)  0.226*** 0.241*** 
  (0.077) (0.074) 
Ethiopia, dummy 1.148** 1.446*** 1.382*** 
 (0.433) (0.391) (0.379) 
Constant -0.125 -2.030*** -2.188*** 
 (0.094) (0.653) (0.617) 
N 27 27 27 
R2, adjusted 0.17 0.37 0.38 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter started by noting a puzzling pattern, namely that the respondents who are on 
average the most satisfied with current levels of international aid are found in some of the 
least developed countries in the world, and that the resulting relationship with economic 
development is very strong. The main aim of the analysis above was to explain this.  
There is little support for Hypothesis 1, that the amount of aid received by respondents’ 
countries explains the mentioned pattern. The point that may provide the most support for 
Hypothesis 1 is that a dummy identifying Indonesia has a significant effect in the analysis. As 
Indonesia received considerable amounts of humanitarian aid after the 2004 tsunami, a few 
years before the survey, this might be interpreted as a sign that the population has 
acknowledged the aid, and responded accordingly. However, it should also be noted that this 
is a particular kind of aid (humanitarian, triggered by a disaster), and that this single country 
dummy does not provide a strong test. Still, it may provide limited support for Hypothesis 1, 
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not in the sense that aid receipts explain the relationship with economic development, but in 
the sense that under extraordinary circumstances, where there is considerable public attention, 
the public in less developed countries can respond to aid receipts.  
Hypothesis 2a suggests that low development results in a general tendency for individuals to 
give less critical survey responses. This hypothesis receives more support, as even responses 
regarding the performance of domestic institutions tend to be less critical when development 
is lower. That the governments in these countries are more oppressive fails to explain this 
relationship. The constructed index of critical responses is notably related to opinions on aid 
at the individual level, showing that respondents who are critical with regard to one also tend 
to be so with regard to the other. Nevertheless, the individual level effect fails to account for 
the full aggregate level effect, and the average levels of the index appear to have additional 
explanatory power. This suggests there is something about national contexts and not just 
individual circumstances that explain the pattern.  
The results are broadly consistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s argument (2009) that 
modernization leads to more emancipative values, which will involve more critical 
assessments of a range of policies and institutions. In addition, their point that levels of 
information are lower where development is lower is very likely to be important here. At the 
national level, it appears likely that the nature and content of mass media, which is related to 
the level of development, plays a role.54 Furthermore, Downs noted already in An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (1957) that there are costs attached to acquiring political information. 
When the benefits of more information are low, he argued “rational ignorance” might prevail. 
Along the same lines, people living in poverty have less time and fewer resources to spend 
acquiring information, and may not have much general information to base their responses 
upon. The most general implication of these findings is that caution is needed when survey 
responses from the world’s least developed countries are compared to those of other 
countries.  
                                                
54 While the impact of mass media on public opinion was once said to be slight (e.g. Klapper 1960), 
more recent research, with better specified theories and models, have found notable effects (e.g. 
Feldman 1995; Kinder 1998; Zaller 1989, 1991, 1992, 1996; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Zaller and 
Hunt 1994, 1995). 
 
 120 
APPENDIX 
An Alternative Measure of Development  
If the tendency for respondents to give less critical responses is indeed an effect of low 
development, as Hypothesis 2a suggests, it may be interesting to assess its role using better 
measures of development than GDP per capita. The extent to which people live in poverty 
may be particularly relevant. The World Bank (2009b) and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP 2009) provide useful data for measuring poverty. Among the variables that 
the UNDP use to form the human development index, a few stand out. The percentage of the 
population living on less than 2 dollars per day gives a good measure of the share of people 
living in poverty. In addition, average life expectancy at birth captures the severity of a 
country’s living conditions. The World Bank provides a measure of telephone lines per 100 
people, which of course is connected to economic development, but is also related to the 
population’s ability to communicate and access information. For the countries in question, 
these measures correlate at .77, .81, and .87. The telephone line indicator has one missing 
value, and the less than 2 dollar per day indicator has two. Each has been imputed using the 
observations on the other two variables. A principal component analysis of the three variables 
gives a single factor that explains 88 percent of the variance (N = 27). The resulting factor 
score will be referred to as (the) Absence of Poverty (Index). 
To examine further the role of the Absence of Poverty Index, Figure 5.9 plots dissatisfaction 
with current aid levels over it. The relationship is much like the one for GDP, save for the fact 
that it is even a bit stronger, with a correlation of .91 (N = 26).  
  
Figure 5.9. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over the Absence of Poverty Index, for less developed, Pew 
surveyed countries, 2007.  
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According to Hypothesis 2a, the Index of Critical Responses should also depend on the 
Absence of Poverty Index, and Figure 5.10 plots the former over the latter. The two show a 
reasonably strong relationship, with a bi-variate correlation of .58, when Ethiopia is excluded 
(N = 26). Interestingly, dissatisfaction with current aid levels has a stronger correlation with 
the Absence of Poverty Index than do the Critical Responses (the Appendix reports directly 
comparable correlations). As mentioned in the text above, using responses regarding domestic 
institutions as indicators of a general tendency to be more or less critical, involves the strong 
assumption the responses have little substance. Thus, the fact that poverty appears more 
strongly related to the opinions on an international issue than national ones may reflect that 
the latter are more influenced by objective country-specific circumstances. When the 
responses are used this way, there may be more “error” in the national opinions.  
 
Figure 5.10. The Index of Critical Responses over the Absence of Poverty Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed 
countries, 2007.  
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Table 5.4. Additional hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regressions of dissatisfaction with aid levels. 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Fixed part,  (γp) Critical Responses 0.332***  0.325*** 
lower level   (0.041)  (0.041) 
Fixed part,  (γq) Critical Responses, mean  0.742*** 1.217*** 
upper level    (0.195) (0.292) 
 Aid Receipts    
     
 ln(GDP per capita) 0.732*** 0.615***  
  (0.077) (0.084)  
 Indonesia, dummy -1.614*** -1.548*** -1.570*** 
  (0.361) (0.339) (0.609) 
 Ethiopia, dummy 0.502 -0.147 -1.984*** 
  (0.388) (0.456) (0.682) 
Intercept  (γ)   -4.626*** -3.603*** 1.676*** 
  (0.636) (0.718) (0.133) 
Random part   (up) σ(uCritical Responses)  0.179***  0.178*** 
  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Intercept   (u) σu  0.346*** 0.325*** 0.592*** 
  (0.053) (0.049) (0.083) 
 N 23463 23463 23463 
 N of Clusters 27 27 27 
 BIC 24025.71 24343.34 24052.01 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are given in parentheses. σ denotes standard 
deviations of random components. 
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Figure 5.11. Predicted probabilities of dissatisfaction with current aid levels, over the Index of Critical Responses, 
within the countries that score highest and lowest on the Index of Critical Responses, based on Model 7. 
Note: The solid lines give the fixed part of the effect, while the dotted lines give a 95 percent confidence interval for these 
effects. The two country dummies have been kept at zero. 
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Table 5.5. Predicted values for all observed values of GDP per capita, by model. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Model 1 0.758 0.123 0.506 0.909 
Model 2 0.763 0.103 0.555 0.893 
Model 3 0.775 0.090 0.594 0.889 
Model 4 0.773 0.097 0.577 0.896 
Model 5 0.767 0.113 0.537 0.906 
Model 6 0.770 0.095 0.580 0.891 
Note: Country dummies have been kept at zero, other variables at their mean. 
Table 5.6. Predicted values for all observed values of the Index of Critical Responses, corresponding to reported 
figures, based on respective models. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Model 4, Figure 5.6 0.784 0.052 0.675 0.914 
Model 4, Figure 5.7 (high) 0.847 0.040 0.760 0.942 
Model 4, Figure 5.7 (low) 0.712 0.063 0.584 0.878 
Model 7, Figure 5.11 (high) 0.930 0.020 0.886 0.975 
Model 7, Figure 5.11 (low) 0.562 0.077 0.418 0.784 
Note: Country dummies have been kept at zero, other variables at their mean. 
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Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics for indicators used in the Index of Critical Responses, Pew, 2007. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
National government, 24930 2.263 0.909 1 4 
Prime Minister/President 24903 2.094 0.956 1 4 
Military 24169 2.011 0.895 1 4 
Media 24816 2.036 0.879 1 4 
Religious leaders 24334 2.046 0.894 1 4 
Note: The table refers to variables as they were before imputation.  
Table 5.8. Descriptive statistics for relevant variables. 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Dissatisfaction with Current Aid, aggr. 0.760 0.143 0.514 0.947 
Index of Critical Responses, aggr. -0.188 0.422 -1.119 0.594 
GDP per capita, 2007, ln 8.288 0.971 6.923 9.496 
Telephone Lines per 100 people 10.485 9.086 0.0 28.0 
Average Life Expectancy at Birth 64.556 9.707 47.7 78.5 
Less than 2$ per day, % 37.582 31.126 0.5 96.6 
Absence of Poverty Index 0.038 1.011 -1.496 1.376 
ODA of GNI, 2007 3.363 5.047 0.010 17.430 
ODA, current USD, 2007 888 739 71 2810 
Pew indicator (2) PEPFAR + (3) Global Fund  0.440 0.768 0 2 
Aid Receipts Index -0.082 0.938 -0.982 2.754 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, Freedom House 11.680 3.473 5 16 
Associational and Organizational Rights, Freedom House 7.960 2.685 2 12 
Rule of Law, Freedom House 7.720 2.836 3 15 
Freedom of Assembly and Association, CIRI 1.160 0.624 0 2 
Freedom of Speech, CIRI 0.760 0.779 0 2 
Independence of the Judiciary, CIRI 0.600 0.645 0 2 
Physical integrity Rights Index, CIRI 3.520 1.917 0 7 
Freedom of Speech Index -0.458 0.765 -1.906 1.210 
Note: These statistics are based on 25 observations, as Indonesia and Ethiopia are excluded. 
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Table 5.9. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated individual level indicators. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.000         1. Dissatisfaction with 
Current Aid, aggr.          
0.711 1.000        2. Index of Critical 
Responses, aggr. (0.000)         
0.894 0.553 1.000       3. GDP per capita, 2007, ln 
(0.000) (0.004)        
0.880 0.671 0.879 1.000      4. Telephone Lines per 100 
people (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
0.787 0.379 0.800 0.769 1.000     5. Average Life 
Expectancy at Birth (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000)      
-0.893 -0.584 -0.866 -0.866 -0.805 1.000    6. Less than 2$ per day, % 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
0.913 0.584 0.907 0.940 0.915 -0.952 1.000   7. Absence of Poverty 
Index (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
-0.659 -0.475 -0.691 -0.593 -0.617 0.633 -0.656 1.000  8. ODA of GNI, 2007 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)   
-0.640 -0.512 -0.690 -0.684 -0.601 0.811 -0.748 0.588 1.000 9. ODA, current USD, 
2007 (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  
-0.579 -0.375 -0.432 -0.485 -0.661 0.528 -0.595 0.428 0.510 10. Pew (2) PEPFAR + (3) 
Global Fund (0.003) (0.064) (0.031) (0.014) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.033) (0.009) 
-0.763 -0.556 -0.742 -0.719 -0.761 0.806 -0.815 0.822 0.861 11. Aid Receipts Index 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.148 0.262 0.201 0.145 -0.052 -0.132 0.082 0.109 -0.261 12. Freedom of Expr. and 
Belief, Freedom House (0.482) (0.206) (0.334) (0.488) (0.807) (0.529) (0.697) (0.603) (0.208) 
0.102 0.212 0.176 0.144 -0.086 -0.059 0.043 -0.016 -0.232 13. Associational and Org. 
Rights, Freedom House (0.627) (0.309) (0.401) (0.494) (0.685) (0.779) (0.838) (0.941) (0.265) 
0.026 0.003 0.118 0.147 -0.047 -0.048 0.054 0.128 -0.186 14. Rule of Law,  
Freedom House (0.904) (0.989) (0.575) (0.483) (0.822) (0.819) (0.798) (0.543) (0.373) 
0.136 0.273 0.190 0.228 0.102 -0.128 0.164 0.232 -0.253 15. Freedom of Assembly 
and Association, CIRI (0.516) (0.187) (0.364) (0.273) (0.629) (0.543) (0.435) (0.265) (0.223) 
0.349 0.385 0.308 0.346 0.267 -0.315 0.331 -0.205 -0.277 16. Freedom of Speech, 
CIRI (0.088) (0.057) (0.134) (0.090) (0.197) (0.125) (0.106) (0.325) (0.180) 
0.074 -0.010 0.194 0.012 0.028 -0.060 0.036 0.047 -0.229 17. Independence of the 
Judiciary, CIRI (0.724) (0.963) (0.352) (0.954) (0.893) (0.777) (0.865) (0.823) (0.270) 
0.272 0.224 0.186 0.234 0.156 -0.332 0.258 0.240 -0.373 18. Physical integrity Rights 
Index, CIRI (0.189) (0.282) (0.373) (0.261) (0.457) (0.105) (0.213) (0.249) (0.067) 
0.262 0.265 0.242 0.255 0.124 -0.289 0.239 0.173 -0.382 19. Freedom of Speech 
Index (0.206) (0.201) (0.243) (0.218) (0.556) (0.161) (0.250) (0.408) (0.059) 
Note: P-values are reported in parentheses. The correlations are based on 25 observations, as Indonesia and Ethiopia are 
excluded to reflect that they are represented by dummy variables in the analysis and to make the correlations comparable. 
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Table 5.10. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated indicators (cont.). 
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
0.776 1.000        11. Aid Receipts Index 
(0.000)         
0.039 -0.051 1.000       12. Freedom of Expr. and 
Belief, Freedom House (0.852) (0.809)        
0.049 -0.086 0.915 1.000      13. Associational and Org. 
Rights, Freedom House (0.815) (0.683) (0.000)       
0.078 0.003 0.731 0.814 1.000     14. Rule of Law, Freedom 
House (0.711) (0.988) (0.000) (0.000)      
-0.153 -0.072 0.524 0.427 0.591 1.000    15. Freedom of Assembly 
and Association, CIRI (0.466) (0.734) (0.007) (0.034) (0.002)     
-0.234 -0.291 0.479 0.573 0.440 0.339 1.000   16. Freedom of Speech, 
CIRI (0.260) (0.158) (0.016) (0.003) (0.028) (0.097)    
0.034 -0.065 0.665 0.688 0.778 0.579 0.464 1.000  17. Independence of the 
Judiciary, CIRI (0.873) (0.757) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.019)   
-0.218 -0.145 0.533 0.393 0.526 0.728 0.227 0.444 1.000 18. Physical integrity Rights 
Index, CIRI (0.294) (0.491) (0.006) (0.052) (0.007) (0.000) (0.276) (0.026)  
-0.160 -0.153 0.777 0.700 0.767 0.803 0.493 0.700 0.911 19. Freedom of Speech 
Index (0.445) (0.465) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: P-values are reported in parentheses. The correlations are based on 25 observations, as Indonesia and Ethiopia are 
excluded to reflect the fact that they are represented by dummy variables in the analysis. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
While the chapters of this thesis are rather self-contained, they are pieces of a larger picture, 
and this brief conclusion aims to put the pieces together. First, it recapitulates the main 
questions and summarizes the findings of each chapter, while pointing out the necessary 
qualifications and limitations of these findings. The final part contains suggestions for further 
research.  
The underlying question motivating this study is simple: Do citizens of more and less 
developed countries disagree over international issues whose costs and benefits will affect 
them differently? Or, put differently, do they disagree over how they should be distributed? 
And, if so, does their behavior conform to a self-interested pattern, in which their 
disagreement would parallel traditional class conflicts within countries? To address these 
questions, this thesis has focused on opinions on development aid, because this issue is most 
often perceived as a zero-sum game, which makes it better suited than most other 
international or foreign policy issues. Thus, the main questions of this thesis are why some 
people and some countries show more support for development aid than others how and why 
such support varies with levels of economic development. The questions mentioned in the 
beginning of this paragraph are too general to be answered fully, but this focus on 
development aid allows a partial answer, and this answer may at least to some extent be 
generalized theoretically, in so far as the reasons for the observed patterns of opinions are also 
investigated. In other words, the questions above invite the further questions of what reasons 
people have for their opinions and how these reasons differ between countries. This further 
invites the question of whether their expressed reasons are genuine and independent or 
whether different types of reasons interact, so that for example one reason could take the form 
of another. Lastly, there is the question of whether patterns found in among more developed 
countries can be generalized to hold more generally, including the least developed countries 
in the world. This invites the question of whether survey responses in the latter countries are 
at all comparable to those of the former.   
Chapter 2 addresses the overall topic more directly than the other chapters, looking at macro-
level explanations of national support for the idea that more developed countries should 
donate more aid financed by taxes. While particular attention is given to the question of 
whether citizens of more and less developed countries disagree over this issue, the chapter 
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also looks at other potential explanations of international differences in such opinions, 
especially among aid donors. At the aggregate level, which this chapter looks at, a few 
explanations appear important. One is that support for international aid is lower in countries 
facing economic difficulties, measured by long-term economic growth (or even decline). The 
other major explanation is the level of economic development, as support is lower the more 
developed the country in question is. However, looking at aid donors only, among which 
notable differences remain, it appears that the relationship between these opinions and 
economic development is dues to the fact that more developed countries started donating aid 
sooner, and that support is such countries is now lower. While the levels of donations in 
absolute and relative terms do not have clear effects, it is clear that getting support for 
increasing aid is harder in countries that have been donating aid for a long time. This may in 
part be due to their citizens knowing better that their country is a donor, but also, that they 
gradually lose faith and interest in the notion of aid, as Chapter 3 suggests. Thus, Chapter 2 
does reveal a clear effect of GDP, which is consistent with an interest-based explanation, but 
among aid donors, the picture is less clear.  
Chapter 3 investigates the reasons people give for their support or non-support of international 
aid and the extent to which these reasons explain their opinions at the aggregate level. The 
analysis looks at reasons related to disinterest, thermostatic responsiveness, national priorities, 
and ineffectiveness. Interestingly, economic development is positively related to respondents’ 
tendency to cite disinterest as a reason for not supporting aid. It is also related to reasons 
based on inefficiency. It appears that these relationships may be due to the fact that more 
developed countries have donated aid for a longer period of time, which may have caused the 
public to lose interest and faith in efforts to promote development abroad. Turning to the 
impact of the different types of reasons on the level of support for aid, only disinterest is 
found to have a clear effect. However, all categories of reasons have estimates with the 
expected negative sign in each analysis, they just fail to reach a level of statistical significance 
– which is hard given the low number of observations and thus the low test strength. Add to 
that suboptimal indicators, and we see that we cannot draw strong conclusions on this basis. It 
is still quite likely that all of these categories have some effect, but these may be too weak, or 
too much obscured in the analysis to come out as significant. Chapter 2 illustrates this clearly, 
as it finds an effect of domestic economic challenges – a variable that in Chapter 3 is found to 
influence a measure of reasons related to national priorities, although that measure does not 
register an effect on the dependent variable used in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter 4 addresses the issue of whether respondents’ expressed reasons for their opinions on 
development aid are independent of each other and initial opinions on aid. In particular, it 
looks at whether reasons related to inefficiency and waste are related to initial support for aid. 
In other words, whether there is causality going in the opposite direction of what is usually 
assumed and what the respondents express. This case is particularly interesting because 
reasons related to inefficiency are widely accepted as legitimate reasons even by those who 
otherwise believe the donation of aid is a good idea. Thus, such reasons provide an easy, 
conflict-avoiding way of justifying low support for the donation of aid. The chapter uses an 
instrumental variable analysis (after a matching procedure), as well as an additional analysis 
where it is argued causality can only flow one way. Both these analyses lend support to the 
hypothesis that initial support for development aid affects the propensity to express 
skepticism regarding the efficiency and impact of such aid.  
Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether the pattern found in Chapter 2 can be generalized 
to the whole world or whether it might just apply to the countries investigated, which do not 
include the very least developed countries of world. To address that question, one must also 
tackle the question of whether survey responses in so widely different countries are 
comparable, not least at the aggregate level. The chapter is largely preoccupied with the latter 
question. It shows that survey responses regarding development aid, as well as a number of 
other issues, are heavily influenced by the level of development, making aggregate level 
comparisons across such levels difficult, if not impossible. In other words, the chapter cannot 
answer the first mentioned question, which it would ideally answer. Instead, it provides a 
more general insight about the feasibility of international comparative survey research 
including the worlds least developed countries. With regard to the question of generalization, 
we are still left only with the findings of previous chapters, and possible assumption that the 
relationship between economic development and opinions on aid is monotonic. 
This discussion already identifies a few limitations of the analyses and necessary 
qualifications to the findings. Chapter 2 identifies a pattern in which economic development 
has a negative effect on national support for the idea that developed countries should help less 
developed countries (more than they currently do). It is hard, however, especially with 
aggregate data to rule out all alternative explanations, and the interpretation of this pattern as 
a result of self-interest depends on the assumption that other explanations fail. While an 
attempt is made in the chapter to rule out such explanations, and the same is done in Chapter 3 
one can never achieve full certainty. Chapter 3 is limited in its own way, relying on 
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Eurobarometer (EB) data that are only available for a relatively small selection of EU 
countries. In addition, the survey questions regarding respondents’ reasons for their opinions 
on aid are only available for those not supporting the donation of aid, so that the additional 
assumptions are necessary in order to generalize about the whole populations. The EB 
questions are also worded in ways that do not conform to good practice in survey design, 
resulting in data whose validity is less than optimal. Chapter 4 shows that there is reverse 
causation between the support for aid and expressed beliefs regarding aid efficiency. It does 
not, however, address how other reasons may interact and influence each other, or how they 
also may depend on the support for aid. Chapter 5 shows that generalizing the pattern found in 
Chapter 2 to include the least developed countries of the world is difficult, rather actually 
determining whether or not the pattern does indeed apply. Ideally, it would also do the latter, 
but the chapter suggests this may be impossible, unless one can find a way to produce 
comparable data.  
Thus, we see a few ways in which further research could improve upon what is done here. To 
strengthen our confidence in the present results, it would be a very helpful if they were 
replicated using different datasets, including more countries, possibly using more recent data, 
if such were to become available. Replication and triangulation across datasets, researchers, 
selected subjects, and more is key to establishing knowledge, and can still contribute much in 
this case. Some of the data used here are about ten years old, and a recent poll found 
majorities of the people in eight surveyed OECD countries explicitly willing to fund cutting 
hunger and severe poverty in half by the year 2015 – a key Millennium Development Goal 
(Kull 2008; WorldPublicOpinion.org 2008). While it remains to be seen whether they in 
practice will put stronger demands on politicians to provide domestic services and keep taxes 
low, and also reward politicians who satisfy these demands, this finding once again appears to 
confirm their strong support for development aid. In other words, while the pattern revealed in 
Chapter 2 appears quite pronounced, there is a danger of over-generalizing it. Whether it is to 
be found on a worldwide basis in the long run, is a question for further research. The need for 
replication on a wider basis is also clearly illustrated by the suboptimal data and low power 
and of the analyses in Chapter 3, and not least by the possible discrepancy between some of 
the results of that chapter and analyses in the other chapters.  
Apart from this, the previous chapters invite further research along several paths. Chapter 4 
shows that conclusions individuals draw regarding the effectiveness of international aid 
depend on whether individuals find helping other countries important, in contrast to the one-
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directional causation one would expect based on a purely rational model. These two ideas are 
both part of a broader cluster of ideas that map on to the general Left-Right dimension in most 
countries. Thus, the topic of Chapter 4 relates to a much larger research topic, namely how 
dimensions of public opinion form and sustain themselves. Chapter 4 shows an instance in 
which individuals adapt their empirical beliefs to fit their normative views, which may be an 
importance mechanism is this regard, but many questions remain in this area, both regarding 
individual behavior and the role of parties in framing issues and mapping them onto existing 
political structures. Such questions are important both with regard to aid, and other political 
issues. 
There are also more specific questions regarding the role of the left-right dimension and how 
different groups interpret it with regard to international aid. Chapter 2 shows that more leftist 
individuals are more supportive of international aid, and we know from before that Left-Right 
self-positioning depends on personal income. There is a question, however, as to when lower-
income groups support international and not. In light of Noël and Thérien’s findings (2002), 
and the findings here, that support is lower when a country is facing social and economic 
challenges, we may expect an interaction between such challenges and the effects of income 
and left-right positioning on support for aid. It is an open question whether the opinions of 
higher-income groups are affected in the same way by such challenges, or whether it is 
mainly the solidarity of lower income groups that depends on national circumstances.  
More generally, further research might expand in other directions, looking for example at 
whether one finds the same patterns among political elites as among the public, and see how 
the opinions of the two groups relate to each other – a topic that at least to some extent might 
connect with the literature on dynamic representation. The role of parties, policies and 
institutions in forming opinions on aid is still not completely clear. Lastly, and in light of the 
overall topic of which the questions of this thesis is part, further research might look at 
whether nationally defined interests influence opinions on other issues where the costs of 
international policy coordination, or the absence of such, are likely to be distributed unequally 
among countries. For example, one could investigate what the publics of different countries 
think about policies to limit CO2 emissions, and the different possible ways of distributing the 
costs of such policies. Such an investigation might reveal whether or not there is a general 
pattern in which nationally defined interests shape public opinion on international matters.  
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This leads us on to the implications of this study. The results are broadly consistent with the 
notion that opinions on development aid are in part shaped by self-interested considerations. 
Another is that the reasons respondents give for their opinions – and the beliefs they 
genuinely hold about the efficiency of giving aid – are influenced by whether they like the 
idea of giving aid in the first place. Those who like it want it to work, while those who don’t 
become more skeptical about its effects. A third lesson is that comparing survey responses 
from the least developed countries to those from other countries requires caution. Leaving the 
last point aside, what are the implications of the two former points? With regard to the first, it 
may help us better understand international relations, and it appears to fit with models in 
which governments are driven by the interests of their citizens. More generally however, the 
two first points both alert us to patterns of behavior we may not like, as self-interested 
reasoning about political issues is at odds with truly principled reasoning, which ideally 
would be independent of such interests. The second point, on the other hand, alerts us to a 
psychological mechanism that may be as human as it is irrational, namely cognitive 
dissonance leading us to allow normative opinions shape our empirical beliefs. While such 
findings may promote our understanding of political psychology, they may also be relevant at 
a more basic level. By helping us better know ourselves, reminding us of behavior we may 
not like, they alert us to challenges we may need to overcome in order to arrive at truly well-
considered and rational opinions. 
 
 
 135 
7. GENERAL APPENDIX 
MEASUREMENT AND VALIDITY 
Chapter 2 uses the following indicator from one of the International Social Survey 
Programme’s waves on Social Inequality (ISSP 1999): “Turning to international differences, 
do you agree or disagree… […] People in wealthy countries should make an additional tax 
contribution to help people in poor countries.” In the original dataset it is coded as an ordinal 
variable with five categories: “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, 
“agree” and “strongly agree.” In contrast to most survey questions on this and related issues, 
this question has a higher threshold for people to give socially desirable responses. This is 
demonstrated by the greater degree of international variation in the aggregate levels of 
responses to this as compared to other questions. It is thus a well-suited indicator for detecting 
international differences. Its main weakness is its limited coverage of levels of development. 
The least developed country covered is the Philippines, which leaves out the half of the world 
population with lower GDP per capita.  
Chapter 5 therefore uses a related indicator with wider coverage that comes from Pew’s 
Global Attitudes Project (Pew 2007). This survey was conducted by fact-to-face interview in 
2007.55 The following question was asked in 47 countries: “Do you think the wealthier 
nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations of the 
world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving 
health?” The available answer categories were: (1) “Doing enough” and (2) “Not doing 
enough”. 56 Respondents who either refused to answer or replied that they did not know were 
                                                
55 The only exceptions, in which telephone interviews were used, are the US, Canada, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As explained below, these 
countries are not part of the analysis.  
56 For the purposes below, both of these indicators have been aggregated as country means, using the 
supplied weights. Germany and the UK are treated as single observations. The Pew indicator has been 
recoded as a binary variable (by subtracting 1).
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also coded. These have been excluded in the following analysis, and the variable has been 
coded as a binary indicator.57 
At face value, the ISSP and Pew indicators seem to capture approximately the same attitude, 
namely the extent to which respondents think developed countries are giving a sufficient 
amount of aid to less developed countries. The main difference is that the ISSP indicator 
explicitly relates aid to costs and in terms of increased taxes in donor countries. The Pew 
indicator does not mention taxes or set aid up against other policies, so it may not properly 
capture the strength of the respondents’ support. It does not tell us whether they are willing to 
forgo other options, to finance the donation of aid. Thus, respondents are likely to express 
their support, even when it is weak compared to that of alternative policies, which may be 
illustrated by the very high percentage of supporters across different countries.  
Figure 7.1 below plots the aggregate of the Pew indicator along with the dichotomized ISSP 
indicator (where the categories of agreement are given one and the others zero). The 
correlation between the two is quite strong (r = .71, N = 15), and as the Pew indicator was 
measured approximately 8 years later, this suggests that the differences between countries are 
quite stable. It is also worth noting that the countries that fit the least well are post-Communist 
countries (excluding them the correlation would be .88). This confirms that their recent 
national experiences set their responses somewhat apart, as found in Chapter 2.  
Figure 7.1 also demonstrates that respondents are much more likely to express a call for more 
aid as a response to the Pew indicator than to the ISSP indicator. This is especially the case in 
countries where people such calls are less common. While more than 70 percent of the 
Japanese think developed countries are not doing enough to help less developed ones, only 26 
percent of them think people should pay higher taxes to support an increase in aid. Thus, 
Pew’s statement (2007a) that “the survey shows substantial support among wealthier nations 
to do more to help poorer nations”, may be an exaggeration. While it is clearly detecting 
support, it is more questionable whether it is substantial. 
                                                
57 These respondents are generally fewer than 10 percent of the samples. Judged by the inclusion of 
their share of these samples as independent variables in aggregate level regressions, their exclusion 
does not make a noticeable difference for the analysis conducted here.  
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Figure 7.1. Aggregates of the ISSP and Pew indicators of dissatisfaction with current levels of aid plotted against each 
other, for available countries. 
The Eurobarometer (EB) indicator used in Chapters 3 and 4 is based on the following 
question: “In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all 
important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” 
(e.g. Melich 2006). This indicator is similar to the Pew indicator in not referring to the costs 
of donating aid. However, it differs from the two others in neither referring to current levels 
of aid, making it more likely to capture absolute rather than relative policy preferences 
compared to the others. However, despite the differences in wording, and the fact that the 
ISSP indicator asks for relative policy preferences and the EB indicator for absolute 
preferences, the two are strongly related. If we aggregate both, and keep East and West 
Germany as well as Great Britain and Northern Ireland separate to maximize the observations, 
we have 9 observations for which both indicators are available. The aggregates of the two 
indicators correlate at .92 and form an almost straight line in scatter plots. If we dichotomize 
the ISSP indicator in the manner done in Chapter 1, the correlation remains strong. Exactly 
how strong depends on what we do to the EB indicator. Dichotomizing it on the middle, 
results in a correlation of .78. However, if we lower the threshold for the ISSP indicator to 
include neutrals as supporters, or raise the threshold for the EB indicator, looking only at 
those who say “very important”, the correlations approximate the one initially reported of .92. 
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